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RISK, REWARDS AND REGULATION: Exploring Regulatory and Ethical 
Dimensions of Human Research Participation in Phase I (First in-human) Clinical 
Trials in the UK  
In recent years, contemporary society – particularly in the West – has 
witnessed a growth in the production, promotion and consumption of 
pharmaceutical products, particularly for disease treatment. The process of producing 
these medicinal products involves testing for safety and efficacy on, among others, 
healthy human subjects. Taking a phenomenological approach, this thesis examines 
how risks, rewards and regulation associated with first-in-human clinical trials 
(FIHCTs) are viewed and experienced by regulatory and corporate professionals, and 
by healthy volunteers. Using conceptual and empirical forms of inquiry, the study 
shows how current understandings of human involvement in clinical trials heavily 
influenced by bioethical conceptions of healthy volunteers as rational, altruist and 
willing participants, limits our appreciation of the context in which such acts take 
place. This is because the decision to take part in trials is shaped by the situation in 
which people find themselves. Appeals to rationality, altruism and voluntarism do 
not explain all the elements that go into that decision. Therefore, new insights into 
the lives of healthy volunteers challenge bioethical conceptions and generate new 
frameworks for policy and practice of FIHCTs.  
Having identified a gap in medical sociology research on healthy volunteering 
in FIHCTs in the UK, this qualitative research project brings the findings of 
extensive desk and field research into analytical discussion. Specifically the research 
examines existing regulatory discourse and practices around the implementation and 
conduct of clinical trials and experiences of healthy volunteers in clinical trials in the 
UK. It investigates how the different actors view and experience the risks that 
emanate from medical technological innovations, and how their views shape human 
involvement in drug testing. Data were gathered from documentary analysis, 
interviews with 4 corporate professionals, 8 regulatory officials and 35 healthy 
volunteers, and a survey of 187 healthy volunteers.  
This research breaks ground for further social scientific research into healthy 
volunteering in FIHCTs in the UK. Specifically it adds to calls for more nuanced 
discussions of human involvement in clinical trials and the unpacking of concepts 
such as “volunteer”, “compensation” and “informed consent” in clinical trial 
contexts. Schutz’s (1970) “system of relevance” is used as a tool for studying the 
interaction of risk, rewards and motivation for both the “individual” and the 
“institution”. The findings show that the existing regulatory system is fragmented, 
and healthy volunteers are often pushed to the margins of the regulatory system. In 
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addition, regarding participants in clinical trials as “willing volunteers” serves to 
obscure the ways in which inequality is perpetuated and experienced by some 
participants in these early studies. The thesis concludes by suggesting that Schutz’s 
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
1.0 Research journey 
My interest in the subject of this research started in March 2006 
during in a conversation with a colleague, Christina Ryan, about the novel 
“The Constant Gardener” by John Le Carre. The novel tells the story of a 
British diplomat, Justin Quayle, who meets an activist, Tessa, marries her at 
her request and takes her on a diplomatic mission to Kenya. Tessa is 
murdered. Justin decides to investigate her death against the strong wish of 
his superiors to let the matter quietly disappear. He discovers secrets 
involving members of the British High Commission and the sleazy 
business practices of the multi-billion-dollar pharmaceutical industry 
(LeCarre 2006). My colleague and I, reacting to the portrayed disregard 
that the pharmaceutical corporations and politicians had for human life, 
began to discuss how social research on pharmaceuticals and society 
should be carried out. 
Soon after, I learned of the Northwick Park incident in London 
late in March 2006 in which healthy volunteers in a phase I clinical trial for 
a cancer drug TGN1412 suffered severe effects while taking part in the 
trial (Sample and Maley 2006). This incident aroused public disquiet over 
the safety of phase I trials and the ethics of pharmaceutical corporations in 
administering such trials. However, despite the outrage by the public, 
media reports noted an increase in the number of people willing to take 
part in clinical trials (Mckie and Revill 2006). These events led to a series of 
discussions with my colleague about the ways in which pharmaceutical 
corporations are regulated and what could be done to research their 
practices. After a series of meetings with potential supervisors and 
bouncing ideas off my colleague, this project was born. 
1.1 Rationale and context of the research 
The objective of this research is to explore ways in which the risks, 
rewards and regulation of phase I clinical trials that specifically involve 
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healthy volunteers are viewed by professionals, regulatory bodies and lay 
volunteers in these trials. The study explores how risks arising from 
medico-technological innovation and testing are perceived and experienced 
across commercial and social spaces within the UK, and to consider 
whether existing ethical and regulatory structures and standards governing 
the protection of clinical research subjects in the UK offer equal and 
adequate protection to UK citizens in diverse social circumstances. The 
thesis describes the organisation and structure of regulation of first-in-
human clinical trials (FIHCTs) in the UK, and explores questions about 
the biographies and motivations of healthy volunteers and their 
understanding of risks associated with FIHCT research. It asks what role 
financial rewards should play in FIHCTs, how such rewards are regulated, 
and what their impact is on the ethical conduct of these trials. Lastly, it 
investigates how the UK political, commercial and healthcare institutions 
influence the practice and implementation of FIHCTs and European 
Union guidelines respectively.  
This chapter gives an outline of the research on which this thesis is 
based. It first states the context, then gives a brief discussion of the history 
of human involvement in clinical trials and the emergence of volunteering 
as a prerequisite, and goes on to describe the commercial context of the 
study: the growth of the pharmaceutical industry and the consequent 
growth in demand for healthy volunteers. Linked to this is a discussion of 
the regulatory context which considers how regulatory changes, specifically 
the implementation of the Nuremberg Code, have contributed to a shift 
from the use of captive and vulnerable individuals to encouraging the use 
of people capable of “voluntary” and “rational” consent. Then follows a 
discussion of the substantive focus of the study – what clinical trials 
consist of and how FIHCTs are organised and regulated today. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the contribution the study makes to 
sociology and provides an outline of the thesis as a whole.  
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1.2 Context of human involvement in clinical trials 
Until approximately one hundred years ago, the production and use 
of medicines for humans was both uncontrolled and unconventional 
(Carter 1995; Bartifai and Lees 2006). The development of the 
pharmaceutical industry as we know it today has its roots in major 
pharmacological developments and scientific breakthroughs that occurred 
before and after World War II, when antibiotics such as penicillin, 
streptomycin and several other broad-spectrum antibiotics were discovered 
and mass-produced (Petryna and Kleinman 2007:2). Though drugs have 
been tested on people far before the 18th century, the systematic testing of 
drugs on humans is a recent phenomenon, and is connected to the rise of 
drug regulation regimes and controls on how drugs can be administered 
(Bartifai and Lees 2006). Before the rise of drug regulation mechanisms, 
drugs were often tested haphazardly on patients who were mostly poor 
people or slaves; some of these practices continued even when a systematic 
procedure of drug testing developed in the 20th century. In the United 
States, testing was carried out on prisoners and in the UK on patients and 
army service personnel who served as human guinea pigs (Rosner 1996; 
Bolton 2005). Although tests had been done on humans prior to the 20th 
century, it was during the first four decades of the 20th century (Marks 
2009) that scientists started to test drugs systematically on a select few 
individuals in randomised clinical trials. The origin of randomised clinical 
trials can be traced to the Elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy of 19371 (Carpenter 
2010). Before then, and in the UK up until the 1960s, drug developers 
were under no obligation to test or to demonstrate the safety of their drugs 
before marketing or public use. The tragedy aroused widespread public 
disquiet over the safety of drugs. The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), itself trying to establish itself as a force in regulating the industry at 
the time, conducted an extensive investigation, which identified the lack of 
                                                          
1
 In 1937 a doctor in Tulsa USA developed Elixir Sulfanilamide, as part of what was then a growing trend in the use 
of sulfanilamides in Europe in the treatment  of common colds. However, Elixir Sulfanilamide itself was actually 
diethlene glycol – a highly toxic substance similar to ingredients found in anti-freeze and was sold as an infective 
treatment for venereal diseases. People who consumed this drug become seriously ill and at least seventy-three people died. 
Following extensive media coverage, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that drugs should be tested 
before being put on the market.  
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pre-marketing testing as a problem of the process that resulted in the 
disaster. Therefore, on December 1, 1937, an amendment was added to 
legislation that required drug manufacturers to provide “records of their 
clinical and non-clinical experiments” before drugs would be certified for 
public sale or use (Carpenter 2010:103). However, in the UK it was not 
until 1968 that systematic pre-marketing testing of drugs was instituted. At 
the time such testing was voluntary (Rägo and Santoso 2008). 
 Research focus: what are clinical trials? 
This research explores human involvement in FIHCTs. Clinical 
trials involve a set of practices that are required before new drug molecules 
can be declared safe and effective for marketing. The clinical trial process 
today is involved and elaborate, relatively standardised across the world 
and is carried out in a “number of stages, contributing to the immense 
time, risk and expense of the drug development process” (Rajan 2006:67). 
First, the drug is put through pre-clinical tests for toxicity. This usually 
involves conducting tests on animals in order to establish if the new 
molecule is safe to introduce into humans (Pocock 2000). If a molecule is 
deemed too toxic, it does not proceed to the next stage; if considered 
sufficiently safe, it proceeds to clinical trials, which often involves four 
stages, starting with the first-in-human phase. 
 My research focuses on phase I (first-in-human) clinical trials. 
These trials are carried out on a limited number of healthy volunteers with 
the aim of testing the basic safety of the drug and to determine the 
maximum dose that can be administered without causing serious harm. 
The participants in this phase usually have no health benefits to gain from 
their involvement in these trials (Elliott and Abadie 2008; Goldacre 2012). 
I should point out here that the moniker “phase I clinical trials” is also 
often used generally to refer to clinical trials that involve healthy 
participants on trials testing IMPs that are already on the market. In 
addition, some phase I trials are also conducted on patients, particularly for 
developing cancer and HIV/AIDS drugs (Kohli-Laven et al. 2011). This is 
because, strictly speaking, it is deemed unethical to expose healthy subjects 
to drugs which are highly likely to be toxic to humans, although there are 
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cases where such drugs have been tested on healthy subjects (Gupta et al 
2012; Andrew and Roy 2004; Dagher 2005; Guideline IHT 2009). Phase 2 
involves a larger numbers of patients and aims to investigate further the 
efficacy and refining of optimal doses. This involves patients in controlled 
numbers and holds no obvious benefits for participating patients (Pocock 
2000). Phase 3 clinical trials involve samples of several thousand 
participants who are usually suffering from the very disease for which the 
new drug has been developed. During phase 3 the drug continues to be 
tested for safety and its therapeutic benefits are evaluated. The fourth 
phase aims at comparing existing remedies with the new drug and 
establishing how treatment might work in a broad range of patients (Kerr 
et al. 2006). Most drug compounds do not proceed beyond phase I due to 
their toxicity. The process of taking a drug from the laboratory to a 
hospital or market is an arduous one. It takes between 10 and 15 years. 
Estimation of the real costs involved in this process is equally difficult 
(Abadie 2010). However, the process has become increasingly contentious 
as the public calls for cheaper drugs, arguing that production costs are low 
and that the market value that companies attach to the finished product is 
not justifiable (Abadie 2010). Recently, phase I clinical trials have attracted 
public criticism – the Northwick Park incident of 2006, in which six 
healthy volunteers suffered severe side effects after taking part in a phase I 
trial for the cancer drug TGN 1412 (MHRA 2006), led many people to 
claim that the trial had been conducted amid open disregard for safety and 
regulation. Others called for tighter British regulation of the 
pharmaceutical industry, claiming that it favoured corporate interests over 
the safety and interests of participants (Stebbings et al. 2009). However, 
healthy volunteer involvement in clinical trials is not a new phenomenon. 
In the following section, I will give a brief account of the advent of mass 
healthy volunteering. 
 The beginning of mass healthy volunteering 
The term “volunteer” is not commonly discussed within sociology. 
In its daily use volunteering tends to carry connotations of willingness, 
help and selflessness without prospect of payment. The term has long been 
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open to interpretation, but, in general, it can be seen as doing something 
without expecting a reward; it is seen as proactive rather reactive (Wilson 
2000). For instance, among people in full-time employment, volunteering 
for a charity is seen as a commendable thing to do. Bolton (2005), a 
historian, observes that in the UK the term “volunteer” is associated with 
the enlistment of soldiers during the world wars as the ultimate 
demonstration of courage and selflessness. Bolton argues that today 
volunteering seems to carry similarly loaded meanings. However, in the 
1950s, particularly within the army, to “volunteer” came to be associated 
not only with a personal decision to enlist but also as an expectation of 
service personnel to do certain things when asked and whenever the need 
arose. Bolton (1995) illustrates the historical complexity of the term by 
citing an incident at the birth of the Common Cold Research Unit (CCRU) 
in the 1950s, when the management of the unit and at the Ministry of 
Health at the time wanted to define the term “volunteer”. In this exchange, 
the then Health Minister expressed concern over the use of prisoners and 
service personnel, considering them incapable of “volunteering”. Of 
interest here is how even during the 1950s there was an indication that 
officials were against the use of people for who were not, strictly speaking, 
able to free agree to participate in medical research because of the 
institutional context.  
Within sociology, the term “volunteer” has also been contested. 
Wilson and Musick (1999) argue that volunteering can be informal or 
formal and can include productive work that should be recognised as 
requiring both social and cultural capital (Bourdieu 2005) to function; it 
should thus be rewarded. However, the reward here is not clearly defined; 
it could take the form of either money or non-monetary rewards, such as 
encouragement or acknowledgement. Wilson (2000) argues that there is no 
consensus on the meaning of “volunteering” but that it can be linked to 
the giving of time freely to benefit others and is among a cluster of helping 
behaviours. Other discussions in sociology about volunteering revolve 
around questions of motives, rationality, rewards and altruism (Wuthnow 
1993; Weber, Swindler and Parsons 1963). However, less attention has 
been paid to the context in which volunteering takes place and how 
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volunteering takes on different meanings depending on social 
circumstances.  
At an individual level two theories of volunteering can be 
distinguished. The first considers the individual as complex and multi-
dimensional and located within a given context and background. This 
theory perceives volunteering subjectively and it emanates from 
sociological attempts to investigate motives for volunteering. The second 
theory assumes individuals are motivated by simple mechanisms; it 
considers the context in which decisions are made as complex, and is more 
behaviourist in orientation. This view also considers actors as rational so 
that accounts of volunteering are based on a cost-benefit analysis (Wilson 
2000). In this research I have used a subjective approach to volunteering to 
consider not only the role of rewards and individual rationality but also 
how to demonstrate the conflicts and complexity of individuals as social 
actors and social situations, and how these determine and define acts of 
voluntarism in society. 
Volunteering in clinical trials 
Human involvement in clinical trials has not always been based on 
volunteering. As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, human 
involvement in clinical trials was often a result of the use of force against 
mostly captive populations. Historians Hazelgrove (2002), Bolton (2005) 
and Washington (2006) and the sociologist Epstein (2004) attest to the fact 
that prisoners and ethnic minorities were often coerced into participating 
in clinical trials. Growing objections eventually led to the development of 
the 1946 Nuremberg Code, which followed the revelations of grossly 
unethical research experiments in Nazi Germany in the 1940s. The 
Nuremberg ruling on human involvement in clinical trials was a set of 
ethical codes of practice aimed at curbing the abuse of human subjects 
(Scocoza 1989; Bartifai and Lees 2006; Abadie 2010).  
However, in many countries, including the UK and the US, the 
Nuremberg Code was largely disregarded (Bolton 2005). For instance, 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the use of servicemen and women as research 
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subjects in the UK was common and so were cases of abuse, and of trials 
going badly wrong. For instance, the death in May 1953 of Airman Ronald 
Maddison at Porton Down chemical research facility in Salisbury in the 
UK after being exposed to nerve gas was in 2004 ruled an unlawful killing 
(Bolton 2005). In the US, it was not until the 1980s that the use of 
prisoners for medical research was officially outlawed (Goldacre 2012). 
Hazelgrove (2002) argues that the actions of Britain at the time of the 
Nuremberg Code served to divert attention away from its own unethical 
practices while ensuring the protection of professional power to carry out 
research. Reports by medical practitioners such as Goldby (1959) and 
Pappworth (1967) exposed unethical practices in British hospital trials 
involving patients. During this period, self-experimentation was also 
common as researchers or staff in laboratories took part in their own 
studies. However, questions about risks and ethics are different when 
students in laboratories or patients in hospitals are asked by their lecturers 
and doctors to take part in clinical trials. Here influence and power come 
into play as fears of letting superiors down may influence an individual’s 
perception of risk and involvement in clinical trials (Goldacre 2012). The 
question of how pressure to comply might influence human behaviour can 
be seen in Milgram’s psychological experiments in which force or the need 
to obey those in authority was clearly demonstrated as a factor in human 
behaviour (Milgram 1959). 
Changes in attitudes about ethical approaches to medical research 
were brought about partly by the thalidomide and Tuskegee scandals and 
the growth of the civil rights and anti-apartheid campaigns of the 1960s 
and 1970s, which protested the abuse of ethnic minorities (Abadie 2010; 
Hazelgrove 2002). In the Tuskegee incident in the US, over 500 black men 
suffering from syphilis were unknowingly recruited into a study of the 
disease and denied treatment (Des Jarlais and Stepherson 1991). The use of 
thalidomide to alleviate morning sickness in pregnant women resulted in 
the birth of infants with malformations in Western Europe and North 
America. These scandals caused growing public disquiet regarding the 
conduct and regulation of clinical trials. As a result, during the early 1970s, 
human involvement in clinical trials came to be portrayed as a social good, 
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with images of people engaged in leisure activities during trials (Bolton 
2011). The Belmont report, published in 1979, has since shaped bioethics 
practice and discourse (DHEW 1978). Moreover, changes to funding 
following the economic downturn of the 1970s meant that by the early 
1980s there was an increase in clinical trials as drug development was 
privatised (Mirowski and Van Horn 2005), resulting in further growth of 
the industry. Developments in science, which led to a better understanding 
of the biology of the human body and its interactions with chemical 
agents, brought about further change. Clinical trials became established as 
a standard for the testing and certification of the safety and efficacy of new 
drugs, governed by ethical codes and driven by the need to mass-produce 
antibiotics and other profitable drugs. Gradually, clinical trials became a 
highly successful business and pharmaceutical companies such as Pfizer 
(Marks 2009) and other organisations expanded, including contract 
research organisations (CROs) which conduct clinical trials on behalf of 
pharmaceutical companies. However, restrictions and regulation governing 
the recruitment of volunteers meant that readily available participants – for 
instance prisoners – were no longer accessible (Abadie 2010). Instead, 
pharmaceutical companies had to depend on willing members of the 
public. In addition, the growing pressure to quickly develop commercially 
profitable drugs (Illich 1995) led to an increase in the demand for human 
volunteers on whom these drugs had to be tested. This meant that human 
bodies became highly valuable resources for pharmaceutical companies, as 
scientists reconceptualised their objects of study “not as a people but as a 
population” which could be brokered as valuable research subjects in the 
commercial pharmaceutical context (Petryna 2005:3).  
It was during this period that incentives to encourage participation 
were introduced which are still recognisable today. Incentives in healthy 
volunteering could be seen in experiments at Porton Down, where it was 
argued that some kind of incentive was needed to ensure wider 
involvement. Until 1955, service personnel who took part in studies at 
Porton Down were paid the sum of one shilling for risking their lives and 
health. But the Treasury was willing to increase the reward when the 
matter of extra pay was raised with the Treasury in a letter of October 17, 
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1955, by P.L. Burton of the War Office, in which he gave an overview of 
the history of the payment of “servicemen volunteers” (Bolton 2005:8). 
The rationale was that the tests were dangerous and unpleasant and that 
the payment of one shilling was not sufficient incentive. Staff running the 
clinical trial unit asked that payment be increased because of the dangerous 
and unpleasant nature of the “work”. Though payment was increased, it 
was discussed only in relation to service personnel at Porton Down, and 
there is no evidence that healthy volunteers involved in trials in other 
medical research were paid (Bolton 2005).  
1.3 Commercial context 
In the UK, US and other Western countries, clinical trials began to 
take place on a large scale from the 1970s and pharmaceutical companies 
became a major source of tax revenue (Bartfai and Lees 2006). The 
evolution of the pharmaceutical industry as a profitable, successful 
business since the 1970s brought an increase in the demand for human 
subjects to take part in clinical trials. This has extended beyond national 
boundaries, with many clinical trials now moving offshore to poor and 
developing economies. The anthropologist Petryna (2005:2) observes that 
clinical trials are migrating “globally to so-called non-traditional research 
countries experiencing demographic change associated with declining 
health resources but having little or no share in the global pharmaceutical 
market”. 
By 2001 it was estimated that there were about 10,000 clinical trials 
taking place worldwide (Petryna 2005:2). By July 2013 about 172,178 
clinical trials were taking place worldwide (US National Institute of 
Health), but this refers only to those registered with a clinical trials portal. 
This significant increase in the numbers of clinical trials conducted 
offshore is thought to be a result of the growing number of trials taking 
place every year, making volunteer numbers insufficient in the West. It is 
also thought that the need to meet regulatory requirements has contributed 
to this increase, for example in the US, where large numbers of 
participants are required before a drug is certified as fit for human use. On 
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the other hand, calls by the International Conference on Harmonisation 
(ICH) for the creation of international regulations aided the growth of 
offshoring as the ICH allowed for the transfer of clinical data from 
international studies to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the 
US for approval of new drugs (Petryna 2005). Recently the UK 
government has tried to bring about collaboration between pharmaceutical 
companies and the National Health Service (NHS) in later-phase trials, not 
only for the benefit of science but also with the stated aim to “improve” 
care within the NHS, clearly raising ethical (and sociological) concerns 
about the tensions between research and healthcare (Will 2011). The later-
phase trials that are the subject of the proposed collaboration are often 
seen as part of the improvement of care in pioneering research and also as 
a part of care for patients with conditions for whom existing treatments 
may not have worked. Early phase trials are not part of this collaboration; 
most of them are conducted offshore. 
The global offshoring of clinical trials is also influenced by the 
complex needs and healthcare situations in emerging economies. Reduced 
government funding for research and healthcare in these countries leaves 
local scientists and lay people open to taking part in these trials so as to 
advance science or have access to healthcare (Rajan 2006). Thus scientists 
in these countries actively seek to establish contacts with CROs, hoping to 
host clinical trials (Petryna 2005). However, despite the growth in 
offshoring, the pharmaceutical industry is still very strong in the UK.  
According to the Office of National Statistics (ONS), the 
pharmaceutical industry contributes about three times the size of the textile 
and clothing industry to the UK economy (ONS 2014; Towse 1996; 
Abraham 2008; Abraham and Lewis 2000). With regard to the size of the 
pharmaceutical industry, as of January 2015 the Association of British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), an influential organisation that lobbies 
the government and the EU on behalf of its members (Abraham and 
Lewis 2000), had approximately 51 pharmaceutical companies and CROs 
registered as members (ABPI 2014). This number does not reflect the total 
number of companies operating in the UK, as membership of the ABPI is 
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not mandatory. Furthermore, some of the larger pharmaceutical companies 
conduct some phase I trials on their own while some – especially small and 
upcoming pharmaceutical companies – contract out such trials to CROs to 
cut costs. With regard to CROs registered to conduct FIHCTs in the UK, 
by November 2014, there were about 15 clinical trials units accredited as 
part of the MHRA Phase I accreditation scheme aimed at licencing CROs 
to conduct FIHCTs (MHRA 2014a). Under this scheme, which developed 
following the Northwick Park incident, CROs are only permitted to 
conduct a FIHCT if they are accredited having met certain set criteria. 
Among the criteria is the need to have a Principal Investigator who has a 
qualification in conducting FIHCT (MHRA 2014b).  
With regard to the recruitment of health volunteers, CROs 
advertise in newspapers and on their websites. The CROs call for 
interested individuals to register their interest, after which they are sent 
regular information as and when screening for trial commences. Figures 
1.1 and 1.2 below are examples of advertisements.  







In the above advert, it is interesting to note the way in which 
altruism is invoked – asking volunteers to come forward to contribute to 
the development of medical research, which benefits the wider population. 
In this case, volunteering is framed as moral and a social good. Attention 
should also be paid to the emphasis on how significant volunteers are 
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thought to be to the research process by stating that “…volunteers are key 
to the success of the research”. Such advertisements are common in some 
open calls for volunteers to register their interest in participation. Figure 
1.2 below, however, shows a call for volunteers both to a specific trial and 
a general message to anyone interested in taking part in clinical trials.  












What is of interest here is how in this specific call to enrol into 
specific clinical trials there is emphasis on the personal benefits healthy 
volunteers will obtain in the form of a financial reward. Similarly, the call 
for general enrolment seen here in the lower right corner of figure 1.2 also 
alludes to the financial rewards available and how easy it is to become a 
“paid volunteer”. On the other general call in the bottom left corner of 
figure 1.2, while attempting to explain how drugs are developed, focus 
quickly shifts to portraying taking part in clinical trials as a comfortable and 
relaxed experience akin to taking a holiday. In summary, the 
advertisements invoke altruism and rewards to healthy volunteers for 
 




taking part in clinical trials; they make no reference to the risks associated 
with taking part in clinical trials. 
CROs specialise in locating research sites, recruiting participants as 
illustrated above, and sometimes drafting the design and analysis of the 
study. The clients of CROs are pharmaceutical companies who contract 
them because they are seen as efficient, quick and cheaper than the 
traditional academic institutions that used to carry out these functions 
(Petryna 2005). The role of biotechnology or pharmaceutical companies is 
to sponsor the clinical trials, while the CROs organise the trials in multiple 
centres, increasingly on a global scale. For far less invasive or less risky 
clinical trials, universities and other publicly funded institutions are used. 
However, although universities and other publicly funded laboratories 
continue to carry out low-risk studies and to play a major role in the 
development of drugs (identifying potential lead molecules, for example), 
the work required for the licensing of potentially good molecules tends to 
be given to CROs. Consequently, the biomedical and experimental 
rationales for clinical trials become interwoven with the market potential 
that these companies hope for, together with the risks inherent in the drug 
development process (Abraham 1997; Rajan 2007). This situation has 
fostered a collaborative relationship between corporations and universities. 
Though universities are key in identifying lead molecules, there are also 
times when corporations have funded studies in universities, blurring the 
private versus public research divide (Petryna 2009). The types of clinical 
trials that take place in universities are on a very small scale and are subject 
to scrutiny by internal ethics committees. These studies are also considered 
less risky because if human subjects are involved the trials are non-
invasive. However, although studies in academic settings are usually 
deemed low-risk, they are not always free of controversy. In July 2002 a 
healthy volunteer died in the US after taking part in a study aimed at 
investigating the reflex that protects the lungs of healthy people against 
asthma attacks. She was made to inhale hexamenthonium, a substance 
once used to treat high blood pressure; afterwards she developed a cough, 
her condition worsened and she died (Savulescu and Spriggs 2002). This 
highlights the complexity in risk considerations associated with FIHCT 
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studies. In some cases what might be deemed low risk and fit for “relaxed” 
regulation might in fact be as risky as so-called high risk studies. The 
following section examines the regulatory context and responses to what 
became known as the Northwick Park incident. 
1.4 Regulatory context 
Clinical trials have had a troubled history associated with scandals 
and fatalities as can be seen in the incidents cited above. On the one hand 
we have pharmaceutical companies who want to make profits, albeit with 
governments regulating them, and on the other hand the public wants safe 
drugs, healthy lives, and for science to make the world a safer and better 
place (Bartfai and Lees 2006).  
From an economic point of view, regulation can be construed as 
state intervention in the market (Abraham and Lewis 2000), including 
oversight of contracts and ownership rights so central to transactions in 
capitalist economies. However, the distinction between the market and 
regulation is not quite as clear as it is made out to be by free-market 
advocates. Rather, regulation may be useful in both creating and 
demarcating how far markets can go (Scott 2004; Abraham and Lewis 
2000). By being involved in this way, the state’s actions impact the interests 
of industry and consumers (Majone 1994; Ünay 2013), but state 
involvement in healthcare markets – unlike that in consumer markets – is 
strongly linked to the state’s responsibility for the safety of its citizens. 
Over time the Nuremberg Code, described earlier in this chapter, 
has been updated in response to criticism, for instance, that it failed to take 
into account the context in which the trials were done. It was replaced by 
the Helsinki Declaration in 1964 (Scocozza 1989), which also sought to 
advance the protection of volunteers in medical research. However, like 
the Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki Declaration was the target of much 
criticism, notably for its failure to provide adequate protection for 
participants. Media reports at the time exposed a number of serious 
breaches of ethical guidelines. Pappworth’s persistent publication of 
reports about experiments involving vulnerable patients and captive groups 
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in 1967 in British hospitals, for instance, showed how the Nuremberg 
Code and the Helsinki Declaration were ignored in Britain. Other reports 
pointed to the Tuskegee incident. Thus it has been argued that researchers 
in the US and Britain not only ignored the Nuremberg Code on informed 
consent but deceived the world by strongly condemning the original 
Nuremberg experiments in order to divert attention from unethical 
practices in their own countries (Hazelgrove 2002). Other studies 
highlighted differences in interpretations of what was meant by “ethical” 
practices. As a result, the Helsinki Declaration was amended in 1975 at a 
medical conference in Tokyo, leading to a second declaration (Scocozza 
1989). The revised version is still in force today, though it had gone 
through a further four revisions by 2000 (Vastag 2000). The Helsinki 
Declaration stipulates that a research protocol with clearly explained plans 
and procedures must be made available to established ethical committees 
for analysis and guidance before any research is conducted; for non-
therapeutic biomedical research the participants must be volunteers for 
whom the trial will have no health benefit. Today many ethical and policy 
guidelines, including those of the EU on clinical trials, have built on these 
initial guidelines (EMEA 2007). Nevertheless, some critics feel the 
declaration is an outdated guide and question whether continued revisions 
of the initial declaration affect its relevance in terms of practical 
implementation (Vastag 2000). 
Within the EU different national, supra-national and international 
guidelines are now in place to oversee the protection of human volunteers’ 
rights, safety and wellbeing during the various phases of clinical trials. The 
guidelines are the same for all four phases of the clinical trials and are 
enforced by competent national authorities (Abraham and Lewis 2000). 
However, as recently as 2006 in several EU member states such as 
Germany, the UK and the Czech Republic, there was no strict 
enforcement of the regulation requiring investigators to submit 
applications to regulators before conducting clinical trials. Instead, trial 
applications were often hastily processed with little independent ethical 
review (Marshall and Castle 2007; Hedgecoe 2013), despite the fact that 
phase I clinical trials are the riskiest in the clinical trial process – the first 
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time that drugs are tested on humans to assess levels of toxicity and 
ascertain safety (Elliot and Abadie 2008). However, following the 
Northwick Park incident, the EU regulator, the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA), was compelled to issue new guidance to ensure strict 
controls over the conduct of the FIHCTs. In the latest guideline, the EMA 
emphasises that it is required during clinical trials that the rights, safety, 
and wellbeing of the trial volunteer participants must prevail over interests 
of science and society (EMA 2007).  
Analysis of these guidelines, discussed at length in Chapter 4, 
shows that the EMA guidelines do not mention the role of monetary 
inducements in FIHCTs or how they are to be calculated or regulated in 
practice. Despite this regulatory oversight, in the bioethics literature there 
has been a growing debate on the role of monetary rewards in FIHCTs. 
Hale (2007) and Elliot and Abadie (2008), among others, argue that the 
role of inducements cannot be ignored in ethical considerations of clinical 
trials since inducements clearly affect people’s judgment about whether or 
not to participate in clinical trials.  
History of the European Clinical Trials Directive 
It should first be noted that the process described here cuts across 
the period of the data collection of this research. Preceding the 
introduction of the European Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20/EC (CTD) 
on May 1, 2004, clinical trials in the UK were governed by the Medicines 
Act of 1968. For UK clinical trials in patients, Clinical Trial Certificates 
(CTCs) had to be obtained; this was the case until 1981 when the Clinical 
Trial Exemption/Doctor and Dentist Exemption (CTX/DDX) system 
was introduced. At the same time, it should be noted that before May 1, 
2004, there were variances in approval procedures and laws relating to the 
conduct of clinical trials within the EU (EU parliament 2001; Hedgecoe et 
al 2006; Hedgecoe 2012).  
The main concern of the EU at the time when changing regulation 
was to protect and sustain the EU clinical trials market. More precisely, the 
purpose of the European CTD was to develop an increasingly harmonised 
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and simplified approach to the conduct and regulation of all clinical trials 
carried out within the EU (Hartmann 2012; Abraham and Lewis 2000). 
The EU member states were expected to adopt and publish national 
legislation and administrative provisions necessary for compliance with the 
European CTD before May 1, 2003, and had to apply these provisions at 
the latest with effect from May 1, 2004. In the UK, these requirements 
were achieved through UK Statutory Instrument 2004/1031 the Medicines 
for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (SI 1031). Statutory 
Instrument 2004/1031 outlines the procedures for both regulatory and 
ethical assessment of all clinical trials including those on IMPs in order to 
obtain a Clinical Trial Authorisation (CTA). In addition, the statutory 
instrument sets out standards by which trials should be conducted (Good 
Clinical Practice, [GCP]) and provides the basis for powers to regulate 
clinical trials, such as inspection and enforcement (Medicines for Human 
Use [Clinical Trials] Regulation 2004). 
While the development of the directive that resulted in the 2004 
regulatory changes to clinical trials could be taken in the wider context of 
policy and science debates following, for instance, the outbreak of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalophathy (BSE) in the UK (Brown 1998; Taylor 2003) 
and debates about the safety of genetically modified foods that emerged in 
the late 1980’s through to today and their impact on general public’s trust 
of science, there seems to be no clear link between these events and the 
changes that led to the 2004 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical trials) 
Regulation. Rather evidence so far seems to point to the EU 
harmonisation agenda as outlined above. As an illustration of EU policy-
making practices driven by internal EU interests, the 2001 CTD directive 
has recently been revised. The new directive, which came into effect in 
October 2014, was reviewed following an announcement by the EU 
commission in December 2008. The review aimed to assess options for 
improving the functioning of the European CTD with a view to making 
legislative proposals, if necessary, within the context of the global market 
for clinical trials. A public consultation was carried out during the latter 
part of 2009, and, as a result, a concept paper on the revision of the 
European CTD was published and a second public consultation began in 
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February 2011. The concept paper specifically sought to investigate two 
significant disadvantages of the 2001 European CTD. First, it looked at the 
impact (of what was seen as unnecessary administrative costs) of the 
requirement that largely identical information be shared and sent to several 
different member states when applying for clinical trial permits. Secondly, 
the assessment was meant to explore whether the requirements set out in 
the European CTD were being applied differently in different member 
states. While the broad concepts of the CTD are identical, divergent and 
conflicting points of view could surface when dealing with the details of 
the request for a CTA in different member states (EU commission 2011). 
Different options are currently being explored by the European 
Commission to address these disadvantages.  
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, the motivations and 
aims of the European CTD are therefore to ensure the facilitation of the 
internal EU market by eliminating barriers to clinical research and building 
a harmonised and more efficient process for the conduct of European 
clinical trials. To achieve this objective, clinical trials taking place in 
multiple states should become simpler to carry out and more cost-
effective. In addition, the EU CTD also provides a framework for a 
consistent regulatory compliance to GCP in relation to the protection of 
clinical trial participants (whether as patients or healthy volunteers). The 
CTD also sets the standards of and frameworks for improvement of the 
data from clinical trials conducted in all member states, by setting 
standards of its robustness and reliability (EU Commission 2011).  
Implications of CTD on UK clinical trials 
The major change in the clinical trials process in UK clinical 
research after the implementation of the 2004 Medicines for Human Use 
(clinical trials) Regulation, was first that the authorisation became an 
authorisation for the clinical trial itself, i.e. a CTA. The previous legislation 
derived from the Medicines Act of 1968 controlled the supply of the drug 
product. Second, the introduction of the European CTD on UK clinical 
trials meant that the legislation would now cover both patient and healthy 
volunteer studies. Prior to May 1, 2004, healthy volunteer studies or 
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FIHCTs were not included in the regulation of clinical trials. The inclusion 
of FIHCTs in this regulation was concerning for the industry as they saw it 
as potential barrier to clinical research in the UK, and there were industry 
concerns that pharmaceutical companies would move such studies to 
countries with less regulation and where the approval process would be 
faster (Abraham 2007). Today, in practice the timescale for the initial 
assessment of FIHCT applications is generally said to be 14 days from the 
receipt of a valid application. According to the MHRA the concerns over 
the delayed approval process from industry have diminished since May 1, 
2004, but whether this view is shared by the industry remains to be seen.  
Other implications of the European CTD on UK clinical trials 
include the introduction of the manufacturing/importation authorisations 
for companies involved in the manufacture and/or importation of 
Investigation Medicinal Products (IMPs). There is also a requirement for 
the Qualified Person (QP) based at the importation site to make a 
declaration regarding GMP standards at any non-EU manufacturing site. 
Other changes saw the introduction of a statutory basis for Ethics 
Committees as part of the structured regulatory system and the establishing 
of inspection and enforcement powers by regulatory bodies – in this case 
the MHRA (Medicines for Human Use Regulation 2004). 
Politics and regulation of clinical trials 
Regulatory frameworks do not exist in a vacuum. They emerge 
from political and commercial landscapes in which the implementation of 
guidelines is influenced by both national and international political and 
commercial interests (Daemmrich 2004). As a result, the pharmaceutical 
industry often finds itself caught between international and national 
politics as governments and players such as activist groups contend over 
the protection of their interests. At the international level, economic 
interests (Rajan 2006), security and safety are at stake, as shown during the 
pandemics of swine flu in 2009 and the pathogenic avian flu, H5N1 (Elbe 
2010; Davies 2008; Herington 2010), and the global response seen in 
increasing surveillance and government expenditure on treatments such as 
Tamiflu. At the micro or local level, political action is urged regarding 
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citizens’ health, with public health and patient group organisations 
demanding greater representation and influence in pharmaceutical 
innovations (Daemmrich 2004).  
These political contexts and interests further shape the relationship 
between the state, the industry and the public. In the global market 
economy, it is inevitable that tensions will arise between the need to 
promote industry and foster competition while ensuring that commercial 
liberties are not abused. Regulation comes into play as governments 
attempt to manage these conflicting interests. As mentioned in the 
foregoing section, the regulation of FIHCTs are not particularly different 
from the regulation of other phases of trials. Like all clinical trials, FIHCTs 
are subject to a hierarchy of governance structures and processes ranging 
from international bodies such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
and EMA to local research ethics committees. For all trials, safety checks 
start in the laboratory with animal testing and are carried out all the way 
through the later phases of development to post-marketing checks. With 
regard to FIHCTs, regulation is imperative as the trials and ultimately the 
drugs developed affect both volunteer and patient health in terms of 
benefits and potential risks. However, the ways in which pharmaceutical 
regulation is organised and conducted in market economies is exceedingly 
contentious (Abraham and Lewis 2000). Hedgecoe’s (2013) study of 
regulatory practices examines how concerns about the over-regulation of 
the pharmaceutical industry in the 1980s emerged in response to the 
economic downturn of the 1970s and resulted in the introduction of the 
clinical trial exemption scheme, which led to a less rigorous review of trial 
procedures. Hedgecoe argues that this response to foster industry growth 
was part of regulatory practice until 2004 when there was a change in 
regulation, but in 2006 such relaxed attitudes to clinical trial reviews were 
still common. For FIHCTs, concerns about state regulation inhibiting 
industrial growth are common, as are issues to do with protecting 
individuals who volunteer in trials. It is how such attitudes relate to 
FIHCTs that this thesis aims to explore. 
1.5 Sociological contributions 
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To date there has been no research in the UK solely to identify 
how healthy volunteering takes place; as mentioned earlier, most research 
has focused on patient groups enrolled in trials (Featherstone and 
Donovan 2002, 2003; Corrigan 2003). While some studies have included 
aspects of healthy volunteering in their research, which is encouraging, 
healthy volunteer involvement has often been conflated with patient 
participation in clinical trials. Problematically, this suggests that the needs 
and concerns of the two groups are the same, or even that ethical 
considerations are the same, when in fact they are different.  
The research in these chapters is the first sociological analysis of 
healthy volunteer experiences in the UK and the first to juxtapose 
professional and lay views, experiences and conceptions of risk in FIHCTs. 
With increasing numbers of clinical trials taking place every year, and 
growing demand for human subjects (Petryna 2009), healthy volunteering 
has become common among sections of the British population. Human 
involvement in clinical trials has become part of what Schutz (1970:139) 
has called the social “world of routine activities”. Healthy volunteering has 
become embedded in daily life to the point of becoming normalised. 
Understanding healthy volunteering in this way helps to bring to the fore 
the hidden social, political and commercial contexts in which people 
engage with risk and the problems brought about by medical technological 
innovations and the “increasing commodification of the body” (Abadie 
2010:17).  
This is not to suggest that clinical trials and pharmaceuticals have 
not been explored by social scientists. There has been increasing attention 
given to these matters by anthropologists who have studied the increased 
offshoring of later-phase clinical trials and the expansion of the 
pharmaceutical industry in emerging economies (Petryna 2009; Rajan 
2006). Sociologists have also explored pharmaceuticals and clinical trials, 
including the role of informed consent in clinical trials (Corrigan 2003; 
Featherstone and Donovan 2003; Donovan and Featherstone 2002; 
Featherstone 2003; Morris and Bàlmer 2006), while others have analysed 
the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry within the EU (Abraham and 
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Reed 2001; Abraham and Reed 2000; Faulkner 2012). Still others have 
considered the relationship between research practice and the commercial 
value of clinical trials (Will 2011; Moreira 2011) while Faulkner (2011) has 
examined prostate cancer screening research and how society has 
responded to public health campaigns. Hedgecoe (2012) has researched the 
role of research ethics committees (RECs) – how they are constituted, how 
they operate and their role in regulating clinical trials. Hedgecoe and 
Tutton (2013) have analysed sociological and ethical questions that arise 
out of the use of bodily material in genetic research. Tutton, individually 
and with others, has looked at the intersection of race and genetics in 
genetic research (Tutton 2007; Tutton et al. 2008; Tutton 2009).  
Studies closest to this research by anthropologists Abadie (2010) 
and Elliott (2008) and sociologist Fisher (2009) in the US have explored 
emerging professional subjectivity in human involvement in clinical trials. 
Abadie’s work involved an ethnographic study of a group of anarchists in 
Philadelphia, living with them in hostels to understand their perception of 
risk and motivation for involvement in clinical trials. Among his key 
findings were that the group had become “professional guinea pigs” – 
people who had made participation in clinical trials a career. Abadie did 
not define what “professional” meant in this context, whether the group 
had adopted a code of conduct or whether the term was used loosely to 
describe habitual behaviour. However, his work provides interesting 
insights into the lives of some of the people who take part in clinical trials 
in the US. Similarly, Elliott’s (2008) qualitative interview research draws on 
accounts of healthy volunteers for whom involvement in clinical trials has 
become a “job”. Elliott explores how clinical trials involve vulnerable 
groups such as homeless people and undocumented migrants to the US. 
Fisher (2009), on the other hand, looks at clinical trials that involve both 
patients and healthy subjects; her work illustrates the commercial nature of 
clinical trials in the US, particularly the interaction of medical professionals, 
pharmaceutical companies and CROs. She describes how involvement in 
clinical trials has become a source of healthcare for Americans without 
health insurance, offering free access to doctors. Though this is not the 
case in the UK, the possible interaction of healthy volunteering and access 
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to healthcare is explored as part of this research. Thus, examining healthy 
volunteer experiences and perceptions of FIHCTs and juxtaposing them 
with professional views and concepts of healthy volunteers in early phase 
clinical trials allows this thesis to contribute to the ongoing sociological 
debates about clinical research and pharmaceutical regulation. 
Furthermore, this research has the potential to inform policy on issues 
related to rewards and improving protection of healthy volunteers in 
clinical trials. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature and starts by discussing how 
sociology has studied rationality in recent years by examining research that 
has explored public views and responses to public health issues such as 
vaccination. It also examines the central role of bioethics in informing and 
legitimising clinical trial processes and how it has been influenced by 
economic and rational conceptions of the individual. The chapter also 
surveys the different conceptions of healthy volunteering and relates them 
to the wider debates about policies and guidelines of human involvement 
in clinical trials. Here I outline the wider discourses shaping concepts of 
human involvement in clinical trials and regulation in the UK. Among the 
most influential ideas concerning healthy volunteering are the bioethical 
principles of autonomy and informed consent. I argue that the discourse of 
autonomy and consent overemphasises capability and neglects the 
relationship between social-structural factors – such as poverty, debt and 
unemployment – as circumstances that may result in people volunteering 
to take part in clinical trials. Moreover, the commodification of the body in 
pharmaceutical trials means that inevitably bodies have become “goods” 
that can be exchanged, albeit temporarily, for the rewards on offer for 
participation. This chapter also discusses factors such as trust, ideas 
concerning the “gift relationship” and biological citizenship, all central to 
the clinical trial process that shapes people’s concepts of risks and their 
actual experiences in clinical trials. I show that in order to develop a better 
understanding of human involvement in clinical trials, analysis of individual 
experiences and of the relationship between the individual and the 
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structural contexts in which decisions to engage with risk take place is 
required. Chapter 2 concludes by outlining the theoretical framework 
underpinning this research, namely Schutz’s (1970) system of relevance 
and institutional theory. 
In Chapter 3 I make a case for my methodological choices. Taking 
a phenomenological approach, I was able to able to explore human 
involvement in clinical trials, including – as participants in this research –
regulatory officials, corporate professionals (employees of CROs) and 
healthy volunteers. I set out on this research very aware of the sensitivity 
of the subject and the questions I was asking. I was able to account for 
how this influenced the data collected and the number of participants 
recruited. This chapter includes a discussion of research ethics and 
accounts of the challenges I faced when doing research involving 
corporate professionals on the one hand, and, on the other, the negotiating 
of access to individual healthy volunteers as research participants. 
The regulation of clinical trials has become an important aspect of 
the drug development process. However, regulation often involves 
balancing the need for economic development and supporting industry 
demands with the need to meet public expectations of safer and more 
effective medicines (Bartfai and Lees 2006). Chapter 4 discusses the 
regulation of clinical trials by drawing on data from documentary analysis 
to reveal the structure and organisation of clinical trials. I question the 
implementation of certain guidelines and explore why some seemingly 
obvious loopholes in the regulatory system have not been closed. The 
chapter illustrates how the tensions between political and commercial 
demands can result in concerns central to healthy volunteer safety being all 
too easily ignored. 
Chapter 5 explores the demographics of healthy volunteers and 
their motivation for involvement in clinical trials. It employs statistical and 
interview data to show how, while money might be seen as the prime 
motivation for healthy volunteering, the relationship between money and 
the social situations from which participants emerge is a complex one. The 
chapter also examines the demographics of healthy volunteers, focusing on 
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factors such as employment, educational attainment and age. It combines 
statistical and qualitative data to show that healthy volunteers come from 
varied backgrounds and should not be seen as a homogenous group. 
In Chapter 6, healthy volunteering is examined as an economic 
exchange. Interview data illustrate the tensions volunteers face in 
exchanging their bodies for monetary rewards. I discuss the ways in which 
depersonalisation and institutionalisation interact and shape healthy 
volunteer involvement in clinical trials. Several participants in this study 
expressed concern at how they are often treated as mere numbers and how 
they try to retain control and be responsible for their bodies while 
subjecting themselves to the rules of the CROs during the clinic trials.  
The interaction of trust and uncertainty is discussed in Chapter 7. 
Here I consider ways in which participants in FIHCTs draw on established 
relationships and perceptions in negotiating risk in clinical trials and what 
factors influence their degree of trust of pharmaceutical companies. The 
chapter also illustrates how institutions and professionals view healthy 
volunteers and how trust and distrust co-exist among volunteers and 
professionals alike. 
The eighth and final chapter encapsulates the main findings of this 
research. It theorises human involvement in clinical trials by reflecting on 
the previous seven chapters and in particular how Schutz’s (1970) concept 
of a system of relevances can be used in understanding human 
involvement in clinical trials. This builds on the issues raised in previous 
chapters, such as Chapter 4, which analyses the institutional mechanisms in 
place to regulate the practice of clinical trials. Chapter 8 opens with a 
summary of key issues discussed in the preceding chapters and goes on to 
discuss how Schutz’s concept of a system of relevances aids our 
understanding of the complexity of healthy volunteering and the regulation 
of clinical trials. Through reading Schutz’s theory this way, agency is 
restored to healthy volunteers in clinical trials while still appreciating the 
ways in which structural constraints influence healthy volunteering. This 
understanding of healthy volunteering offers a nuanced conception of 
healthy volunteers not as people who participate in clinical trials 
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indiscriminately but as individuals who, in attempting to make a living, 
continuously negotiate and contend with risks and institutional and social 
constraints. Having outlined the advantages of these approaches, the 
chapter discusses the limitations and strengths of the research. Finally, it 




Literature Review and Theoretical 
Framework  
2.0 Introduction: “volunteering” versus healthy 
volunteering 
While human involvement in medical and pharmaceutical research 
is a long-standing practice, the way in which humans are involved in 
research today is a new phenomenon. There has been much sociological 
research on patient involvement in medical research. However, literature 
considering healthy volunteering in sociology has emerged only in the 
recent past.  
In the previous chapter I looked at how the term “volunteer” is 
used in discussions about human involvement in clinical trials, whether as 
patients or healthy subjects. Within the army in the 20th century, 
volunteering became synonymous with being “committed”; today it is 
associated with willingness, kindness and in some cases moral 
responsibility.  
In this research, I use the term “healthy volunteer”, which is widely 
understood. My choice is not simply a matter of terminology but also a 
preferred analytical framework referring to what might be termed the 
“volunteering turn” following the Nuremberg ruling and subsequent 
legislation. Firstly, the use of the term “healthy volunteer” distinguishes 
volunteering in clinical trials from other kinds of volunteering by clearly 
indicating that the research is concerned with human involvement in 
medical clinical trials. Secondly, when volunteering is associated with 
kindness and willingness to help others (Bolton 2005; Abadie 2010), it is 
likely to be considered in a way that is removed from the context of 
institutional power interactions in which the “volunteering” takes place. 
Hence, the aim here is to consider healthy volunteering by studying and 
analysing the human subjects, institutions and social circumstances (such as 
debt, unemployment and homelessness) that are often taken for granted, as 
factors that shape and influence decisions, experiences and perceptions of 
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risk and subsequent volunteering. Healthy volunteering and the institutions 
in which it operates need to be brought together in an analytical dialogue 
because they are imbued with meaning and power and because they 
influence each other.  
There is a need to consider ways in which institutions such as 
regulators, corporations, political and legislative bodies view healthy 
volunteers and shape their involvement in clinical trials. This context has 
been investigated by sociologists and anthropologists in the US. For 
instance, Epstein’s (2008) sociological study on inclusion and politics of 
science and Fisher’s (2009) sociological study on the economy of clinical 
trials in science and technology studies explored human involvement in 
such trials, looking at how both patients and healthy volunteers 
“volunteer” in clinical trials in order to access healthcare. Further afield, 
Petryna’s (2009) research offers an anthropological account of clinical trials 
in Eastern Europe and Brazil among low-income populations, and of how 
these trials are linked to healthcare access. Rajan (2006), working on bio-
capital in the anthropology of science and technology, illustrates the 
differences in clinical trial conceptions and practices in India. All these 
studies, spanning diverse contexts, highlight how institutions influence the 
conduct of clinical trials. Further analysis of these studies elicits important 
information about demographic profiles of likely participants in medical 
research, as well as participants’ motivations, backgrounds and experiences. 
The limitation of such studies is that they have all been conducted in the 
US, which is different socially and politically from the UK. In conducting 
this study in the UK the aim was to provide an understanding of human 
involvement in clinical trials in the national context. 
Focusing on healthy volunteers also reveals the ambiguities of the 
institutional, social and political contexts of low income, debt, and 
employment in which human involvement in clinical trials takes place. A 
healthy volunteer may be a willing participant but his or her motivation 
may be largely financial; it should be noted however that in some contexts, 
for instance in the US, people take part in clinical trials as a means of 
accessing healthcare (Fisher 2007; 2009; Abade 2010). The healthy 
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volunteer is actively involved in negotiating structures and institutional 
relations, rules and influences that society may uncritically accept. 
Therefore healthy volunteers should be seen not just as human subjects 
but as individuals who might well be in debt, unemployed and/or 
homeless (Abadie 2010) and embedded in a social locale with particular 
standards and expectations (Johnston and Longhurst 2009). My 
exploration frames the healthy volunteer as a subject in both social and 
institutional contexts because different political and institutional contexts 
may give participants different experiences. Petryna’s (2005) work points to 
such variations in what she calls “ethical variability” (p. 184) and she argues 
that international codes of ethics governing human involvement in clinical 
trials fail to take into account the local contexts and lived experiences and 
how these might shape people’s experiences in clinical trials. 
This chapter introduces theories that have shaped discussions on 
human involvement in clinical research and their relevance to this research. 
Section 2.1 outlines sociological attempts at exploring rationality in 
everyday life and approaches to risk. Section 2.2 is a discussion of the 
principles of bioethics, payments to healthy volunteers and the role of trust 
in dealing with uncertainty in clinical trials. Section 2.3 considers the 
exchanges, such as bodies for money, in clinical trials in relation to 
economic and gift relationships. Section 2.4 discusses healthy volunteering 
in terms of social and moral expectations and “biological citizenship” in 
which conceptions of citizenship go beyond civil rights to cover the 
biological constitution of more or less healthy subjects (Rose and Novas 
2004). Then follows a discussion of the development of the theoretical 
framework that will frame my analysis and interpretation of findings: this is 
the phenomenological approach using Schutz’s (1970) concept of system 
of relevances jointly with institutional theory.  
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2.1 Sociology and rationality  
The idea of rationality in relation to everyday social life has been of interest 
in sociology from the times of its earliest proponents. In the 19th and early 
20th centuries, Marx and Weber both looked at questions about 
motivation and rationality. For Marx motivation was seen to be the result 
of material concerns linked to the need to survive, which became 
problematic as capitalism brought about conflicts between workers and 
those owning the means of production. Weber’s approach focused on 
explanations for actions. Over time, this work has come to be interpreted 
as a focus on the verbal justifications or accounts given as reasons for their 
questioned conduct (Campbell 1996). The approach developed from what 
Campbell (1996) calls the uncritical reading of Wright-Mills’s (1940:907) 
definition of motive as “anticipated situational consequences of questioned 
conduct”. This definition resulted in the rise of what came to be known as 
the “vocabulary of motives tradition of inquiry” within sociology 
(Campbell 1996:101), in which Wright Mills’s definition was taken to refer 
to ways in which motives are presented as explanations in defence of 
questioned conduct. But as Campbell (1996) argues, this view is contrary to 
both Weber’s and Wright Mills’s original understanding of motive as a 
concept. For Wright Mills (1940), motives should not be seen as mere 
expressions of intentions and separate from actions; rather, the 
verbalisation of motive is itself an act just as much as the actions or 
behaviours in question are. Therefore, analysis of motive should consider 
more than just the words used in the assumption but should also include 
the context in which the account is given as well as where the act in 
question takes place.  
 It is not surprising therefore, that rationality and motivation have 
been subjects of interest in much sociological research, precisely focused 
on explanations for individuals action, in relation to issues ranging from 
motivations to the kinds of reasoning used by lay people when engaging 
with science and medicine. Lay reasoning has been well documented in 
recent research such as a study on health-seeking behaviours in smoking 
cessation programmes (Bond et al. 2012) and immunisation. In all these 
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sociological studies, the focus has been on finding logic in lay reasoning. 
For example, Rogers and Pilgrim’s study of public resistance to mass 
childhood immunisation considered ways in which the public construct 
their own risk assessments (Rogers and Pilgrim 1995). A study by Hobson-
West explored the logic of public resistance against vaccinations in the UK 
and the implications of this resistance for public health. Hobson-West 
argues that rather than seeing public resistance to vaccinations as a 
misconception of risks, or that public decisions on risk are based on 
comparisons of individual risk, such conceptions of risk and resistance 
should instead be seen simply as a different ways of comprehending health 
and disease as categories (Hobson-West 2003). A similar anthropological 
study by Poltorak et al. (2004) considers the contexts in which resistance to 
Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccination takes place. Their 
research questions the focus on parental choice in seeking to explain 
resistance to immunisation and draws attention to the wider social and 
personal issues that shape parents’ views on immunisation (Poltorak, 
Leach and Fairhead 2004). A similar study by Mishra and Graham looks at 
attempts to prevent cervical cancer by the use of vaccination against 
human papilloma virus. The study focused on the representation of young 
women as autonomous rational actors in a campaign to reduce cervical 
cancer in Canada (Mishra and Graham 2012).  
Approaches to risk 
Closely linked to studies on rationality has been the focus on lay or 
public understandings of risk. Risk is a highly contested concept within 
social science. For centuries, society has attempted to define measure, 
identify and predict risk. However, as a concept within social science risk 
has become more topical in the recent past (Beck 1992; Furedi 2002). Risk 
as a concept is to do with the probability of events happening and their 
potential effects in terms of losses or gains, mostly as a result of some 
activity or policy (Moldrup and Morgall 2001; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 
2006). There have been several sociological attempts to theorise risk, and 
today debates about what constitutes risk have become symptomatic of 
what Giddens (2004) and Beck (1992) call “risk society”. However, others 
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such as Green (2009) have challenged the usefulness of risk as a concept in 
sociological analysis of health issues. While this debate is important, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, knowledge of the value of risk 
in this sociological literature informed my analysis and was useful in 
conceptualising my “lay” participants’ understanding and decision making 
about the riskiness of their activities. 
However, for the purposes of this research it is important to 
discuss how risk has been theorised in sociology. According to Beck and 
Giddens, risks in “risk society” are the result of the artefacts of modern 
technological innovations; they argue that the social production of wealth 
simultaneously results in the social production of risks. The limitations of 
Beck’s thesis have been discussed at length in much sociological literature 
by, among others, Peterson (1990), Tullock and Lupton (2003). Of 
particular significance to this research are observations by Lash (1993), 
who argues that the way people view risks (and I add those associated with 
clinical trials) may be associated with the ways in which they respond 
emotively and aesthetically by virtue of their socio-cultural and socio-
economic context, in this case people on low incomes or those with debts. 
Medical research professionals may have their views of the same risks 
reshaped by virtue of belonging to these subgroups and of their 
circumstances (Lash 1993; Lupton 1999; Mandeville 2006). Furthermore, 
Lash (1993) states that to understand social responses to risks there is need 
to consider the role of implicit assumptions, moral and cultural values and 
practices, and how socio-economic contexts shape perceptions of risk 
(Enticott 2003). People’s willingness to engage in overtly risky activities 
provides an interesting puzzle for social scientific conceptions of 
individuals as reflexive actors who intently seek to avoid risks but 
maximise profits. One view is that this gives empirical evidence for 
Giddens’s conceptualisation of individuals as rational actors always 
engaging in a risk benefit analysis by consciously balancing potential harms 
and gains. This representation of the individual tallies with the bioethical 
conception of personhood that emphasises informed consent in protecting 
volunteers’ interests in medical research (Corrigan 2003). It is discussed in 
the next section. However, suffice it to say here that Giddens’s conception 
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of the self as stated earlier overemphasises the rational and calculative 
individual also common among psychologists and ethicists, as capable of 
controlling their circumstances – in other words as an un-embodied. This 
view of the individual negates, as Lash (1993) observes, the aesthetic or 
emotional-expression of a modern self, who is situated in a certain context 
where both individual and collective practical reasoning, and traditions 
contour perceptions and responses to risk.  
Risk as a concept in this research is therefore used as discussed in 
sociological literature as mediated or defined by institutions and from a lay 
individual’s perspective. In regards to expert and institutional conceptions 
of risk, sociologists (Wynne 1996; Brown and Calnan 2010; Otway and 
Thomas 2006; Otway and Wynne 1982; Fiorino 1990) have explored and 
critiqued common institutional conceptions of risk in technical and 
analytical terms. This institutional conception of risk tends to situate risk as 
purely a technical issue amenable to expert measurement and ranking using 
statistical models and thus can be mitigated against (Fiorino 1990). Within 
this context, risk decisions are often thought to be the domain of the 
experts; experts then mediate and define risk for the public. In this 
research this is linked to the institutional approaches to managing risks and 
uncertainty associated with adverse drug reactions in the drug development 
process (Brown 2010). It is also looked at in terms of the roles played by 
the MHRA’s clinical trials assessment and licensing team who evaluate the 
safety of the chemical compounds in IMP formulations to ascertain drug 
safety and RECs. Broadly speaking, within this framework, the experts’ 
role is to assess, define and mitigate against risk, and while lay individuals 
are seen as rational, they are capable of making informed decision if 
provided with information by the experts. Hillman (1993) alone and with 
others, has explored how institutional conceptions of riskiness of cycling in 
inner city roads influences public perceptions of the risks associated with 
cycling. They argue that the mistaken view that cycling is more risky than 
travel by car has led to fewer people taking to cycling due to the perceived 
risk of accidents associated with cycling. Hillman argues that this view 
tends to negate how the so-called safe modes of transport, such as car 
travel, are equally risky and prone to accidents. This is of interest as it 
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illustrates how institutions and experts play a role in shaping lay views and 
responses to risk. Horlick-Jones (2004) has looked at emergence of new 
forms of expertise on risk and how the experts are challenged by the 
changing characteristics of risks itself. Wynne (1996), Otway and Thomas 
(1982), and Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006) among others in their work 
have explored differences between institutional and lay conceptions of risk. 
This difference in views means that lay responses to risks are at times at 
odds with expert advice and prescriptions. Walls et al. (2004) explored how 
presence or lack of what he calls “critical trust” in the relationship between 
the lay public and institutions that define and mediate risk, influences 
public responses and actions to risk. Brown and Calnan (2010) have looked 
at the role of trust between lay individuals and institutions in 
understanding lay responses to risk. This is discussed to some detail later in 
this chapter. Suffice it to say, as Bendelow (2006) argues, an expert 
definition and communications of risk tends to negate people’s lived 
experiences and how these contour people’s understanding and 
engagement with risk. 
There has been extensive research on risk and lay individual action 
in sociology among others relating to lay understandings of health and of 
risk. For instance, taking a broad approach, Horlick-Jones’s (2005) paper 
on logics of risk examines how discussion of public or individual 
rationality and irrationality often assumes a canonical conception of reason. 
Canonical here could refer to how rational and economic theories’ 
conceptions of individual action as rational and calculative (Scott 2000; 
Keynes 2006) have become established as explanations for individual 
action. Horlick-Jones argues that in practice the lay public’s everyday 
engagement with and conception of risk is contingent on the context and 
thus adopts a more practical reasoning approach rather than a canonical 
approach (Horlick-Jones 2005). An important case and of relevance to this 
research, in investigating approaches to health risk is Bloor’s (1995) study 
of HIV and AIDS transmission. In his work, Bloor looks at how gay male 
prostitutes conceived of risk. The study demonstrates how people’s 
engagement with risk is contingent on the power relationships involved in 
their interactions. Lupton and Tulloch (2003) and Kemshall (1998), among 
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others, look at individual concepts and responses to risk in diverse social 
situations. Peretti-Watel and Moatti (2006) and Peretti-Watel et al. (2007) 
have explored conceptions of risky behaviours in health promotion 
settings. Their findings suggest that labelling people who engage in “risky” 
behaviours as delinquents brings about pressure to conform to social 
norms. This, they argue, may make people deny the “risky” label or even 
the fact that their actions are actually “risky”, resulting in an escalation or 
continuation of the “risky” behaviour. Keeping with the same theme of 
health promotion, Bendelow, France and Williams (1996) explored how 
young people view interactions of lifestyle, risk and health. Their study 
found that for young people engaging with risk was often shaped by the 
social context, of age, gender, race and class and that health was often not 
the highest priority on their list of concerns. Of interest in the findings of 
both Bendelow France and Williams (1996) and Peretti-watel et al. (2007) 
is how for individuals, accounts of risk seem to suggest how repeated 
engagement with risk resulted in individuals conceiving of risk as 
diminishing and in some cases as absent.  
Bearing in mind the above discussion, in this research I approach 
risk by building on Lyng’s (2005) conceptualisation of risk and edgework 
to inform my discussion and analysis, to consider how “consequences of 
political, economic and scientific progress” and their impact on “health 
and wellbeing” (Lyng 2009:107) have resulted in public willingness to 
engage with risk and the emergence of positive views of risk-taking 
behaviours. According to Lyng, this has stemmed from wide-ranging 
“neoliberal” policy and political initiatives, specifically in Western societies, 
which have shifted responsibility for everyday concerns such as health and 
employment from the state and the wider society to the individual 
(neoliberalism is discussed in detail later in this chapter). In drawing on 
Lyng’s conception of risk, I am focusing on healthy volunteering in clinical 
trials not as a leisure activity but as a form of “voluntary” risk taking in 
which “choice” to engage with risk is delineated, as in high-risk sports 




The studies discussed in this section all have a common theme: 
understanding individual rationality. Most emphasise the significance of 
context in understanding risk. In general, society and professionals 
recognise that that people grapple with issues around risk in clinical trials 
and that these are often thought to be resolved by the application of 
procedures informed by bioethics. The following section discusses 
bioethics and its responses to risks in clinical trials. 
2.2 Bioethics and the logic of human involvement in 
clinical trials 
As stated in the introduction, my research is situated at the 
intersection between healthy volunteering and institutional contexts. In this 
section I discuss bioethics in order to illustrate its role in this relationship. 
While the sociological research discussed above focuses on the rationality 
of the lay public in relation to risk, the application of the canonical 
conceptions of rationality has not been limited to economics and 
psychology (Horlick-Jones 2005). Rather, the influence of established 
conceptions of individual action can also be seen in disciplines such as 
bioethics. Discussions regarding human involvement in medical research 
have usually been considered to be the domain of medical ethics or 
bioethics (Evans 2000).  
Bioethics is distinguished from medical ethics in that it is seen 
broadly to be concerned with attending to a variety of new developments 
in biological sciences. These include ethical concerns emanating from 
experiments and human involvement in clinical trials. Medical ethics, on 
the other hand, is an older discipline dealing with ethical concerns arising 
from the practice of medicine (Reich 1994; Bosk 1999; Hedgecoe 2004). In 
this section I focus my discussion on bioethics and specifically on the 
principlist approach (Evans 2000) that guides the practice of medical and 
pharmaceutical research. With the banning of forceful use of human 
subjects in medical research following the landmark Nuremberg ruling 
(Scocozza 1989; Hazelgrove 2002) came the guidelines and emphasis on 
voluntary involvement in clinical trials. The aim here is not to give a 
historical account of the Nuremberg ruling, bioethics and informed 
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consent as they relate to clinical trials, or to imply that this was the only 
important event in the history of ethics and medical experimentation. 
There have been many incidents over the years pertaining to clinical trials 
illustrated by the Tuskegee (Harris et al. 1996) and thalidomide disasters 
(Hazelgrove 2005) as outlined in Chapter 1. I raise the Nuremberg trial 
because it made incidents in medical research visible, and it is also a useful 
reference point for tracing how discussions of approaches, guidelines and 
attitudes about human involvement started to change.  
Since its inception, the Nuremberg Code has undergone several 
revisions and has evolved into fundamental guiding principles for human 
involvement in clinical trials internationally. The involvement of the WHO 
in promoting these principles and the signing by many countries of these 
international codes of practice of medical research are indications of how 
bioethics has become part of clinical trial organisation and regulation and is 
now woven into codes of practice at national and institutional levels in 
many countries, including the UK. These principles have been influential 
in shaping views and debates about human involvement in medical 
research (Dingwall 2008). Today debates about safety, informed consent 
and payment of volunteers are all imbued with this traditional bioethical 
discourse, including a commitment to avoid harming participants and, in a 
larger sense, achieving good (Evans 2000). Thus bioethics has become 
institutionalised in the regulatory system as a tool for regulating and 
legitimising clinical trials and the hub on which the moral practice of 
medical research is based. This discussion focuses on the dominant 
principles-based approach of bioethics, which I call “institutionalised 
ethics”. By “institutionalisation” I refer to ways in which ethics and 
bioethics in particular have become embedded in the organisation, 
regulation and standards of medical research on which both individuals 
and organisations in medical research have to model their decisions and 
practices (Evans 2000; Dingwall 2008). For Evans (2000) the principles of 
bioethics have such a hold on society that they have become established 
and linked to ideas of formal rationality. Here differences should be noted 
between bioethics as practice and bioethics as a discipline. As a discipline, 
bioethics is concerned with other principles, such as avoiding harm and 
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duty of care in addition to autonomy and informed consent. These other 
principles are equally relevant in that they relate to questions about the 
boundaries between care and medical research in patient involvement in 
clinical trials (Will 2011), which may easily become blurred as medical 
professionals assume the roles of both researcher and health professional. 
In this chapter I consider two principles of bioethics – informed consent 
and autonomy – and discuss the role of trust in sustaining the principles. 
Informed consent 
One of the major tenets of biomedical ethics is informed consent. 
This principle assumes that to protect participants’ interests in medical or 
any other research they should be offered full information (Scocoza 1989; 
Hoeyer 2009) upon which to base their decision to take part. Within this 
framework, the provision of full information is considered to resolve most 
ethical issues as it assumes that it enables participants to make decisions 
freely and rationally about their involvement. Informed consent is thus 
seen as a counter to tyrannical and paternalistic medical research practices 
(Weindling 2001; Corrigan 2003; Dingwall 2008). This model of the 
autonomous individual is consistent with Giddens’s (2004) 
conceptualisation of the self as rational, free-acting and calculative, and is 
attractive to governmental regulatory cultures. It can be considered to be 
an offspring of the increasing importance attached to individualism in 
Western neoliberal society, with its focus on the autonomous individual 
and his or her rights.  
Autonomy is taken to mean the ability to act freely without 
restriction or coercion (Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Pescosolido, 
1992). With regard to clinical trials, it is often assumed that people take 
part out of a rational informed choice. The principle is also invoked when 
addressing debt as a social problem and solving chronic over-borrowing 
(Walker et al. 2012; Watson 2003). However, using autonomy in such a 
way negates the social circumstances and the wider social and political 
discourses in which “informed” decisions are made (Corrigan 2003). This 
is because the process of consent takes place within contexts of power and 
against a background of cultural norms that shape the way freedom and 
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choice are experienced by individuals. In addition, the interaction in which 
informed consent is given “involves continual negotiation of power that is 
contingent upon the context” (Lupton 2000:105) in which the interaction 
takes place. But one may also draw from Milgram’s experiments on how 
people in authority or professional positions may influence people’s 
reactions to risk or obedience to requests, thus compromising the 
informed consent process (Milgram 1974, Cassell 2005). This further 
illustrates how power imbalances in relationships may affect what people 
take on trust or accept. Thus people are likely to be less critical and more 
ready to believe doctors or other medical personnel, who may be seen as 
rational and altruistic and held in high esteem.  
Voluntarism – the “volunteering turn” 
At the core of institutional bioethics is the view that anyone 
involved in clinical trials or medical research should not be coerced into 
taking part. This stemmed from the landmark ruling of the Nuremberg 
trials and subsequent ethical developments such as the Helsinki 
Declaration, which banned coercion and encouraged voluntary 
involvement in medical research. In this scenario – what I call the 
“volunteering turn” – human subjects are expected to consent willingly, 
coming forward on their own account to be research subjects instead of 
being forced or deceived into taking part. This development, among 
others, came about in response to the evidence of abuse suffered by many 
people at the hands of researchers (Rosner 1996). The aim of introducing 
voluntarism at the Nuremberg ruling was to restore agency and protect 
human dignity in medical research.  
Chapter 1 gives an historical account on the introduction of 
voluntarism in clinical trials in response to the Nuremberg ruling. Policy 
responses to implementing voluntarism in the US and UK did not take 
place until the 1970s and 1980s. There has been little sociological interest 
in the UK regarding clinical trials, particularly those involving healthy 
individuals. However, in the US sociologists and anthropologists have 
researched human involvement in clinical trials in different ways and at 
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different times, looking at the relationship between politics, discrimination, 
the commercial nature of clinical trials and healthy volunteering. Chapter 1 
also discussed how the historical analysis by Hazelgrove (2002) and the 
sociological work of Epstein (2008) demonstrate ways in which the 
guidelines for voluntary recruitment of participants in clinical trials 
following the Nuremberg Code were largely ignored in the UK and the US. 
While Hazelgrove (2002) has also analysed incidents such as the 
thalidomide scandal in the 1950s and 1960s in which the anti-nausea drug 
was licensed and sold to the public despite its threat to public health, 
Bolton (2005) explores how the use of soldiers and other army service 
personnel was a common practice at the time. Similarly, the works of 
Epstein (2008) and Washington (2006) on the post-Nuremberg history of 
clinical trials in the US show how “captive” populations such as prisoners 
continued to be used well into the 1980s (Epstein 2008a; Epstein 2004; 
Washington 2006). This was clearly demonstrated in the Tuskegee syphilis 
study in which black men were recruited as subjects without their consent 
between 1931 and 1972 (Armstrong et al. 1999; Y. Harris et al. 1996).  
The supposedly “strict” application of the Nuremberg Code 
following the incidents highlighted above in the UK in the 1970s (Bolton 
2005; Abadie 2010) meant coercive use of humans in medical research was 
banned, resulting in the “volunteering turn” in which it was hoped that 
human subjects would come forward of their own accord to be research 
subjects. It must be emphasised here that “coercion” refers to making 
people participate forcefully in clinical trials as research subjects; hence the 
notion of volunteering became central to bioethical considerations for 
human involvement in medical research. However, it also draws on 
economic conceptions of individuals in which people are seen as freely 
acting and rational (Weber 2009; Scott 2000). To volunteer, therefore, 
meant people could choose to take part in clinical trials without any force 
or coercion. In 1964 the Helsinki Declaration revised the Nuremberg Code 
by drawing attention specifically to vulnerable people such as patients, 
children and those seen as mentally incapable of making their own 
decisions; these groups would require special protection in law. People 
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who do not fit these criteria were (and are still) assumed capable of making 
rational decisions and representing their own interests. 
This shift to voluntarism in the 1970s destabilised what were then 
established sources of human subjects for research – prisoners, slaves and 
service personnel (Abadie 2010; Bolton 2005). However, it is argued that 
forceful and deceitful use of prisoners for research in the UK has never 
been a problem historically. Whether or not this is true is a matter open to 
debate. Suffice it to say that these groups were now no longer readily 
available for use in medical research. As the business of clinical trials 
coupled with privatisation grew and changes took place in the roles played 
by pharmaceutical companies and hospitals regarding the conduct of 
clinical trials in the late 1970s and early 1980s, human research subjects 
became a scarce resource. Consequently, researchers had to start thinking 
of new ways of recruiting participants while adhering to the new legislation 
and requirements regarding recruitment of “volunteer” human subjects. It 
was during this period that payment to volunteers was introduced. For 
example, by April 1984 there was such a strong commercial interest in 
setting up clinical trial units that the government commissioned a working 
party to look into issues such as the licensing of clinical trial units, 
volunteer health and safety and the impact of payments to volunteers for 
medical research. The measure came in response to requests by the 
Medicines Commission, which had become concerned about the increase 
in clinical trials requiring healthy volunteers both in the private sector and 
in the NHS (Royal College of Physicians 1986).  
However, this meant that regulators focused on a definition of 
coercion that involved forcefully and deceitfully recruiting people for 
medical research. They did not consider the more subtle ways in which 
coercion might work (O’Neill 2003; Moser et al. 2004), particularly the 
introduction of payments. In other words, it was not considered that 




Payments and voluntarism 
Of particular interest to this project is the issue of incentives in 
phase I clinical trials with regard to healthy volunteering. The emergence 
of payments for volunteers in clinical trials cannot be traced to a specific 
time but allusions to the need to pay participants in research can be seen in 
the 1950s when a government official talked of increasing payments to 
research participants at Porton Down. Some observers point to such 
changes in the early 1970s in response to the civil rights and anti-apartheid 
campaigns of the late 1960s, alongside public disquiet over the thalidomide 
disaster and the Tuskegee study (Bolton 2005 and Abadie 2010). For 
instance, Bolton (2005) shows how in the early 1970s the discourse of a 
leisure and holiday experience being part of the healthy volunteer 
experience appeared in advertisements and media coverage of health 
volunteering at CCRU and Porton Down, a centre for chemical and 
biological research in Wiltshire. During the same period there were shifts 
in official discourse at Porton Down as officials started to portray 
participants in their experiments as “volunteers”. They were shown in 
adverts as being relaxed, as though on holiday, amid entertainment 
facilities such as snooker tables. Yet participants in these experiments were 
mainly army service personnel – people who were not normally asked for 
their consent, but who were used to obeying commands from superiors. It 
seems questionable that their consent was ever sought or given. Bolton 
also states that during this time the use of service personnel in military 
research was endemic and so were incidents that demonstrated consistent 
negligence. Similarly, the Porton Down unit had “experiment” removed 
from its title in order to divert attention from any taint of negligence and 
abuse that was starting to appear in the media and in response to public 
disquiet over thalidomide and other such incidents (Goldby 1971; 
Hazelgrove 2002; Bolton 2005).  
As human subjects became a scarce and valuable resource, 
monetary rewards were introduced as part of the commercialisation and 
privatisation of medical research. The growth in commercial clinical trial 
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units resulted in a market-oriented approach; healthy volunteers became 
commodities who could be “bought” on the market. Human subjects in 
medical research came to be viewed as “volunteers” and capable of rational 
consent, meaning that from the 1970s onwards, healthy volunteers in 
particular started to be seen as capable of pursuing and protecting their 
interests just as though they were making transactions in a market 
economy. While it must be acknowledged that in deciding whether to take 
part in clinical trials, subjects are involved in weighing risks against gains, 
most social scientists (Lemmens and Elliott 1999; Abadie 2010; Petryna 
2007; Corrigan 2003) argue that if potential participants are promised large 
sums as rewards for their involvement, it problematises the entire notion 
of both informed consent and volunteering itself.  
Within this debate, payments are seen as being at odds with the 
principle of non-coercive involvement as they raise the possibility of 
participants being exploited because it is thought that most of these 
volunteers are from economically disadvantaged backgrounds (Schonfeld 
et al. 2007; Abadie 2010; Geissler 2011; Graduate Fog 2014). This has been 
found to be true in a variety of recent studies (Corrigan 2003 Rajan 2006; 
Fisher 2007; Petryna 2007: Abadie 2010). All these studies highlight ways 
in which structural inequalities – among lay volunteers and professionals 
and citizens of different countries – and payments to research participants 
in developing countries or across national boundaries undermine the idea 
of autonomy in consent and raise ethical dilemmas about the potential for 
coercion (Corrigan 2003; Rajan 2006; Fisher 2007; Geissler 2011).  
Today, providing incentives for volunteers has become common 
practice especially in FIHCTs, but incentives are also common in later-
phase studies. Illustrating the complexity of payment to volunteers in 
clinical trials, Geissler (2011) looks at how volunteers on an HIV and 
AIDS vaccine clinical trial in Kenya were offered a bar of soap as an 
incentive and had their transport costs reimbursed. However, most of the 
volunteers are thought to have walked to the clinics and the transport 
refund came to more than the daily cost of living, thus being a kind of 
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payment for participation in the trials. The researchers were aware of the 
anomaly, yet the official line was that participants were not being paid.  
Corrigan’s work examines whether participants in clinical trials in 
the UK understand the informed consent process, while Petryna focuses 
on how late-phase clinical trials are being increasingly offshored to 
developing countries in South America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, 
in search of populations thought to be less medicated than those in the 
West (and therefore more likely to be interested in “volunteering” because 
of their need for medication). Petryna also shows how offshoring is often 
driven by the desire to realise quick profits by doing trials in countries 
where costs for doing clinical trials are low and regulation is not as strict as 
in the West. Researchers and even governments in these countries see 
pharmaceutical studies as sources of research funding and employment. 
However, most participants in these trials are poor people who cannot 
afford healthcare. Anthropological studies by Petryna (2009), Glickman et 
al. (2009) and Rajan (2006), among others, on the global political economy 
of pharmaceutical research highlight how the increasing commercialisation 
and outsourcing of clinical trials abroad raise the risk that research will rely 
unduly – and unjustly – on economically vulnerable populations. These 
studies tend to challenge Beck’s (2002) argument that risks in the “risk 
society” have been democratised. Schonfeld et al. (2007) argue that the 
risks in clinical trials are borne disproportionately by vulnerable social 
groups who volunteer for the reward that is offered. This makes the issue 
of monetary inducement relevant ethically in the conduct of clinical trials. 
It draws attention to the subtleties of coercion – that it can also be traced 
to circumstances such as debt or other financial stresses that blinker 
people’s conception of risk in the face of alluring rewards (Weindling 1996; 
Weinstein 2001).  
The difficulty with an emphasis on rationality is that it does not 
take into account that people with low incomes and who are in debt 
and/or unemployed will see the sums offered for participation in clinical 
trials as life-changing, while for others such sums may offer relatively little 
inducement. Nor does it account for the ways in which interactions 
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between professionals and the public are based on interdependencies and 
reciprocities.  
Another observation worth highlighting here is the point raised by 
bioethicists Lemmens and Elliot (1999) that legislation at both national and 
international levels has been vague if not silent about how payments 
should be calculated. This silence is symptomatic of the assumption of 
capability on the part of healthy volunteers to represent their own interests 
and make rational decisions.  
The preceding discussion makes it clear that ethics are part of the 
fabric in which clinical trials are designed, regulated and conducted. It also 
highlights how rational choice theories and their conceptions of individuals 
as rational actors have been influential in shaping the principles and 
practice of bioethics. The view of individuals as rational actors is also 
apparent in the principles and practice of clinical trials today. It must be 
emphasised that the intention of bioethics was to restore dignity and 
agency to individuals, but this has had unintended consequences – the 
blind spots in the interaction between agency, power and inequality and 
their capacity to shape each other.  
Within theories about economic, rational choice and social 
exchange, motivation is conceived to be a result of people’s expressed 
wants and goals which influence their behaviour or actions. It is here that 
rational choice becomes linked to the business of human involvement in 
FIHCTs. As has been shown, bioethics applies the rational choice theory 
in its classic sense, by emphasising that the capacity for voluntary action is 
assumed to emanate from people’s capability to make informed decisions. 
Within bioethics, economic and rational choice theories (Scott 2000) 
provide the basis for the assumption that adequate provision of 
information is sufficient to answer ethical questions arising from the 
interaction between volunteers and researchers in clinical trials. It is 
assumed that information provision is liberating and enables individuals to 
make “informed” or “rational” decisions or choices (Corrigan 2003; 
Weindling 2001). While individuals may be making choices within this 
framework, rational choice approaches negate the complex interplay of the 
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individual and the wider social and political structures and how these create 
a milieu in which certain forms of actions are preferable for certain 
individuals. Neither model accounts for the ways in which power 
relationships and wider social factors such as employment, income and 
cost of living, debts and social expectations come together to make people 
feel they have to take a certain course of action – such as taking part in 
clinical trials.  
Furthermore, the models seem to portray individuals as calculative 
and focused on financial benefits but this view does not take into account 
actions that are motivated by social norms such as altruism. To understand 
people’s involvement in clinical trials requires an approach that takes into 
account all these additional aspects of individual action, without focusing 
exclusively on issues of risk and reward.  
Trust: in uncertain research 
Trust is also an important dimension of bioethics and a key value 
underlying human volunteering in clinical trials. The role of trust in 
medical research has become central to debates regarding the 
medicalisation of populations by the practice of medicine, which has 
resulted in people trusting and depending on medicines and professionals 
(Fitzpatrick 1997; Clarke 2010). In encounters between healthy volunteers 
and medical professionals, the mutual dependencies are obviously not the 
same as those between patients and doctors. For volunteers the 
dependence may take the form of monetary rewards – which they need – 
while professionals need the healthy volunteer’s body to test their drugs. 
This interaction requires trust in order for it to be sustained; the need for 
trust comes from the risky and uncertain nature of the interactions with 
regard to outcomes or consequences of the decision and choices made. To 
address the consequences of risk and uncertainty, bioethics adopts the 
meaning of risk and uncertainty common in economic theory in which risk 
and uncertainty are connected concepts associated with outcomes and 
expectations of the future. Within canonical economic theory, risk is seen 
to be a probability, and adequate provision of information prepares and 
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equips people to make rational decisions (Alaszewski and Coxon 2009; 
Alaszewski and Brown 2007).  
The idea of humans as rational calculative actors is controversial 
within both economics and sociology (Beck 1992, Giddens 2004, Douglas 
1992), but rather than address the debate, this research is concerned with 
risk as it relates to what happens in the interaction between rationality and 
subjectivity. Risk and uncertainty are seen in this study as separate entities 
in relation to clinical trials, to refer to the probability of undesirable 
outcomes as shown by Hawkes et al. (2009). In this framework, risk can be 
used to describe two aspects of uncertainty, namely the potential danger 
that comes with it and how individuals respond to the danger (Hawkes, 
Houghton and Rowe 2009). Uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to 
“worries or concerns that are often the product of the behaviour of other 
people”; to deal with uncertainty, people adopt strategies that involve the 
use of readily available resources such as relationships, feelings and 
intuition, which are central to establishing trust and distrust (Alaszewski 
and Coxon 2009:201). Trust can be considered an entirely rational action 
(Coleman 1990) in which people decide to put faith in a system. Or it can 
be pre-rational, as when one listens to and respects providers of 
information before making a choice, or a springboard in cases where an 
individual lacks knowledge. To compensate for this lack of knowledge the 
individuals place their hope in powerful institutions or individuals in the 
hope of positive outcomes (Möllering 2006; Zinn 2008). Given the risky 
and uncertain nature of clinical trials, it is the role of trust in interactions 
between research participants and medical researchers that is of interest in 
this discussion.  
There is therefore a need to consider the relationship between 
professionals and lay people in the conduct of clinical trials. Miller and 
Weijer (2009) argue that the consent process depends largely on building 
trust between players. They identify two types of encounters – involuntary 
and voluntary – in which this may be the case. Involuntary encounters 
involve working with people who are legally defined as vulnerable, such as 
children and mental health patients. They are considered involuntary 
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because they are based on a level of incapacity, which requires that consent 
must be determined by others. Voluntary relationships are those in which 
someone deemed capable of a rational decision entrusts another person 
with important personal issues. Such relationships are established on a 
basis of a presumed willing transfer of power (Miller and Weijer 2009). An 
example might be the interactions between patients deemed mentally 
competent and their doctors, or healthy volunteers and researchers in 
FIHCTs.  
 Miller and Weijer further distinguish between the two categories 
by referring to involuntary relationships as “status relationships” (in which 
trust is not a factor) and voluntary relationships as “trust relationships”. 
The latter are those in which the individual is deemed capable of willingly 
entrusting another person with power over specific or shared interests. 
They are also distinguished by the extent of the differences in power and 
legal and moral responsibilities and the extent to which the actors are 
aware of and fulfil these responsibilities (O’Neill 2002). However, both 
relationships are characterised by inequalities in power and dependence, 
which challenge the assumption that all players in the interaction have 
equal power to act in their own interests. Miller and Brody (2003; cited in 
Miller and Weijer 2009) state that the main bioethics principles of 
autonomy and informed consent assume that different players in the 
clinical trial process have an equal capability to protect their interests. Yet 
this is not possible in relationships involving subjects considered to be 
vulnerable. Even for individuals who are considered capable of making 
such decisions, particularly in clinical trials, such encounters also involve 
vulnerability because of the uncertain outcomes. So both encounters are 
characterised by vulnerable individuals – patients and healthy volunteers – 
needing to trust those with power to take reasonable steps to avoid harm. 
The transfer of power in these interactions is necessitated by risk 
and uncertainty that may surround the activity associated with the 
interaction. For instance, the risk of death for a patient undergoing a new 
surgical procedure requires trust in the medical professional’s decision to 
act in the best interest of the patient. That many people tend to trust what 
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doctors say (Mechanic 1996; Pringle 2000) is illustrated in bioethical 
debates (Melo-Martín and Ho 2008; Appelbaum et al. 2008) and social 
science literature (Lidz and Appelbaum 2002) on how informed consent is 
obtained from patients in medical research and the benefits and risks are 
communicated to patients involved in clinical trials. Though the patient-
doctor interaction may be different, parallels can be drawn with volunteer 
involvement in clinical trials. Healthy volunteers can be expected to trust 
professional explanations of potential side effects and thus take part in a 
trial on the assumption that the doctors are likely to act in their interest. 
Trust can also result from familiarity with the individuals and institutions 
in a given context (Mollering 2006). 
Trust in medical research is central since researchers are not certain 
of the outcomes of their trials. They are trusted nonetheless because they 
make a strong commitment to protect the patient or subject from serious 
side effects or to stop the trial when side effects occur. It is through such 
claims to commitment to protect participants that trust becomes a crucial 
part of the transactions and power relations are made explicit. However, 
some perceptions of the informed consent process and of individuals as 
rational actors are heavily influenced by neoliberal ideologies of 
individuality in which capability and vulnerability are looked at in medical 
terms and individuals are seen as free actors. This view does not take into 
account the contexts in which risks and uncertainty are encountered and 
how they shape decision-making processes. These observations show that 
the nature of the relationships in FIHCTs could be modelled on the trust 
relationship between patients and doctors, in which volunteers entrust the 
research team with their wellbeing, placing confidence in their status and 
expertise. Yet this can leave them vulnerable to exploitation. The main 
characteristic of the trust relationship is the disparity that results from 
voluntarily trusting someone else with power over one’s life and how much 
these interactions are imbued with uncertainty or risk. Trust and 
voluntarism therefore become interconnected.  
2.3 Market and gift exchanges: the body in clinical trials 
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This section considers the concept of exchange underlying human 
involvement in clinical trials. In viewing healthy volunteers as capable of 
rational consent, an exchange inevitably takes place: the volunteers submit 
their bodies for trials and in return receive the rewards offered. Medical 
sociology needs to examine issues of human involvement and social 
differences and their roles in medical research. The commodification of 
the body has become topical in social science, in the studies of 
anthropologists Scheper-Hughes (2000), Sharp (2013), Moore and Schmidt 
(1999) and Lock (2007). Sociologists such as Wardby and Mitchell (2006) 
and Cooper (2013) have also explored the topic and how in some cases the 
use of the body reflects social capital (Bourdieu 1985; Wainwright and 
Turner 2003). A sociological analysis of how the body is objectified, as an 
object for research, and commoditised in everyday life is useful in 
understanding people’s perceptions of risk and their motivation to engage 
with it.  
Market exchanges? 
In Section 2.2 I discussed how anti-apartheid and civil rights 
campaigns, scandals such as the thalidomide disaster, and the growth of 
the pharmaceutical industry in the 1970s, resulted in an emphasis on 
voluntary human involvement in clinical trials. Human subjects became a 
scarce and valuable resource. Cooper and Waldby (2014) observe that in 
post-Fordist political economies there has been a shift from mass 
production to service economies and knowledge production; flexible 
working has been introduced, involving contracts in which individuals 
rather than employers are responsible for the risks at work.  
Cooper and Waldby (2014) argue that the response of post-
industrial economies to emerging economies has been to focus not on 
mass production but on biotechnological and ontological innovations that 
would surpass the achievements of the post-industrialisation era. The 
accompanying policy discourse has focused on the unrealised potentials of 
biofuels, genome projects and efforts to harness them for the growth of 
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their economies. Yet there has been little research into how these bio-
economic ideas move from ideas in the laboratory to experiments on 
human beings. It is through the process that I call “passive labour” that 
value is produced. Today the pharmaceutical industry demands increasing 
numbers of research participants, and the search for volunteers has gone 
beyond national boundaries (Petryna 2009; Rajan 2006). The growth in 
CROs and the global scramble for healthy subjects for clinical trials is an 
illustration of the value that human subjects in research contribute to the 
bio-economy.  
Within medical research today, human involvement may be 
conceptualised as an economic exchange: healthy individuals are used to 
test new drugs in exchange for the money offered by research companies 
(Elliott 2008; Abadie 2010). This exchange can be traced back to mediaeval 
times. Until recently the poor were used as subjects for such trials because 
it enabled them to receive healthcare and in some cases test the remedies 
of their masters (Washington 2006; Weinstein 2001). Today, healthy 
volunteer participants in research are often from vulnerable populations 
which do not stand to benefit from the medicines being tested on them. 
The issue of taking part in clinical trials to access healthcare features in key 
debates about clinical research in developing countries such as Kenya 
(Geissler 2011). Though this may not apply in FIHCTs, the notion of the 
poor as participants contrasts starkly with the demographics of healthy 
volunteers in the US. This development in human involvement in medical 
research feeds on the dominant conceptions in which individual choice 
and consumption are closely tied to the idea of liberty (Higgs 1998).  
Anthropologists Lock (2007), Petryna (2005, 2007, 2009) and Rajan 
(2006) illustrate how recent biotechnological developments have 
transformed the bodies of human research subjects and all their 
constituent parts into valuable material. Blood serves as the basis for 
immortalised cell lines and is an important commodity in pharmaceutical 
research. Sperm, embryos and other body parts such as kidneys have 
acquired commercial value both to pharmaceutical companies and to the 
public, especially financially disadvantaged people (Lock 2007). The 
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demand for healthy volunteers in medical research has led pharmaceutical 
companies to search locally and globally for cheap and accessible subjects. 
Petryna draws attention to how the application of ethics seems to vary 
across international boundaries, specifically among populations of different 
economic status; such variability obscures who governs the conduct of 
clinical trials and who is responsible for protecting the rights of clinical trial 
participants. Petryna’s notion of ethical variability is equally important in 
this study because it may be applied to an interrogation of regulatory 
frameworks and the interpretation of ethical guidelines. Moreover, 
professionals with easy access to bodies realise they possess a capital 
resource (Harding 2000; Petryna 2009; Cooper and Waldby 2014), despite 
the risk of harm that their products and trials hold for humans (Lupton 
1999; 2000; Flynn 2006). The difficulties of recruitment and efficient 
running of trials have provided a growing market for CROs, which recruit 
subjects and carry out research on behalf of big pharmaceutical companies, 
and there is increasing competition for research subjects.  
The nature of the exchange in these trials is also closely tied to 
technological developments; human bodies and body parts are now used 
openly in such exchanges as resources for medical research or treatment. 
Medical technological innovations since the 1950s have increased transfers 
of body parts in complex operations to save lives or pursue projects like 
parenthood. While most of these parts can be harvested from cadavers, 
organs and tissues such as kidneys and bone marrow from living persons 
are today common candidates for transfer. It is not only institutions that 
see the body as a resource; individuals, too, see the potential of their 
bodies to generate income. Actors on both sides of the equation are trying 
to make the most of this resource. There has recently been a growing 
supply of surrogate mothers and egg and sperm donations among poor 
communities in parts of India (Aristarkhova 2005; Roberts and Scheper-
Hughes 2011). Healthy volunteering has become routine among some 
groups. Abadie’s work, discussed in Chapter 1, shows how some healthy 
volunteers have come to see their bodies and body parts as resources with 
which to make a living. It is here that morality, specifically questions about 
what is an acceptable way of making a living, and individual agency collide. 
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Given the commercial prospects of the human body in clinical trials, there 
has been an increase in debates around the role of the human subjects or 
their bodies. Of interest here is the fact that while in market exchanges, 
goods swap hands and ownership, in clinical trials healthy volunteers retain 
the ownership, “control” and responsibility of the body while sharing or 
lending their bodies for research. This adds to the complexity of exchanges 
in clinical trials. 
Anthropologists Scheper-Hughes (2000), Sharp (2000) and Grub 
(1998) raise concerns about viewing the body as a commodity possessed by 
autonomous individuals. They argue that conceiving of human subjects as 
a valuable “resource” is symptomatic of consumerist, neoliberal tendencies 
in which the focus is on free markets, individual liberties and reduced state 
regulation. By neoliberalism here I refer to aspects of the liberal traditions 
that stand against government intervention, in the form of restrictions and 
barriers, in economic matters. In this way, individuals are seen as rational 
actors capable of participating freely in self-regulating markets. State 
regulation is reduced to creating an environment that fosters a free market 
or imposing protectionist policies to favour local industry and commerce. 
Neoliberal approaches are demonstrated in state policies of privatisation of 
public services, including aspects of research, and deregulation. Fisher 
(2009) observes that neoliberalism also entails the state’s transfer of its 
responsibilities to the individual citizen. Part of the rhetoric of individual 
liberties is that the state should not interfere with individual choices; rather 
people should be allowed to participate of their own accord in the market 
thereby providing for themselves. Neoliberalism is prevalent in healthcare 
in the UK, as seen in the growth of the CRO industry, the emphasis on 
choice and the emerging debate about marketisation of healthcare in which 
patients are regarded as consumers (Haynes 2003). Understanding human 
involvement in clinical trials requires an awareness of how their conduct 
and regulation are influenced by the neoliberal approach, which extends 
beyond privatisation to include the commodification of the body. 
Discussions about healthy volunteers are framed within ideas of liberty and 
consumption while limiting options for the individual with a discourse of 
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rationality and efficiency. At an institutional level, healthy volunteers 
become consumers.  
The over-commodification of the body often occurs under the 
guise of a “gift exchange”, free choice and voluntarism, with participants 
portrayed as individuals interested in helping society or capable of making 
choices. But as Sharp and Giessler (2011) argue, such an approach masks 
the suffering and pain endured by many who subject themselves to these 
trials and obscures the value of the exchanges. Neoliberalism espouses a 
view of self-regulation by professionals on the one hand and by individuals 
on the other. Here the focus is on how self-regulation works both at 
individual and institutional levels in relation to rationality and subjectivity 
within neoliberal conceptions of the individual and state regulation of 
clinical trials. Allowing the body to be used in exchange for payment is 
justified – healthy volunteers are seen as capable, consenting adults who 
should be allowed to do whatever they wish. Viewing human subjects as 
rational actors negates the effect of unequal power and disadvantages in 
the exchange process. There is also the assumption that all players have 
equal access to resources and influence and thus take part in the market on 
an equal footing with everyone else (Massey 2013). 
Studies of volunteering today allude to the phenomenon that poor 
populations, especially in developing countries, are tested with drugs, 
which, once approved, are sold to wealthy populations in the West (Shah 
2006). But in the absence of clear demographics it is difficult to ascertain 
to what extent the poor are over-represented in clinical trials, and 
specifically in FIHCTs. Bioethicists Lurie, Wolfe and Angell analyse later-
phase trials in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa for the prevention of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV, in which drugs were tested unethically on 
humans by researchers keen on obtaining quick results (Lurie and Wolfe 
2012; Angell 1997). Anthropologists like Petryna (2009) consider the 
conduct of trials in Brazil and Eastern Europe on populations that are 
desperate for adequate healthcare. While the issues that this literature raises 
are important, most of the focus has been on later-phase trials. There has 
been no sociological discussion on early phase trials, whether they take 
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place in poor countries and how they are carried out. There are no clear 
data showing the demographics of participants. Regarding healthy 
volunteers, for instance, Abadie’s and Fisher’s studies cited earlier in this 
chapter discuss healthy volunteering in the US as becoming almost a 
profession and how this could be linked to a lack of jobs and permanent 
employment among some social groups. Nevertheless, both studies depend 
on data summarised from qualitative research and do not provide adequate 
demographic details; there are no data that could confirm that the poor are 
over-represented in clinical trials. Such data would advance the critique of 
neoliberal framing of healthy volunteering by capable participants with free 
choice in a free market.  
The gift relationship? 
The exchange has not always taken the form of economic 
exchange; volunteering for medical research or medical donations can be 
construed a “gift” exchange, with underlying altruistic motivations. Within 
this context, medical research and human involvement in the testing of 
drugs and health technologies are construed as “a gift”. This section draws 
on Titmuss’s (1971) work on the gift relationship associated with blood 
donations. Titmuss’s theory of gift relation is based on a comparison of 
altruistic blood donations in the UK and paid donations in the US, and the 
relative success of their systems for gathering blood. His thesis addressed 
voluntarism and he is credited with making an important contribution to 
policy – an official task force in the US was commissioned to respond to 
his observations. Today the concept of the gift relationship is used widely 
and in many contexts (Robinson et al. 1999; Berridge 1997).  
However, the gift relationship has not been without its critics. 
Among the concerns raised about Titmuss’s work is the way in which he 
portrays a social and biological need to help in an essentialist way. Some 
question his assumptions about the altruistic capabilities of the average 
citizen (Page 1996). Others question the applicability of the concept of gift 
relationship in traditional societies that are responding to changes brought 
about by modernity (Mauss 2002; Douglas 1999). Moral discourse about 
human involvement in clinical trials is prevalent in the research literature 
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today because of the debates about donations of organs and blood and, 
indeed, healthy volunteering in medical research as a “gift”. The Nuffield 
report of 2011 on donations of human body parts, which was strongly 
influenced by anthropology, also emphasised the role of the gift 
relationship in healthy volunteering in clinical trials. Studies on motivations 
for human involvement in medical research (Hallowell et al. 2010; Fisher 
and Kalbaugh 2012) show that some patients participate in clinical trials to 
contribute to the development of life-saving drugs. In this literature, 
healthy volunteers are described as at least potentially altruistic. 
 What the discussions do not seem to take into account is how 
people’s responses to questions of motivation, especially in surveys if used 
for data collection, can be influenced by the need to fit with socially 
desirable views; if asked in a questionnaire why they chose to volunteer in 
clinical trials, respondents are likely to tick the box for “altruism”. In 
patient recruitment advertisements, altruism is always given as a major 
reason for doing clinical trials. As Fisher and Kalbough (2012) observe, in 
positioning altruism front and centre, professionals teach patients how to 
respond to questions about their motivations, using altruism to minimise 
potential conflict between care and research in a caring setting such as a 
hospital. There is therefore a need to carry out research that explores the 
assumptions of volunteers beyond their perceptions of an acceptable 
response to questions about their motivation. There is also a need to 
explore the context in which this altruism takes place and how it is shaped 
(Morris and Bàlmer 2006).  
Some work has also challenged the universal way in which the gift 
relationship (TGR) has been applied to human involvement in medical 
research and the wider context in which “gift” exchanges take place: for 
instance, Levi-Strauss’s work on anthropological economics. Bourdieu’s 
work usefully draws attention to ways in which TGR creates social ties and 
obligations similar to economic debt, since once given a gift cannot be 
returned without causing dishonour. In gift exchanges, obligations and 
rules are often implicit, and debates about gift giving in human 
involvement in clinical trials do not take into account the expectations or 
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reciprocal nature of gift exchanges. In every culture exchanges of gifts are 
governed by rules, some of which may bind people to give something in 
return; in others, saying “thank you” may not be seen as an adequate 
expression of thankfulness. It is possible that in other contexts receiving a 
gift makes people begin to feel obliged to reciprocate the gift or gesture. In 
doing so, the gift exchange becomes an exchange based on benefit but also 
fulfilling social norms rather giving freely. For instance, Douglas (1990) 
and Weiner (1992) point to ways in which the gift exchange creates 
enduring commitments symptomatic of principal institutions. Within these 
institutions people are implicitly expected and obliged to reciprocate the 
gift. Giving gifts assumes different meanings, including one in which it is 
viewed as an imposition to and collusion between those involved in the 
exchange with some social meaning attached to the exchange. In this way 
gift giving does not occur in a vacuum but takes place within a moral space 
with defined, though often implicit, rules about how people should 
respond when giving gifts. Any gift giving or acts that break these moral 
codes are often looked down upon or in some cases can be punishable. 
Only some objects are seen as gifts, which suggests that the focus should 
be on the subtleties of human relationships and interactions. For instance, 
one would question whether all claims of altruism in patients are sincere, 
which highlights the moral and political nature of human involvement in 
medical research and the ethical decisions that have to be made. These 
concern how the limits of personal and, for healthy volunteers, economic 
interests are to be delineated. The investigative conclusions of the 
sociological and anthropological literature discussed here indicate a need 
for an analytical approach that examines “gift giving” and exchanges (in 
this case volunteering in clinical trials) over time as potentially habitual and 
repeated actions and not merely focusing on the act of “gift giving”, or 
volunteering in a clinical trial, as a self-contained phenomenon. Also to be 
considered are the role and influence of power and context in which 
exchanges take place.  
This section has considered how human involvement in clinical trials may 
take the form of both economic and gift exchange. The chapter overall has 
reviewed the debates, both academic and ethical, that have arisen as a 
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result of human involvement in medical research. The main theory 
underpinning economic and gift exchange models is the economic view of 
individuals as rational actors and the assumption that healthy volunteering 
is motivated among some people by economic gains while for others by 
altruism. The limitations of both these views have been discussed as well. 
In the following section I develop the idea of morality and consider ways 
in which human involvement in clinical trials becomes an issue in the 
much larger context of citizenship. 
2.4 Healthy volunteering: moral responsibility and 
biological citizenship? 
The term “moral” is used here to refer to a common social understanding 
of what is right and wrong, rather than the meanings governed by ethical 
principles common in academic discourse. I draw on Zigon’s (2009) 
conception of sociality and morals as being distinct from ethics in that 
morals as used in everyday life can be seen as habitual (Schutz 1970) while 
ethics involves a “stepping away from this habitus”, particularly after one’s 
conduct is brought into question by others, thus prompting an ethical 
response (Zigon 2009:2). 
In this study, questions about morality can be seen in two ways: first, as 
moral dilemmas about the use of the human body for medical research in 
relation to socially acceptable ways of using the body to make a living. In 
this case, moral questions are asked of healthy volunteers who get involved 
in clinical trials for money. Second, is the question of whether human 
involvement in clinical trials concerns the responsibilities of all citizens. In 
this section, I will discuss these two questions and conclude with the 
implications for human involvement in clinical trials. 
Moral responsibility or irresponsibility? 
There has been much debate among ethicists and sociologists as to 
whether it is right or wrong to invite and pay volunteers for participation 
in clinical trials. In the discussion on economic exchanges and the role of 
the body, I drew on Scheper-Hughes (2000) and Sharp (2000) to illustrate 
the moral implications of the use of human subjects in medical research. 
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The moral implications are not about the choice some people make to take 
part in clinical trials, but rather about the fact that involvement in medical 
research for the reward on offer seems to attract people who are financially 
disadvantaged. In this context, it needs to be asked whether it is degrading 
to allow humans to subject themselves to such trials in order to make a 
living. The question draws on socio-cultural stipulations which define 
acceptable and unacceptable activities in which individuals may be involved 
(Zigon 2007). Sex work is a related area and is shown to attract stigma and 
labels of recklessness and carelessness (Cobbina and Oselin 2011; Bradley 
2007). Other studies point to ways in which inequality, poverty and 
intergenerational disadvantage in society results in certain people being 
driven to sex work and, indeed, healthy volunteering, to make ends meet 
(Kempadoo 2003; Sanders 2005; Leggett 1999). The risky nature of clinical 
trials means that volunteers are sometimes seen as desperate and reckless 
people seeking quick rewards rather than doing a “normal” job, and their 
rationality and morality, like those of sex workers, are often brought into 
question. However, healthy volunteering and sex work present an 
opportunity to question the meaning of “normal” jobs, especially in a 
neoliberal market economy. This is because in many ways the motivation 
for engaging with risk can become embedded in cultural practices; over 
time the moral lens becomes the “normal” lens through which engaging 
with risk by volunteering in a clinical trial or similar risky work is viewed. 
This makes it easy to ignore the wider context in which such actions and 
behaviours take place.  
In a way, today’s views on healthy volunteering relate to Scott’s 
(1977) idea of moral economy. His work draws attention to the need of 
poor peasants to produce enough to support their families while meeting 
the social expectations of their society and the risks they take in order to 
survive (Edelman 2005; Daston 1995). Scott explored the struggles of 
peasants during years of famine in Burma and Vietnam in the 1930s when 
they demanded access to land, the right to glean on farmlands and fair 
market prices. A parallel can be drawn with the ways in which people are 
living on the margins in the UK today. Social expectations can influence 
how people respond to social problems such as unemployment, loss of 
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jobs or even extreme poverty. Questions about healthy volunteering are 
therefore taken to be ethical questions about how institutions use human 
subjects in medical research, asking whether it is right to encourage people 
to engage with risk by paying them huge sums. But the morality of healthy 
volunteers is also often questioned by society: why are they so willing to 
subject their bodies to such risks for the monetary reward offered? 
Biological citizenship? 
Social scientists Petryna, Rose and Novas also examine the moral 
aspects of taking part in clinical trials – not only the rights or wrongs about 
the use of the body in this context but also how the moral obligations of 
citizenship have come to include what they call “biological citizenship”. 
The meaning of citizenship, they argue, has broadened to include not just 
civic duties but also issues to do with the biological reality of human beings 
whether as individuals or as members of communities (Petryna 2004; Rose 
and Novas 2004; Leach and Scoones 2007). Petryna’s anthropological 
study considers the Chernobyl incident and how it shaped the survivors’ 
experience of citizenship with regard to their claims to biomedical 
resources and justice. The research also looks at how at-risk populations 
are created through scientific discourses and institutions. For Rose and 
Novas, biological citizenship stirs a collective sense of community in terms 
of support for people’s rights to treatment and pooling of information. At 
the individual level, they merge their knowledge about their biological 
being, resulting in widespread individual acts of personal responsibility. 
Others such as Fitzgerald apply the concept of biological citizenship to 
understanding ways in which the activism of people suffering from rare 
genetic conditions are organised, how they respond to medical and 
scientific expertise, and their political goals in negotiating and accessing 
treatment (Fitzgerald 2008). 
Here citizenship is linked to access to healthcare and the 
responsibility of members of society in ensuring health access. In bioethics 
the work of Harris has particularly been explicit on what he calls 
everyone’s duty to take part in clinical trials (Harris 2005). This work is 
linked to views about volunteering in medical research as a “gift”, as 
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discussed in the preceding section. According to this view, volunteering is 
seen as a social good and of benefit to everyone. So while being involved 
in clinical trials can mean individuals are stigmatised as reckless, others 
clearly see it as a noble thing to do. Participation in some trials that are 
seen as less risky – particularly later-phase studies for patients seeking 
treatment for long-standing illnesses – are considered particularly noble 
and socially acceptable. Phrases such as “helping future populations and 
patients” are common in recruitment advertisements (Abadie 2010). 
Similarly, biological citizenship as a concept is useful and relevant here as it 
sits well with conceptions of the body in liberal debates in the 
“volunteering turn”. Volunteering therefore seems to take on the meaning 
of a moral duty, something done for the betterment of society, an attitude 
that is seen to be a motivation for taking part in clinical trials (Almeida et 
al. 2007; Hallowell et al. 2010).  
The problem with the view of the body as a national resource with 
a duty of citizenship is that it overlooks the circumstances in which such 
acts of citizenship are practised and how people are motivated to take on 
such a duty. For instance, patients take part in clinical trials because they 
are looking for a solution to their health problems; healthy volunteers may 
participate not just for altruistic reasons but also for monetary gain. The 
benefits of drugs trials are not always enjoyed in the countries where the 
trials are carried out, but rather in the West. Petryna (2004) Rajan (2006) 
and Shah (2006) show how people who are poor or unemployed are more 
likely to be research subjects in trials whose findings do not benefit them. 
In such instances issues of inequality, marginalisation and nationality are 
inevitably raised.  
Biological citizenship is linked to biology and human worth, and 
unequal experiences are often brought to light. The different ways in which 
biological citizenship is experienced are reflected in discussions about the 
importance of human bodies to science and about citizenship among 
patient populations, specifically the political representation of certain racial 
groups (Epstein 2008a). Epstein examines how participation in medical 
research can become a political issue in the US because of the profits that 
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are perceived to result from the knowledge created in such studies and 
benefits to different groups in society. Pollock explores the racialisation of 
drug development in the US, raising questions about the scientific 
justifications for targeting racial groups in the drug development (Pollock 
2008). Tutton looks at the inclusion of ethnic minority groups in genetic 
research in the UK (Tutton 2007; Tutton 2009; Tutton and Prainsack 
2011)2. Biological citizenship should also take into account the influences 
from within communities and how people conceptualise their identity as 
citizens. Thus citizenship can create a sense of duty to others, to family 
relations and the community and be a basis for claims to particular rights 
and services (Petryna 2004). Biological citizenship therefore becomes 
“both an individualising and collectivising” tool (Rose and Novas 2004, 5) 
as individuals begin to see themselves as having to conform to the norms 
of wider society.  
                                                          
2
 Though this present research does not focus on issues of race, it is an important aspect of human involvement in clinical trials that is 
worth exploring in phase I clinical trials as well. 
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2.5 Developing the theoretical framework 
So far this chapter has discussed some of the theoretical concepts 
and substantive debates that have shaped my understanding of healthy 
volunteering. This research focuses on human involvement in clinical trials, 
precisely FIHCTs involving healthy volunteers. While monetary payment is 
a motivation for taking part in clinical trials, discussions about why people 
take part in clinical trials mainly focus on patient groups predominantly 
portraying volunteers in clinical trials as altruistic or seeking treatment. 
There has been insufficient interrogation of the contexts and 
circumstances in which people make decisions to take part in clinical trials. 
Anthropological literature on global offshoring of clinical trials shows how 
people in diverse socio-economic and socio-political contexts in the Global 
South take part in clinical trials. The literature has also critiqued bioethics 
frameworks especially with reference to therapeutic misconception and 
justice (Appelbaum et al. 2008; Lidz and Appelbaum 2002). In this context, 
structural inequalities in access to healthcare and income are said to 
constrain the choices of populations in the Global South, particularly in 
poorly organised and underdeveloped healthcare systems in countries such 
as Brazil and India (Epstein 2004; Petryna 2004; Rajan 2006; Fisher 2007) 
where people take part in clinical trials to access healthcare. However, it is 
also important to apply sociological analysis to the wealthy North where 
involvement in clinical trials is seen to be purely a matter of “choice”. It is 
important to interrogate the context in which people take part in clinical 
trials and how perceptions of choice and freedom framed within neoliberal 
terms in the West obscure the socio-economic and socio-political 
conditions that make healthy volunteering look like a worthwhile option. 
In Section 2.1 I looked at how bioethics has become part of the 
fabric through which clinical trials are designed and take place. I have also 
discussed the limitations of the bioethics principles of informed consent 
and voluntarism, further stressing the significance of trust when dealing 
with risk and uncertainty. Furthermore, the chapter has examined the 
influence of rational and economic theoretical approaches to risk and 
concepts of individuals in ethical policy considerations. I have considered 
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how these approaches view individuals as rational actors capable of giving 
considered consent. The discussion has highlighted how these approaches 
have been key to informing our understanding of consent in ethical 
debates. However, I also illustrated the potential limitations of these 
theoretical approaches in helping to explain risk and motivation, especially 
in the context of clinical trials. Essentially, there is a tendency within these 
frameworks to over-emphasise capability; assuming everyone has equal 
access to resources while negating structural and institutional impacts on 
people’s motivation to engage with risk. I also considered how these 
approaches are not useful in explaining behaviours that may be habitual 
and repetitive in nature (actions that people would normally engage in 
without much prior thought or calculation). Therefore, to better 
understand human involvement in clinical trials there is a need to consider 
the relationship between subjective and institutional contexts in which 
people engage with risk. Although the idea that people take rational actions 
has often been widely recognised in sociology and beyond, within 
sociology and anthropology it is acknowledged that people engage in both 
rational and non-rational actions in everyday life. Nearly a century ago, the 
anthropologist Malinowski (1921) considered social exchanges as 
entrenched in structures of reciprocity and social obligations. Weber (1920) 
focused sociologically on the typology of action and he considered similar 
issues (Scott 2000). To understand healthy volunteering and its interactions 
with institutional mechanisms requires an approach that considers the role 
of habituation, emotions and other dimensions underlying human action 
such as value-focused actions lacking rational calculation and how these 
are also shaped and mediated by institutional influences. A 
phenomenological approach enables such an analysis to be carried out.  
2.6 Phenomenology: motivation, risk perception and social 
constraints  
A phenomenological perspective on social action focuses much 
attention on actions that are often unconsidered and taken for granted. 
Such actions are typically seen as routine and involve “the suspension of 
these unconsidered certitudes and an explicit analytical interest in the 
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previously implicit” (Bloor 1995:97). Using this approach in analysing 
human involvement in clinical trials adds to the critique of “decision” and 
our understanding of how decisions to take part in clinical trials are made. 
This social arena of unconsidered actions, beliefs and unspoken 
understandings is what Alfred Schutz (1970:139) refers to as the “world of 
routine activities” – familiar topics, conversations, habitual expectations 
and routine behaviour (Bloor 1995). Some motivations for engaging with 
risk may be calculative, such as volunteering with the purpose of receiving 
money to pay off debt, but volunteering in clinical trials with other 
motivations and without any prior calculation also happens routinely and 
repeatedly, with relatively little reflection. For instance, Abadie (in Section 
2.5 above) writes that people who take part in clinical trials as healthy 
volunteers often do not consider other options available to them. The 
tension between calculative and routine action is Schutz’s main interest. 
Similar discussions can also be seen in the work of Bourdieu (1990) on 
attention and habituation. 
For Schutz, however, the distinction between familiarisation and 
thoughtfulness is as a result of the changes in thinking that happen when 
individuals are repeatedly confronted with similar incentives. When faced 
with a new situation people may take time to think through the available 
courses of action. Not all options available will be suitable; some decisions 
may be delayed until one course is considered appropriate. However, with 
routine activities the complex cognitive processes fail; an individual has to 
make a rapid appraisal of the problem and action is taken without much 
consideration of other options. This illustrates how cognition is both a 
“polythetic” (step-wise) process and a “monothetic” (single flash) process 
(Bloor 1995; 97). Polythetic decision making can be seen in theories of 
behaviour that focus on the cost-benefit analysis (Schutz 1974) of risk 
taking. Much as this may be helpful in explaining behaviour, it does not 
take into account the different contexts in which decisions are made. What 
is needed to understand risk-taking behaviour, therefore, is an exploratory 
framework encompassing both the new and the routine in the decision-
making process of social interactions. 
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For Schutz this can be achieved by using a “system of relevances”, 
which collates a variety of perceptive activities within one framework. This 
refers to the ways in which individuals position perceptual stimulations. 
There are topical, interpretive, motivational and interpretive relevances 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1974). These are divided into sub-categories 
depending on whether the stimulus is volitional (intrinsic) or imposed. 
Each of Schutz’s relevances can be extended depending on one’s interest 
in the activity and the extent to which one may be familiar with the stimuli 
(Schutz 1970; Bloor 1995). Relevances are determined by the biographical 
situation, which for Schutz refers to ways in which one’s views and beliefs, 
shaped by the social context they are exposed to, provide the source of the 
stock of knowledge; this socialisation thus shapes individual views, beliefs 
and responses to social stimuli (Schutz et al. 1974). Topical relevances 
define whether the circumstances are a problem for the individual and 
whether interpretation of the issue at hand will be required of the 
individual. Topical relevance comes into play when something does not fit 
prior knowledge or expectations and thus the topic or issue becomes 
relevant to an individual. In other words, topical relevance arises when 
things become questionable to the individual and this happens for certain 
specific reasons (Goettlich 2011). Intrinsic topical relevances denote the 
voluntary quest for interpretation while the imposed stimuli denote the 
constraints. The extent to which an issue becomes topically relevant 
depends on previous knowledge, experiences and the degree of uncertainty 
the situation brings. For instance, a woman who has grown up knowing 
that using an intradermal implant is the best form of contraception goes to 
her doctor and requests one. After the assessment, the doctor inserts the 
implant. Until this stage, the implant as a form of contraception is not 
topically relevant, according to Schutz’s terminology. However, after 
having the implant, she is asked in a conversation with another friend if 
she had done some research before deciding on this form of 
contraception. Had she considered its potential side effects and general 
safety? At this point the implant becomes topically relevant – she becomes 
uncertain about the safety of the implant and starts to question her actions; 
hence the need for interpretation (interpretative relevance).  
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Interpretative relevances refer to the restricted knowledge the 
individual may possess regarding the issue at hand (Schutz and Zaner 
1970) and to aspects of topical relevance which need an interpretation or 
further understanding; this is because not every aspect of the subject might 
need understanding. Similarly, only the interpretive relevance of the stock 
of knowledge defines what part of the stock of knowledge to use in the 
interpretation. The individual may draw on previous experience and 
knowledge to interpret the uncertainty that the encounter brings. Using the 
example of the implant above, the woman may begin to ask what the 
implications are if the implant becomes harmful to her health, and what 
that might mean for her life in general. In seeking to understand the 
situation, the individual may come to the conclusion that the implant is 
safe and that there is no need to worry about it. Alternatively, the 
individual may become more uncertain about the safety and even question 
her decision to have an implant in the first place. At this stage, the implant 
becomes motivationally relevant. 
  Motivational relevance refers to what Weber (1968) refers to as the 
“adequate grounds” upon which human behaviour is based. Schutz, to an 
extent, espouses Weber’s notion, but sees motives as composed of “in 
order to” and “because of” motives. “In order to” motives generally refer 
to “because of” motives after one has taken an action concerned with the 
future and yet building on past experiences or knowledge (Schutz and 
Zaner 1970). The process of interpretation and taking steps to deal with 
the situation is complex and does not follow the order outlined in this 
section. As mentioned earlier, decisions may sometimes be kept on hold 
while other options are investigated so that competing or conflicting 
options can be discarded. On the other hand, the process can be 
momentary, due to only marginal interest in the matter (which can involve 
the category of motivational relevances) and as a result of an individual’s 
pre-existing familiarity with the situation. This results in the individual 
drifting into a monothetic mode of thinking (Bloor 1995). Again, to use 
the example of the implant, the woman might decide that there is no need 
to worry as there are many other women who have implants and they are 
well; or she may simply trust the doctor’s explanations about the safety of 
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the implant. On the other hand, she may have all the available information 
about safety risks associated with implants but still decide to have the 
implant because she prefers it to contraceptive pills, or she is convinced 
that the side effects will not affect her. Alternatively, the woman might 
reconsider the information regarding risk and ask to have it removed. This 
illustrates one framework for understanding the decision-making process 
and how decisions are sometimes based on limited information and 
without much prior thought.  
The system of relevance has been used in sociological research in 
different contexts. For instance, Bloor’s (1995) research on the sociology 
of HIV transmission used this approach to explore the contexts in which 
decisions involving risk among gay male prostitutes take place. He found 
that in most cases decisions are shaped by an interplay of personal factors 
such as an individual’s ability to handle a client, or a tendency to want to 
avoid conflict with the client. All these aspects were crucial in shaping 
responses to HIV infection risks in these contexts.  
The above discussion illustrates the investigative significance of 
Schultz’s system in the conceptualisation of motivation and risk 
perception. One of the merits of using the system is that it draws attention 
to the circumstances in which action takes place instead of the 
preconceptions the individual brings to the situation. This provides a good 
basis for exploring volunteering and regulation in clinical trials – not only 
from an individual perspective but also considering the wider socio-
political and economic milieu in which volunteering takes place. The 
system also highlights the distinctions between polythetic and monothetic 
decision-making processes, and volitional and imposed dichotomies which 
are often unaddressed in theoretical explanations of motivations and risk 
perception. Using Schultz’s system of relevances and considering both 
volitional and imposed dimensions of action enables us to observe how 
individual circumstances interact with institutional or structural influences 
in the context of volunteering for clinical trials.  
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The individual and structural elements of Schutz’s system 
of relevances 
One of the criticisms of Schutz’s approach is that it is overly 
subjective in its perspective on human action. However, the theory of the 
system of relevances does imply structural considerations. As discussed 
above, Schutz considers both volitional and imposed aspects of motivation 
underlying human action. It is the imposed aspect that is of interest here as 
it implies outside influences or pressures. I am particularly interested in 
uncovering institutional or structural influences on the decision-making 
process among human volunteers. In this case, I adopt a 
phenomenological approach to institutional theory to provide the 
structural analysis for the discussion.  
In this research, the notion of institutional forces or pressures 
refers to forms of social action or rules that have been established over 
time. These involve both bodies of knowledge and sometimes even actual 
organisations; in the present research, for example, bioethics as a discipline 
brings biology, health and ethics together to provide a framework for 
understanding the moral implications of human participation in clinical 
trials, while committees, advisory groups and other organisations have 
emerged to consider the moral and rational dimensions of volunteering. 
Institutional considerations within phenomenological institutional theory 
consider the ways in which structures, rules, systems, norms and routines 
become normative and influential guidelines for social behaviour 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The focus therefore is twofold. On the one 
hand, the sociologist is encouraged to consider the taken for granted 
aspects of everyday life, particularly with regard to engaging with risk and 
discounting personal attributes or experiences the individual brings to the 
risk situation. Social class, for example, is a powerful factor in this context. 
On the other hand, it is also important to analyse how institutions are 
organised and how individual circumstances and decisions are shaped by 
wider institutional structures. This facilitates a greater understanding of the 
ways in which human behaviour, in this case healthy volunteering in 
clinical trials, and regulation are produced and sustained by particular social 
norms, rules and types of actors (Walker et al. 2012). Using this approach 
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therefore means taking the conduct, organisation and regulation of 
FIHCTs as an ensemble of individual and institutional/technical aspects 
within established regulatory, ethical and socio-political systems and 
individual actions as well as socio-economic and socio-political contexts. 
The approach requires taking into account the fact that institutions are 
comprised of the “myths and visions that … capture the imaginations of 
its participant actors” (Avegerou 2004:3) as well as the subdued voices 
within and outside these structures and how the systems in place propagate 
and define social norms (Walker et al. 2012) and how they shape daily life 
experiences. 
Thus, questions about motivations require consideration of not just 
individual reasons for actions but also that institutions have their own 
motivations, often described as interests, which drive their policies and 
approaches to business and are fundamental to the structure and functions 
of the institutions (Douglas 1987). For a long time organisations have been 
seen to be composed of production and exchange systems, with 
technological systems moulding their structures and their influence 
emanating from the interdependence of these factors. To understand how 
institutions operate, shape and view actors’ experiences, the 
phenomenological approach to institutional theory requires greater 
attention to the significance of the symbolic facets of institutions. This is 
because institutions are not just technical systems; they also have an impact 
on the environments in which they exist (Scott, 1987) and on the 
individuals in and around them.  
Rather than adopting a utilitarian perspective, which takes the 
premise that individuals always pursue their own interests, taking a 
phenomenological approach to understanding human involvement in 
clinical trials and regulation entails considering how individuals and 
institutions interact and refocuses attention on taken-for-granted factors 
such as norms, assumptions and social circumstances that delineate 
people’s actions. This should not be taken as a disavowal of the reality of 
purposive actions by institutions or individuals but rather as a 
demonstration of ways in which people’s actions are equally shaped and 




This research is situated at the nexus of the healthy volunteering 
individual and the institutional nature of FIHCTs. It aims to examine how 
individuals and institutions interact to shape human involvement and to 
delineate conceptions of risk in clinical trials.  
The theorisation of both healthy volunteering and institutions in 
this research is influenced by phenomenological approaches, particularly 
Schutz’s concept of system of relevances. This framework provides an 
analysis that considers government and non-governmental regulation, 
corporate organisations and professional expertise and how they view 
individuals and bodies, and define customs and practices. This framework 
is useful because the business of FIHCTs takes place in a field of 
interdependent but varied organisations and actors. Rational consent, 
payments and trust, along with economic or gift exchanges, morality and 
biological citizenship are all ultimately dimensions of human involvement 
in clinical trials. This chapter has reviewed literature and discussed current 
research based understanding of how human involvement in clinical trials 
is shaped and influenced by both individual/subjective and institutional 
contexts. A phenomenological approach to the system of relevances can 
include institutions and offers a framework that is useful for identifying 
key actors and agencies and their relations, and the nature of fundamental 
principles that govern the institutions and practices of regulation of 
FIHCTs. 
Research on healthy volunteering has demonstrated how the 
interplay of social, commercial and political contexts influences the 
conduct and experience of clinical trials but it has been carried out only in 
the US. Abadie’s (2010) research on “professional guinea pigs” in an 
anthropological/ethnographic study explored ways in which anarchist 
groups and some HIV patients have made healthy volunteering a 
“profession” of sorts. While some research has acknowledged and 
incorporated institutional aspects on a global level, the focus has mostly 
been on emerging economies as sites of offshore clinical trials. There has 
been little research in the UK on healthy volunteering, where most of the 
focus has been instead on patients’ involvement in medical research. For 
85 
 
instance, Featherstone and Donovan (2003) describe patients’ 
understandings of their own participation in randomised clinical trials, 
Hallowell et al. (2010) discuss cancer patients’ motivation for involvement 
in clinical trials and Corrigan (2003) researches patients’ perceptions of 
informed consent in the clinical trial context. 
The literature discussed in this chapter can be arranged into the 
following themes: ethics, the role of trust, the exchanges which take place 
in the context of healthy volunteering, morality and biological citizenship. 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the influence of economic 
and rational theoretical approaches to concepts of individuals as rational 
actors and surveyed the body of work on human involvement in drug trials 
globally. The literature shows that involvement in clinical trials is often 
reserved for those who are from poor or financially disadvantaged groups. 
Questions remain about the demographics and motivations of healthy 
volunteers in FIHCTs and the regulation of clinical trials and how they are 
structured and organised. The following chapter discusses the methods 




Chapter 3  
Research Methodology, Design and Methods: 
Exploring Human Involvement in Clinical 
Trials  
3.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 examined the different theoretical perspectives that 
shape discussions on human involvement in clinical trials. It concluded by 
looking at how Schutz’s (1970) phenomenological approaches – in 
particular his system of relevances – can contribute to research into ethical 
and regulatory issues in human clinical trials. However, before applying 
this theoretical framework to my research topic, I will explain how and 
under what assumptions this will be done.  
The first part of this chapter outlines the philosophical stance on 
which this research is based. This is followed by a discussion of how the 
methodological approach developed. I then describe my experience of the 
sampling and recruitment of participants for the research. The next section 
discusses the tools used in the collection of data. I then outline the ethical 
considerations and discuss the challenges of doing research involving elite 
and multinational pharmaceutical corporations in terms of access and their 
desire to influence the research. I also discuss the challenges of researching 
motivation and its impact on the interpretation of findings. The chapter 
ends by considering the reliability and validity of the research. This chapter 
is both a personal and epistemological reflexive account of the research 
process. It outlines the rationale for the methodological approach for the 
research and gives an account of the factors that shaped the research 
process and, subsequently, the findings.  
3.1 Phenomenological research 
The theoretical framework adopted throughout this research into 
human involvement in FIHCTs is influenced by phenomenology, 
particularly Schutz’s system of relevances. Unlike assertions in many 
studies about the need for rigour and objectivity in social research (Haslam 
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and McGarty 2003), using this approach entailed acknowledging and 
reflecting on how my role as a researcher influenced the research process 
and its outcomes.  
The main aim of phenomenological research is to identify specific 
phenomena by looking at how they are viewed by the actors experiencing a 
given situation. This involves gathering “deep” information and views 
using inductive, qualitative methods such as interviews, discussions and 
participant observation. Findings are then presented from the research 
participant’s point of view. Phenomenology, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
involves the study of individuals with particular emphasis on the ways in 
which everyday interactions become normalised, embedded in everyday 
culture, and thus taken for granted (Schutz 1970; Bloor 1995). From an 
epistemological standpoint, phenomenological research is grounded on the 
paradigm of personal knowledge and subjectivity that emphasises the 
importance of an individual’s perspective and interpretation. 
Phenomenological research also investigates and exposes the chaos of 
everyday assumptions and conventional wisdom (Lester 1999). 
In practice, phenomenology overlaps with other approaches such 
as hermeneutics, symbolic interactionism and ethnography. In a classic 
sense, phenomenological research is thought to be focused on describing 
rather than explaining phenomena without preconceptions, in the form of 
a hypothesis (Husserl 1950). But this approach is challenged by humanist 
and feminist researchers (Plummer 1983; Stanley and Wise 1993), who 
argue that social research cannot be done without any preconception or 
bias. Instead, they emphasise the need for a clear understanding of how 
meanings and interpretations have been made and how they relate to 
research outcomes. Instead of the researcher being a detached and 
objective player in the research, they argue, the researcher should be made 
visible within the “framework” of the research. In this case, a reflexive 
approach to research is recommended. Since I was in the same 
environment and principally engaged in collecting and interpreting 
knowledge, it was virtually impossible to ask questions of others, such as 
interviewees, without turning the analytical gaze on my own practices. 
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Arguably, social researchers cannot take a neutral stance outside the 
political, social and cultural customs of the people who are subjects in 
research (Abu-Lughod 1991). My research involved interacting with people 
from different cultural backgrounds and social status and I was made 
aware of my own status and ethnicity and of how they might shape my 
participants’ responses to my questions. For instance, interviews with 
professionals were always formal and tense with the exception of those 
with ethics committee members. The interviews with healthy volunteers 
were relaxed and involved different power dynamics. I was also aware of 
how my own preconceptions and perceptions about the interviewees could 
influence my views of the subject. Most importantly, I took into 
consideration the fact that participants had had experiences, social 
circumstances and knowledge far different from mine. This meant that 
they were unavoidably “co-producers” of the knowledge in this research 
(Ansell 2001).  
The phenomenological approach is used in this research because it 
is effective in exploring from an individual’s perspective his or her 
experiences and views which may often remain unexpressed or taken for 
granted. In exploring professional and lay perceptions of risk, I draw on 
Husserl’s (1950) approach to show how in given contexts the “other” is 
constituted and how individuals with a given set of resources and general 
rules use these to construct an “other”. For instance, in relation to 
questions of risk professional and lay views mostly construe each other as, 
indeed, the “other” (Wynne 1996). The different ways in which people 
assess and experience risk and the “other” become clear when the views of 
professionals and healthy volunteers are juxtaposed and the context in 
which their interactions take place is analysed (Husserl and Moran 2001; 
Eberle 2013). Therefore, a phenomenological study that includes structural 
context was used. I took into account points of convergence and 
divergence between actors in different structural contexts or positions in 
the structural hierarchy (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) in order to reveal 
how risks are perceived and experienced. This made the approach useful in 
challenging structural and normative conventions. Furthermore, 
phenomenological research, when combined with an interpretive 
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dimension, makes it a practical approach, allowing it to be used to buttress 
and or challenge policy and even action (Lester 1999). Moreover, one of 
the strengths of a phenomenological approach is that, unlike some early 
forms of discourse analysis (Simons 1995), it does not just focus on 
understanding the participants’ experiences and suggestions of resistance 
or how they construct their identities; rather it provides an agenda for 
change by considering how research can “help” people or implement 
change and inform a progressive social or policy agenda (Creswell and 
Clark 1999; Bloor 1995).  
Although I have emphasised the need for reflexivity, it is also true 
that there is value in data gathered in an unreflexive manner; this may bring 
about fruitful results, for instance, from questionnaires or even the simple 
conversations with which I started the interviews.  
However, phenomenology has been criticised about the 
generalisability of its findings. Unlike positivist research, phenomenological 
research findings cannot simply be generalised to the wider population 
(Bryman 2004). Therefore, the use of individual subjective accounts in my 
study means that this research cannot be generalised. However, as Flyvberg 
and Stake argue separately, despite the unique nature of each account and 
experience, each may be a part of a wider consensus and thus could be 
used to think about how others in similar situations may be experiencing 
life (Flyvbjerg 2006; Stake 2003). For instance, considering how healthy 
volunteers become involved in clinical trials could be used to develop ways 
in which the recruitment of and sharing of information with participants in 
medical research could be improved. This is not to suggest that the 
findings from this research could be generalised to all clinical trials or 
healthy volunteer experiences. Also, as Flyvbjerg (2006) and Yin (2009) 
state, findings from qualitative research can be combined and expanded 
into wider theories. Insights from qualitative research can also prompt the 
development of quantitative tools which could establish whether the 
qualitative findings are generalisable. Therefore, this study could contribute 
to theories of human involvement in medical research and could be 
relevant in the conduct and regulation of future drugs trials involving 
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human volunteers. Nonetheless, the idea of generalisability based on 
statistical conceptions is obviously not applicable here. In the following 
section I discuss how the methodological approach used in this research 
developed and evolved. 
3.2 Developing my research approach 
“Method is journey after one has travelled it” (Ginzburg 1993:1). 
This assertion resonated with my experiences while doing this research. 
The initial research design was a sociological ethnography involving 
observations, semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. The 
justification for this was based on the approach of Layder, who argues that 
using a combination of such qualitative methods in this manner is an 
effective way of collecting data as it happens or shortly after it happens 
(Layder 1994). However, in response to changes in the field I decided to 
use a questionnaire as a tool for data collection.  
The influence of space and place on the design and process of 
social research has been extensively discussed (Massey 1992, Bryman 
2008). Of particular relevance for me was the question of how research 
involving professionals, corporations and people in positions of power can 
influence how social research is conducted. Bryman (2012) argues that 
social research in corporate settings is particularly prone to influence 
because of funding and access issues, which researchers must negotiate in 
order to conduct research. It is possible for funders, specifically private 
funders, and gatekeepers to push for research to be done in a certain way 
and for questions to be asked that might differ from what the researcher 
intended (Walford 2011).  
My initial plan was for a qualitative study with observations of 
clinical trials in progress. My observations were intended to aid exploration 
of the regulatory policy implementations and practices. However, 
encounters with corporate gatekeepers to negotiate access changed, as they 




[T]he only way to do this project is for you to prepare a 
questionnaire that would be sent out to all those on our 
register, that’s all. No such thing as interviews, no one 
will talk to you considering the numbers you want 
(Corporate Professional 2). 
I doubt there will be anyone one willing to talk to you; 
this is a complex industry and obviously ethical issues 
will make it difficult for anyone to give you access as 
well as let you observe. We need the approval of the 
sponsors. I would suggest you use questionnaires … for 
your study (Corporate Professional 12) 
In these extracts, the gatekeepers felt qualitative techniques were not an 
ideal approach even when the rationale for the method was explained. 
They believed the only way to do research was to use survey questions. It 
is possible that using surveys was not about developing the best technique 
for data collection but rather about a type of research that they would 
possibly find more convenient, but this would mean that certain questions 
would be asked and answered to a limited depth while other questions 
would not be asked at all. It was also apparently preferable to have me on 
the premises for a defined period instead of “hanging around” (Gold 1958; 
Kawulich 2005). The private nature of the business meant that as an 
outsider I was likely to be viewed suspiciously, possibly even as a spy 
(Adams 1999) or a journalist. All this could have added to their 
apprehension. Because the gatekeepers had such strong views about 
research methods, after some negotiation I drafted a questionnaire as a 
data gathering and recruitment tool. I argued that interviews would add to 
the research outcomes while quantitative responses would strengthen the 
arguments and provide scarce statistical data about healthy volunteers.  
I was not permitted to observe phase I clinical trials in progress 
except for a 30-minute observation which was strictly supervised and 
which failed to yield sufficient data. It was, however, useful in 
demonstrating how difficult it is to conduct research in such settings. After 
further negotiations, the questionnaire was used only for recruiting 
volunteers as interviewees, but not for the professionals. With the use of 
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questionnaires, observations were eliminated, my main research data 
collection tools became mainly interviews, and documentary analysis was 
supplemented by statistical data. The questionnaires provided unique 
demographic and other data for the research. Using a mixture of data 
collecting tools in social research is widely supported as a more responsible 
and comprehensive approach to doing social research (Bryman 2012; 
Coxon 2005). Combining qualitative and quantitative data allows for 
analytical triangulation in which a subject can be investigated by three 
methods (Bloor 1997).  
3.3 The development of qualitative research 
Qualitative research methods have been part of social science since 
the early 20th century. Of particular significance was the development of 
the Chicago School of Sociology in the 1930s. During this period there was 
a departure from the tradition of doing research by following the 
conventions of the natural sciences. It should be mentioned that the 
debate about ways of doing social research had been ongoing and would 
continue into the 1950s and beyond. This resulted in a desire to explore 
social phenomena that could not be investigated using conventional 
methods (Hammersley 1989). These developments, coupled with advances 
in anthropological research by Malinowski and Mead among others, led to 
the possibility of establishing and justifying qualitative research as we know 
it today (Bryman 2004; Silverman 2010). Denzin and Lincoln define 
qualitative research as “multi method in focus” and involving the studying 
of “things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret 
phenomena in terms of meanings people bring to them”. It also involves 
using “case studies, personal experiences, introspection, life story, 
interview … observational, historical, interactional and visual texts” 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998:3) as sources of data.  
Qualitative social researchers must be able to account for their role 
in the research process. In contrast to quantitative research, which focuses 
on objectivity, qualitative research concerns itself with parity in the 
relationship between researchers and participants, or at least some 
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understanding of the relationship if parity is not possible. There is a 
recognition within qualitative research of the influence this relationship has 
on research outcomes. There should also be an acknowledgement of the 
potentially exploitative and intrusive nature of the researcher-participant 
relationship and its impact on the production of data (Reinharz and 
Davidman 1992; Adams 1999).  
3.4 Sampling: recruiting participants for the research 
Sociological research most often involves groups and institutions. 
The research often starts with the identification of the interest group or 
institution followed by the development of a strategy for accessing 
participants in that context (Flick 2009). However, the definitions of a 
“healthy volunteer” are ambiguous, and identifying a group of healthy 
volunteers found in one place was not possible. Identifying professional 
participants proved difficult too, as they are able to protect themselves 
from public access by complex gatekeeping strategies. This challenge was 
overcome only after a number of failed attempts.  
To access healthy volunteers, I contacted several CROs whose 
details I had found on the clinical trials accreditation scheme of the 
MHRA. About 20 e-mails were sent to operations managers or others in 
authority. Five replied that they were not in a position to help me to access 
healthy volunteers. Two were willing to discuss this further. One agreed to 
help provided I changed my approach to include the questionnaires 
mentioned above. Working with his CRO I agreed to sending a 
questionnaire to healthy volunteers to recruit participants for my research. 
The outcome was a non-random sample survey with 187 respondents, of 
whom 97 agreed to be interviewed. This yielded 25 interviews. Contacts 
provided by four of the respondents led to a further 10 interviews. 
Recruitment of professionals working for CROs involved, first, the 
e-mails seeking access to healthy volunteers. I requested an interview with 
the five recipients who responded, or any of their staff. Four declined. I 
decided to adopt a different approach. I searched clinical trial forums for 
contributors, looking at what they wrote and where they worked. I 
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redrafted my research synopsis by personalising the summaries and, where 
possible, citing them. This proved fruitful and within a few days I had 
secured agreements to be interviewed from a medical director and an 
operations manager of one of the units. This allowed me to conduct three 
interviews with professionals. One interview was over the phone; the 
others were face to face.  
Research ethics committee participants were selected from a list of 
ethics committees available online on the Research Ethics Service website, 
which contains details of committees dedicated to reviewing applications 
for FIHCTs and contact details of the chairpersons’ assistants who could 
arrange meetings. Five e-mails were sent to ethics committees in London 
that review FIHCTs. One participant agreed to an interview over the 
phone; another agreed to be interviewed face to face. Two other ethics 
committee members were recruited at a conference I attended. A member 
of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) was 
recruited after I had e-mailed the head of the organisation. The member of 
a team that specialises in FIHCTs called me to arrange an interview. As for 
professionals from the MHRA, I was able to interview the director of a 
team who gave his permission for three other interviews, two with 
members of his team and one with a member of another division. I 
arranged a total of 47 interviews – 12 with regulatory officials and 
corporate professionals and the rest with healthy volunteers. Table 3.1 on 
the next page is a summary of participants used in this research.  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of research participants  
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The sampling framework used in this research was purposive and 
snowballing (Bryman 2012). This was ideal, as it was difficult to find the 
subjects – especially healthy volunteers – in one place. The challenges of 
accessing professionals meant that snowballing became the most 
appropriate approach in finding participants.  
3.5 Data collection 
This section describes how data were collected and the challenges 
encountered in gaining access to participants. 
Documentary analysis 
  The study design included an analysis of documents. According to 
Prior (2003), analysing documents can provide an insight into how 
organisations operate and is a source of information for interviews. The 
purpose of my documentary analysis was twofold: first, to develop an 
understanding of the regulatory context in human clinical trials, which 
involved exploring regulations regarding rewards, risk management and 
mitigation in general; and second, to inform subsequent interviews, which 
enabled me to understand what information was in the public domain and 
helped me to formulate appropriate questions for professional and healthy 
volunteer participants. 
I made systematic searches for relevant scientific and regulatory 
literature and, where possible, reports held by organisations. The 
documents analysed were mostly those found on organisational websites 
such as the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 20043. 
The analysis included a comprehensive review of guidelines and 
procedures for the regulation of clinical research organisations and how 
they were interpreted (Prior 2006). It also involved the study of documents 
given to volunteers prior to consent, such as information sheets and 
consent forms (Corrigan 2003). Among the documents analysed were 
Department of Health and EMA reports of the 2006 Northwick Park 
incident.  
                                                          
3
 (National Archives: www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/1031/contents/made). 
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The documentary fieldwork involved a qualitative content analysis, 
identifying and listing themes from regulatory documents, monitoring the 
implementation of regulatory guidelines regarding drug safety, risk, 
informed consent and incentives, in order to develop a broad picture of 
the issues to be investigated (Abraham and Reed 2001; Abraham 1994). 
This was important because, as Abraham (1994) states, it led to analysing 
institutional technical inconsistencies and their underlying values, and the 
practical implementation of regulatory frameworks. The role of 
documentary analysis in informing interviews (Bryman 2004) was clear in 
this project; for example, interview questions on payments, safety and 
professional concepts of risk were prompted by documents I had read. 
However, accessing documents was challenging because I was 
dealing with multi-national pharmaceutical corporations as well as 
government departments which were not willing to reveal information that 
might generate negative publicity (Abraham 1994). As a result, the 
documents I analysed were only those available publicly or those that I 
requested through the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act (Bryman 2004). 
Documents that I expected to find turned out not to exist. For example, to 
find out the number of clinical trials that were cancelled due to 
“unexpected adverse effects” between 2006 and 2012, I made an FOI 
request. It took approximately three weeks to receive an answer from the 
MHRA. The request generated the following response: 
Dear Mr Mwale  
REF: FOI 13/608  
During the period December 2006 and December 2012 
we had no reports of First Time in Human (FTH) trials 
being stopped due to adverse event.  
If you have a query about this letter, please contact me. 
If you are unhappy with our decision, you may ask for it 
to be reviewed. That review will be undertaken by a 
senior member of the Agency who has not previously 
been involved in your request … 
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Considering the number of FIHCTs that take place every year in 
the UK this response was baffling. During the study, accounts of volunteer 
experiences in trials that were discontinued because of unexpected side 
effects were common. Healthy volunteers talked of being sent home from 
a trial in the previous two years. Either regulators do not keep such records 
or if they do, they are not willing to make these public. I had also hoped to 
access documents relating to information given to volunteers for studies, 
but these were provided only on request to people interested in taking part 
in a particular trial or to people who registered an interest in volunteering 
with a CRO. I therefore registered with several CROs, which have since 
sent me information when they are recruiting for a trial.  
Studying only the documents that were publicly available limited 
the depth of the analysis I was able to conduct. Understanding how 
regulations are implemented requires analysing not only what guidelines are 
in place but how useful they are in achieving the desired goals – in this 
case, the safety of participants as well as systems of safety and 
organisational failures that result from differing interpretations of policy 
and guidelines (Bosk 2005). However, the use of different sources of data 
meant that such issues were explored in other ways. For example, 
questions about policy implementation were asked of professionals and in 
most cases they provided illuminating responses. 
Despite these limitations, the documents accessed for this research 
proved to be useful resources for informing interviews. The information 
they yielded also shaped the discussion on regulations in the first 
substantive chapter of this thesis, which discusses the nature of the 
regulatory approach to FIHCTs.  
Development of questionnaires 
I approached the notion of creating a questionnaire mindful of the 
need to work within established conventions when conducting social 
science research, particularly because I take a phenomenological approach 
that is known for being qualitatively and not statistically oriented. The 
long-standing oppositional stance between qualitative and quantitative 
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“purists” (Ratner 1997; Adams 1999) obscures the potential merits of data 
obtained from survey and interview approaches and from the different 
contexts in which tools for collecting data are used. The limitations of 
using exclusively qualitative or quantitative methods have also been well 
documented (Bryman 2004; 2012). Disregarding research results simply 
because of the data-collection methods might result in the loss of vital 
insights. Statistical and narrative data are complementary in providing in-
depth analysis and understanding of social issues. The use of 
questionnaires with open or closed questions in qualitative research is 
known to be of great benefit (Bryman 2006). 
The methods used in the study involved a mixture of tools – semi-
structured interviews, document analysis and a questionnaire survey. 
Interviews and documentary analysis were the main tools for data 
collection and were supplemented by the quantitative survey data. The 
triangulation of quantitative survey data, documentary analysis and 
interview data was intended to bring about an in-depth understanding of 
the subject (Olsen 2004) and not merely to deal with validity or 
trustworthiness issues (Hamersley 2008). As mentioned, the original 
research design did not include questionnaire surveys. Questionnaires were 
introduced as a recruitment tool and were sent by the gatekeepers to 
prospective participants listed in their register of healthy volunteers.  
The need for questionnaires prompted me to think about the 
demographic profiles of healthy volunteers: educational attainment, age 
and occupation, etc. Such data are kept by CROs and are not made 
available for public use. Healthy volunteers are usually seen as unemployed 
or poor (Fisher 2007; Abadie 2010) according to profiles of participants 
gleaned through qualitative research. For this project, questionnaires were 
also useful for informing the interviews that I would conduct. To ensure 
that the questions were appropriate, I drew on crime and health surveys of 
the Office of National Statistics that offered data about employment and 
attitudes. My survey was developed in July 2012 and was piloted in August 
2012 among University of Sussex students who were available at the time 
and because I did not have direct access to the potential respondents. The 
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survey was revised after consultation with the initial respondents as to the 
clarity and effectiveness of the questions. The questionnaire was developed 
in a very short time because the gatekeepers wanted it sent out within two 
weeks of our meeting. I also had to wait for a supervisors’ review and 
ethical approval for changes to my research methods. Dealing with such 
challenges was stressful, but I had to take care not to lose the confidence 
of the contacts. 
My contact at one CRO sent the questionnaire to about 80,000 
registered healthy volunteers on its books in mid-September 2012, about 
two months after our initial contact. Regarding the population from which 
the survey sample for this research was drawn, it must be noted that 
80,000 was a number given to me by my contact. I could not verify the 
claim, so while the number may be accurate, it is possible that the number 
may well include patients they have registered to take part in clinical trials 
or indeed potential healthy volunteers who may have merely expressed 
interest to take part but have not been involved in any clinical trial. 
Therefore, this figure must be taken with caution. Nonetheless, using this 
sample and data it generated it was still possible to conduct an analysis and 
obtain meaningful insight into the demographic profiles and attitudes to 
risk of some healthy volunteers in the UK.  
 I began to receive data from the questionnaires in November 
2012. A total of 187 respondents took part in the survey (see appendix 2) 
and the positive response was by far the most important step in gaining 
access to healthy volunteers for the second part of this study – the 
interviews. 
The questionnaire was important in other ways. Being the first 
such survey in the UK among healthy volunteers, it provides an overview 
of the demographic profiles of healthy volunteers involved in clinical trials 
in the UK. The limitation of this approach is that it is based on a non-
random sample and thus it does not represent the wider healthy volunteer 
or professional populations involved in FIHCTs because the participants 
were selected on the basis of availability. However, it drew on a register 
claimed to include more than 80,000 healthy volunteers (see above point 
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about this number) of a well-established CRO. Moreover, only those 
participants who had access to the Internet were selected for the study. 
According to the Office of National Statistics (ONS), 73% of the British 
adult population accessed the Internet every day by 2013; 72% of those 
aged 24–35 were more likely to use the Internet; for the unemployed 67% 
had used the Internet for job applications. It is not clear where they 
accessed the Internet, and it is possible that people without Internet access 
who take part in clinical trials on a regular basis were omitted from the 
study. Therefore, it may be difficult to draw wider conclusions about the 
demographic profile of healthy volunteers.  
The survey was useful in that it allowed for a comparative analysis 
of the motivations of healthy volunteers in the UK and substantiated their 
social context in terms of income, employment and levels of education. 
Consequently, it became a foundation on which to build the qualitative 
aspect of the study. The survey revealed surprising differences in age and 
income levels, with many university graduates taking part in clinical trials in 
the UK.  
The questions explored healthy volunteers’ views of aspects of the 
clinical trials and their perceptions of risk. They were asked to consider 
hypothetical situations relating to payment – for instance, how likely was it 
that they would take part in a five-day FIHCT that would pay them 
£1,000? This opened up the possibility of exploring their perceptions and 
experiences in negotiating risks at greater depth. Moreover, responses to 
the questionnaire tended to be positive presentations of selves. Thus, the 
questionnaire became crucial in informing qualitative interviews. It was 
clear that most participants had paid more attention to issues of rewards 
and risk in clinical trials and less to altruism; this emphasis was reflected in 
the time spent exploring these issues in the interview. 
The contact details provided in the responses proved to be crucial: 
I e-mailed all 97 participants who had agreed to a further interview and 
asked for a meeting at their convenience. Though it is uncommon for 
phenomenological research to include questionnaire surveys, social science 
research uses questionnaires for data collection by way of open-ended or 
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even closed questions. Such tools help to gather data beyond that collected 
by interviews or observation tools (Woods 1998). Therefore the use of the 
questionnaire in this research added to the depth of qualitative data and the 
credibility of research claims. For instance, challenging assumptions that 
healthy volunteers are poor, work-shy or uneducated, the survey found 
most of them to have a high level of education and while they may have 
jobs, for one reason or another they feel forced to become involved in 
clinical trials.  
Semi-structured interviews 
Building on the statistical data and documentary analysis, the other 
aspect of the study involved interviews. It has been observed that when 
well used, interviews are useful in exploring issues that people talk about 
only if they are probed (Reinharz and Davidman 1992; Willig 2008). 
Therefore, interviews are useful in exploring deep-seated values and 
beliefs. They also provide an opportunity to deal with people’s tendency to 
present themselves in a good light when questioned about sensitive or 
private subjects. In this way, researchers can follow up on issues that 
spontaneously arise during conversations or rephrase a question to get to 
the heart of the matter (Atkinson, Coffey, and Delamont 2003; Coffey and 
Atkinson 1996).  
All the interviews for this study were semi-structured and aimed at 
recording the participants’ histories, experiences in the clinical trial process, 
motivations for taking part in clinical trials and perceptions of risks. In 
addition, I wanted to explore how their different individual positions, 
decisions and relationships intersected with wider medical discourses, 
cultural beliefs, customs and socio-economic circumstances, and how their 
participation in clinical trials affected them in the course of their 
involvement and beyond (see appendix 1 for interview schedule). In doing 
so I hoped to avoid the common trap of presenting people’s experiences 
as homogenous and internally coherent (Abu-Lughod 1991). Instead of 
producing a smooth narrative about risks, rewards and the regulation of 
clinical trials, including questions about personal histories in interviews was 
useful in revealing the contradictions, conflicts and moral dilemmas people 
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face in their daily lives. It is out of these dilemmas and – possibly more 
important – the participants’ attempts to negotiate them, and the 
regulatory and research organisations’ attempts to mitigate against risks, 
that the “risk, rewards, regulation and ethical dimension” in the title of this 
project emerged. 
The interviews were approximately 45–60 minutes long. They 
involved a variety of questioning techniques with a combination of 
specific/general, open/closed questions aimed at eliciting factual or “hard” 
data and “soft” data (Willig 2008; Gillham 2000).  
I conducted four interviews with regulatory officials, incumbent or 
former serving members of RECs. One was by telephone; two were 
conducted in the officials’ offices and one during a lunch break at a 
conference. For regulatory officials working for the MHRA, interviews 
took place in their offices. For corporate professionals working for CROs, 
two interviews were conducted at their premises while one was done by 
telephone. A further interview was conducted with a representative from 
the ABPI. In all cases, interviews took place at a time and place convenient 
to the participants. The difficulties in gaining access and the defensive and 
sometimes aggressive attitude of professionals in institutions in which I did 
not feel at ease made me nervous and self-conscious. 
 Interviews with healthy volunteers took place face to face, over 
the telephone or Skype, or in e-mails. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with 20 participants in public places such as restaurants and 
cafés close to where they lived and at times that were convenient for them. 
Meetings and venues were arranged via text or e-mail. I was worried – 
needlessly as it turned out – that the participants would find it difficult to 
talk in public places about their experiences. Some of the participants 
talked at length about their experiences and were keen to share them. They 
seemed to be at ease with me as a researcher and it was usually easy to 
direct the interviews – a contrast to the challenges of interviewing 
professionals. Most of the participants were from London and the south-
east, including Kent and parts of Hampshire. Ten participants were 
interviewed over the phone, including four in Scotland and Northern 
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Ireland. Another six interviews where done over the phone because of the 
participants’ work schedules. Three interviews with participants in Brazil, 
India and Sweden were conducted via Skype. A further two interviews 
were done via e-mail at the convenience of the participants, who were 
abroad.  
Using a semi-structured interview approach was of great benefit as 
it afforded me the flexibility of a “loose” interview schedule for the 
fieldwork and with individual interviews (Willig 2008; (Shipman 1997). 
Participants felt able to raise matters of importance in their experience as 
professionals and lay participants in medical research. The semi-structured 
interview allowed the participants to cover broad areas that I was 
interested in exploring. At the same time, it also allowed me to direct 
conversations to some extent. Using a combination of interview 
techniques, I was able to give participants time to share their experiences at 
the times when they were most comfortable and did not feel rushed (Holt 
2010; Sturges and Hanrahan 2004).  
Conducting interviews by telephone and Skype meant that I was 
able to deal with the challenge of time and space that would have arisen 
had I restricted myself to face to face interviews only. The advantage of 
using Skype and telephone interviews was that participants were afforded 
more confidentiality (Hanna 2012; Hanna and Mwale forthcoming). The 
use of Skype requires a good Internet connection. In one interview a poor 
connection disrupted the interview and I found myself talking over the 
participant’s responses. I apologised frequently and was concerned that the 
interview came across as unprofessional; it was longer than I intended. 
Using the telephone meant that I could not read the facial expressions and 
body language of the participants. To make up for these limitations, I 
clarified confusing parts of the interviews in e-mail exchanges. I also 
exchanged e-mails with participants with whom I had conducted face-to-
face interviews. Willing participants in research are likely to give open and 
genuine accounts of their lived experiences (Shenton 2004), and this meant 
that the study became a rich source of data about the experiences of 
healthy volunteer and professionals and their views of FIHCTs.  
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A limitation of this research is that the interviews were conducted 
at a particular point in time; hence the study was cross-sectional rather 
longitudinal. Such data do not tell us how healthy volunteering started and 
developed over time. To address this limitation, participants were asked 
how they came to be involved in clinical trials. This was useful in exploring 
the historical dimension of their involvement and the contradictions and 
moral dilemmas that participants negotiate when involved in clinical trials. 
 Access 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a major challenge of this 
research was finding and accessing participants. Getting access to 
multinational corporations proved to be a complex and lengthy process. 
Like other institutions, pharmaceutical companies, regulatory bodies and 
CROs have rules and gatekeepers. CEOs must consider the needs of 
investors and shareholders must be considered. CEOs are entrusted with 
maximizing dividends for their businesses (Rajan 2007) and may make 
initial decisions about whether a researcher should talk to employees and 
or volunteers (Buchanan and Bryman, 2007). There is a culture of secrecy 
within these organisations (Petryna 2009) and such hierarchical systems 
require negotiation with professional teams involved in the administration 
of clinical trials; they have other demands and interests and they all work 
amid complex power relations (Ansell 2001, Foucault 1980). Negotiating 
with such a diverse group of professionals requires flexibility and patience. 
Furthermore, negotiating access and consent did not only involve 
institutions, but individual healthy volunteers as well. This was particularly 
important for this research as it involved individual participants who were 
to share their stories (Barker and Weller 2003).  
The secrecy that surrounds the practice of clinical trials raises an 
important question for researchers: is it possible to carry out research 
transparently when one’s informants are not open and transparent? Secrecy 
in biomedical research is in sharp contrast to postmodern social research 
practice, in which the social production and distribution of knowledge is 
regarded as being key to solving social problems. In overcoming the 
hurdles thrown up by secrecy, I drew inspiration from similar research on 
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later-phase trials undertaken by anthropologists Fisher (2007), Rajan 
(2007), Petryna (2009) and Abadie (2010) and the sociologist Corrigan 
(2003). All had managed to access participants in different ways and 
settings.  
Negotiating access 
Central to the British Sociological Association (BSA) research code 
of ethics is the principle of transparency. This is also emphasised in 
literature on postgraduate research. It is vital that participants are well 
informed and are given a clear explanation of what is expected of them in 
the context of the research and the purposes of the research (BSA 2004; 
Bryman 2012). Gaining access to elite and corporate organisations for this 
research was challenging as they can readily deny access and keep 
themselves beyond reach and scrutiny (Duke 2002). In my research, 
gatekeeping took different forms, for instance involving personal assistants 
who needed convincing to grant access to their superiors and in one case a 
chief executive who had to sanction a meeting. When e-mailing them to 
ask them for access I received an unexpectedly high number of rejections 
and non-replies. The replies were similar. One e-mail read in part: 
thank you for your e-mail and the questions, they are 
interesting and insightful. After discussions with my 
team, we have decided that we do not have capacity to 
attend to guests such as yourself at our facilities. 
Besides, the questions you are proposing to ask are what 
we already ask our staff and volunteers … 
Discussions in research methods literature about access to 
professionals sometimes overlook the fact that the researchers may have 
no prior contact or relationships with organisations. Negotiating access for 
this study was extremely problematic. As time was running out and access 
had to be obtained one way or another, I changed my approach. More 
potential participants were identified via the professional networking site 
LinkedIn and in some cases institutional websites. The selection was based 
on job titles and roles in the industry, including those involved in 
administering, managing or running clinical trial units. A further search on 
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their publications and interests was carried out and project summaries were 
rewritten to pique their interest or highlight subjects they had written 
about (Thomas 1993; Duke 2002). These personalised summaries were 
more successful in obtaining access to professionals as the following 
extract of an e-mail shows: 
Thanks for your e-mail. I would be happy to talk to you 
about my experience of working with healthy volunteers 
in first-in-human clinical trials … I suggest that you 
might telephone me on the number below, at a time 
that suits both of us. Currently, I can offer the 
following…  
Accessing healthy volunteers was also challenging. Requests to 
prospective participants to e-mail, text or call to arrange interviews were 
not always successful. Due to the time that had passed between completing 
surveys and arranging interviews most of them had forgotten having taken 
part in the survey and needed reminding; access had to be renegotiated. 
One participant remained unclear what the research was about although 
she had been given the necessary documentation. She was sceptical about 
who I was and how I had obtained her details. We exchanged over 15 e-
mails before she agreed to be interviewed. Later I found out that recent 
experiences in her personal life made her wary of people she did not know, 
especially if they were interested in her story. Others who initially agreed to 
be interviewed declined further interviews or did not respond to my 
request for meetings. Access to healthy volunteers therefore was not 
always straightforward despite having a contact list.  
Influence of professionals on research questions 
In Section 3.2 I discussed gatekeepers for this research who were 
influential in challenging and changing the methods used in this research. 
They insisted on the use of questionnaires, influenced the questions I was 
to ask the participants and even wanted to control the interview schedule. 
They asked to see questions in advance and demanded that some questions 
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relating to risk, safety and rewards, for instance, should be omitted both 
from my interview schedule and questionnaire. This was one response: 
we do not deal with uncertainty and risks in our work. 
We are sure of what we are doing. So you are not asking 
these questions [about risk and how much volunteers 
are paid for taking part in clinical trials]… alright?” 
(Corporate Professional 1) 
This was not a request but an outright command to change my 
interview schedule not to focus on questions of safety and uncertainty. The 
gatekeepers also influenced the way the data were collected, declaring who 
would be involved, where, for how long and what information they would 
give me. One wrote me: 
Thank you for your e-mail. I have been clear that there 
will be no contact with volunteers without our 
supervision. The interviews will be over the phone 
lasting no more than 15 minutes and we will provide the 
space and telephone for you to use. You will not be 
given their contact details nor will they be asked to give 
them to you … (Corporate Professional 2) 
To conduct research in in the face of such attitudes requires 
perseverance, imagination and flexibility. Although I had reservations 
about their suggestions, I decided to comply with their demands. After 
collecting data from the questionnaires I was given contact details to 
arrange the interviews myself rather than follow their suggestions. 
Rapport building and the “corporate line” as hurdles 
Another problem was building of rapport. Research ethics 
guidelines and training emphasise the need to build rapport with 
participants to elicit their trust and develop an understanding (Kvale 1996; 
Bryman 2012). In practice this was extremely difficult. I found that in these 
settings there was no time for rapport building; the people I met were 
abrasive and uninterested in the researcher and the research. A typical 
beginning to most encounters was: “I am very busy and only have 15 
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minutes so let’s cut to the chase. What can I do for you?” Or “I am sorry, I 
forgot you were coming. Can we rearrange to meet next week?”  
The interviews took place on their premises – places which were 
alien to me – adding to the intimidating atmosphere. In response to 
questions about views on practices – for instance, informed consent and 
calculations of rewards to volunteers – participants took a combative or 
dismissive approach. Some tried to dictate the terms on which the research 
was to take place. Others tried to put me off by not answering questions or 
diverting the focus of the interview to other questions or talked down the 
significance of my study, as seen in this extract: 
Who are your supervisors? … I must say that if they 
had any idea about ethics and how the industry works 
they would have advised you not to embark on this 
journey. What I am saying is that this project is not 
possible. No one, I repeat no one, will talk to you or 
answer any of the questions you are asking. I am doing 
you a favour to save you from … heartache in future… 
(Corporate Professional 12) 
This quote illustrates the influence powerful individuals have when 
involved as participants in social research. They are the producers and 
guardians of discourses and systems that are being investigated will go to 
great lengths to protect the systems (Fitz and Halpin 1994), resulting in 
interviews yielding standard corporate responses rather than the 
participants’ own views. One participant warned that if I would not get any 
professionals to participate in my research unless I solicited their official 
views. In four instances, participants insisted on talking off the record 
despite assurances of anonymity. Though this left me free to ask questions, 
they still took the official line and their responses were not particularly 
different from those of others. In fact, some things they said were actually 
public knowledge. As Thomas (1993) observes, it was important for them 
to feel assured that their jobs would be treated as sensitive and not 
threatened, and thus they would agree to the interview. Other participants 
seemed happy to share their observations and experiences. 
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When I succeeded in getting them to talk, some participants 
working for MHRA, CROs and the ABPI wanted to know how much I 
knew about their work and the politics surrounding the subject I was 
investigating. I must admit that I had a lot to learn from them. Duke 
(2002) observes that some professionals want to talk to someone they 
believe they can educate. I frequently found myself having to determine 
the degree of knowledge I should reveal. In some cases I endeavoured to 
be seen as knowing and in other cases to be seen as naïve. Sometimes this 
worked but sometimes it backfired. In one instance I was asked if I had 
read the history of the changes of the Medicines for Human Use Act in 
reference to FIHCTs. My initial assessment of this encounter was that my 
participant would have liked to educate me about things so I decided to 
present myself as “naïve”. To my surprise the participant said I had some 
homework to do before I could go around asking questions. This 
prompted some quick backtracking on my part to explain that I did not 
quite understand the question. Another experience in building rapport was 
that I often had to wrestle for control of the interview as some 
professionals tried to usurp the interviewer’s role. This was awkward but 
after some subtle replies to their questions I would attempt to reclaim the 
role of interviewer. In these experiences it was frustrating to have been 
unable to express my knowledge and even my opinions for fear of being 
denied access or having an interview terminated. 
These experiences were in sharp contrast to my encounters with 
professionals in public institutions, who were mostly ethics committee 
members, and with healthy volunteers in general. They were keen to have 
discussions about the topic and answer my questions. In some cases they 
offered to help me by talking to others in the industry to see if they could 
participate in my research. For civil servants knowledge production is seen 
as a public good while for professionals in private corporations it is a 
personal good that should be kept private (Stiglitz 1999). The latter wield a 
certain power and control over aspects of knowledge, making it difficult to 
scrutinise them and their activities.  
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Interviewing professionals: entering another world? 
To get to the office building from a bustling Victoria 
station, one has to negotiate and duck the many bodies 
in the way, put up with the noisy traffic on the streets 
and avoid one or two charity fundraisers. This is an 
ivory tower, you know. (Corporate Professional 1) 
Professionals, especially those working in corporations, are visible 
to an extent. Their names are on company websites; they are sometimes in 
the media and nowadays are often present on online professional 
networking sites. They often work in modern buildings that are usually tall, 
often iconic and sometimes made of see-through glass. However, as 
Thomas (1993) observes, visibility both in the media and in buildings does 
not necessarily mean that individuals and their corporate activities are 
accessible. Accessing corporate premises is difficult. There are security 
scanners, security guards and receptionists to get past, and the host comes 
to receive you.  
The quotation at the beginning of this section shows how 
corporate professionals view outsiders who come into their premises to 
ask questions. They inhabit an ivory tower of sorts, a term often used to 
describe academics, with the outside world as a nuisance that should be 
barred and kept out at all costs. This insider-outsider dichotomy is the 
basis of all encounters one has with professionals in these settings. The 
research encounter is a power relationship between the researcher and the 
participant (Scott 1984; Hunter 1993), which is explicitly demonstrated in 
research involving professionals (Ball 1994; Maguire and Ball 1994). Fitz 
and Halpin (1994) state that the power of professionals is even more 
evident when research has to take place in their offices, which might be 
intimidating to some academic researchers. Encounters with professionals 
in their offices also demonstrate how they shape the discourse regarding 
the subject being explored. They define the terms and what is said and 
known outside of the walls of the corporate headquarters, and this 
constrains corporate interviews. One participant, asked if it was possible to 
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talk to others on his team about their experiences and views, said I would 
gain nothing new, as illustrated in this quote: 
I have no idea why you think talking to more people in 
my team will give you more information; what I will tell 
you is what everyone else will tell you in my team. So 
there is no need to talk to more people (Regulatory 
Official). 
Doing research with professionals involves negotiating not just the 
physical barriers of access but also official systems. At the end of each 
interview I would ask my participants for names of people they thought 
were important for me to interview. In only one occasion did this question 
yield a positive response. Some professionals inhabit tightly knit 
communities and will shield each other from public scrutiny. They may 
even conceal from colleagues that they had participated in an academic 
research project.  
The irony here is that some corporate professionals would be very 
vocal and visible in the media about the need for transparency, yet they are 
not transparent with information or willing to answer questions about their 
practices. For early career researchers (ECRs) it can be a daunting task to 
gain access to professionals. Unlike established researchers, ECRs are likely 
to have limited social capital to facilitate access to professionals in 
corporate settings (Bourdieu 1985; Thomas 1993). Even established social 
science academics rarely conduct research among powerful corporate 
professionals. There is a valiant tradition, but it amounts to a tiny fraction 
of research energies and budgets.  
What I found useful in these settings was identifying who wielded 
the power. Some members of organisations may not be actively involved in 
decision making, so identifying and accessing those who are at the core of 
the system is vital. In one case I contacted the operations manager of the 
unit rather the doctor who was conducting the trials, and I was directed to 
someone helpful. Because the request had come from the manager, I was 
treated with respect even it failed to get me an interview. Professional 
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participants are usually interested in knowing whom else you have spoken 
to (Duke 2002). In some cases I would decline to give names, citing 
confidentiality; the participants believed they could trust me with 
information and agreed to an interview. Most professionals wanted to 
know what they would gain from the research considering the amount of 
disruption I would be causing to their organisation. In one case I offered 
to help with a process review for the organisation’s admissions and 
recruitment systems. Offering to give something in return for their 
participation seemed to ease their apprehensions about giving me access. 
3.6 Data analysis 
The quantitative survey data were analysed using SPSS software 
(Pallant 2010). The analysis involved simple tests, including descriptive 
statistics, frequencies and cross-tabulations. The questionnaire was 
designed with little time to consider possible tests that could be conducted 
on the data; hence it was difficult to do advanced tests.  
A thematic analysis approach was used for the qualitative data 
gathered through interviews and documentary analysis. This method, 
which involves “identifying, analysing and reporting themes within data” is 
further used in interpreting various facets of the study (Braun and Clarke 
2006: 79). This approach is useful because, unlike discourse analysis, for 
instance, it is not attached to any theoretical framework and thus can be 
applied to any approach depending on the aim of the study (Braun and 
Clarke 2006). One of the requirements of thematic analysis is that the 
researcher does the transcription, allowing for closer acquaintance with the 
data for preliminary analysis.  
The first step was to transcribe all interviews verbatim; this helped 
me to understand the data and do a preliminary analysis. Four participants 
– three regulatory officials and a corporate professional – refused to have 
their interviews recorded; instead, I took notes during and after the 
interviews. All of the interviews for healthy volunteers were transcribed; 
those conducted via e-mail were already in text form. After transcribing, 
the data were uploaded into NVivo, computer software which is useful for 
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analysing qualitative data and arranging them in themes. The transcription 
phase had allowed for the identification of initial themes and using NVivo 
more themes were identified and added to those identified in the earlier 
phase. The interview transcripts were analysed for certain patterns and to 
categorise and organise the data into initial themes (Kvale 1996; Frith and 
Gleeson 2004). These reinforced themes identified during the transcribing 
phase. Thus, this first stage was an exploratory analysis of data. The second 
phase involved further analysis of the themes and focusing on 
convergences between themes. This was undertaken to ensure a greater 
understanding of the issues and to develop links between themes. The final 
stage involved looking at the themes in relation to the research questions 
and theoretical approach of the research to identify how they could be 
organised further to address the aims of the research (Gordon, Holland 
and Lahelma 2000; Lahelma 2002; Raisborough 2006). 
The challenge of investigating motivation 
The methodological challenge of researching motivation, 
particularly in semi-structured interviews, is that it requires participants to 
reflect on things they are doing or have done in the past in a rational way 
(Giddens 1984). Until the interview, motivating factors may be 
indistinguishable from customs, entangling motivation with taken-for-
granted, everyday life events (Giddens 1984; Schutz 1970) and 
consequently difficult to explore in social research. Therefore, as Zigon 
(2007) observes, it is only when people come up against a moral dilemma 
that they become aware that they have to answer questions such as “Is it 
worth the risk?” It is when “people or groups of people are forced to step 
away from their unreflective everydayness and think-through … work on 
themselves and respond to certain ethical dilemmas, troubles or problems” 
that moral and rational reasoning becomes a social process, open for social 
analysis (Zigon 2007:140).  
Interviewing participants, as Robbins (2004) observes, may stir a 
realisation of conflicting moral codes, ethics or questions of morality, 
providing a window in which they can see the contradictions with which 
they have to live. Questions of risks, rewards and motivation in clinical 
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trials may occur to both professionals and lay volunteers, but the way these 
risks are viewed will be different because the moral codes and cultural 
subgroups to which they belong may influence their perception of risks 
and shape their behaviour (Lupton 1999). Robbins’s (2004) observation 
raises profound questions about the practice of semi-structured interviews 
in social research. Researching issues such as participation in clinical trials 
may prompt unwarranted rational responses (Callon and Rabeharisoa 2004; 
Will and Weiner 2014), particularly in encounters with strangers. I am 
aware that the interviews in this research took place in certain contexts and 
the analysis should take into account ways in which these contexts and 
certain questions may have elicited certain responses. Nevertheless, I take 
what was said in interviews seriously and do not intend to simply cast 
doubt on it as untrustworthy or accounts looking for approval.  
3.7 Conducting ethical research 
The research gained ethical approval from the University of Sussex social 
science research ethics board (see appendix four) before any advertisement 
or data collection commenced. Social research can involve an intrusion 
into people’s private spaces; researchers must acknowledge the potential 
for exploitation of participants and try to avoid it. Ethical guidelines such 
as the BSA research code of ethics (BSA 2004) and those of the University 
of Sussex are intended to deal with such situations. In these codes special 
attention is drawn to researchers’ responsibilities in ensuring participants 
are dealt with respect and their dignity is preserved; there is also a need for 
consent, trust and integrity in the conduct of research. These principles 
were essential in the context of my research. I made it clear to the 
participants that I was a researcher and offered e-mail contact details 
should they change their minds about being involved in the study. 
Information sheets (see appendix one) detailing what the study was about 
were provided to all participants. To ensure confidentiality, participants are 
referred to by a number prefaced by their role as corporate professionals, 
regulators or healthy volunteers. All consent forms were signed before the 
interviews began. Participants were assured of their rights to refuse to 
answer questions or discuss issues they were not comfortable with, to 
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withdraw from the interview at any time, and even to withdraw their 
responses after the interview. Data were stored in password protected files 
and backed up.  
3.8 Trustworthiness – dealing with credibility and validity 
questions 
The application of questions of reliability and validity to 
phenomenological research is always problematic (Bryman 2008). This is 
because qualitative research often takes as its focus of study the 
exploration and understanding of the subjective and contextual 
experiences of participants; it is not concerned with wider generalisation of 
findings to other contexts (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). However, this does 
not imply lack of rigour in qualitative research. What I set out to do was 
not to find the truth or “right” answers, but rather to use the available 
interactions with participants to identify critical aspects of their experiences 
and views and to develop plausible interpretations of their accounts. My 
aim was not so much to get it right as to get it “differently contoured and 
nuanced” (Richardson 1994, 521). An alternative to reliability and validity, 
as suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1986), is to consider the 
trustworthiness of qualitative research. The trustworthiness of my research 
had to be established in several stages: to start with, during the data 
collection and analysis phase the engagement with the participants was 
deliberately prolonged to establish trust and to become immersed in the 
data and the issues the participants were raising. The contact with 
participants did not end with the interview; besides exchanging e-mails to 
clarify issues after the interview I also held in-depth discussions with them 
about the research and their experiences as interviewees.  
Trustworthiness was also established in the use of different sources 
of data; survey data, documentary analysis and interview data were 
combined, making the analytical claims from this study credible. Another 
means of ensuring trustworthiness was the peer debriefing in the form of 
feedback from my supervisors and colleagues (Lincoln and Guba 1986), 
who critically reviewed the work throughout the research process in 
supervisions and at seminars and conferences where I presented my 
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efforts. This ensured that the research process, analysis, difficulties and 
compromises in data collection, and ultimately the outcomes were subject 
to continuous interrogation.  
During the research I shared some of my findings with participants 
who I chose for their interest in the research outcomes – what Woods 
(2006) refers to as “respondent validation”. The aim was to make sure that 
I had accurately captured the participants’ experiences, views, issues and 
feelings and put them across to others accordingly (Woods 1998; Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000; Woods 2006).  
 I developed a systematic audit trail of information, such as field, 
conference and supervision notes on which I based my actions and 
decisions. Systematic record keeping helps to give confidence in the 
findings of the research. In the next chapter I present a description and an 




Structure and Practice of Regulation 
4.1 Introduction 
Hochschild observes that some modes of operating in 
organisations supplant people’s normal ways of acting with institutional 
mechanisms of conduct (Walker et al. 2012) in which individuals’ actions 
are organised and shaped by institutional rules and customs (Hochschild 
2003; Walker et al. 2012). In a typically hierarchical context, individuals are 
expected to work and act in keeping with standardised procedures. It can 
be argued that this is evident in the regulatory process of FIHCTs. As 
individuals assume their roles in this process, the institution they work for 
positions them in such a way that they view and respond to questions 
about institutions and their roles in a pre-defined and official way. This is 
clear from discussions about access to professionals as discussed in the 
previous chapter, where it was shown that professionals may be reluctant 
to express personal views on issues related to their work.  
This chapter aims to answer the following research questions: how 
is the regulatory system of FIHCTs structured and organised in the UK? 
And how does the political, cultural, socio-economic, legislative and 
healthcare context in the UK shape the ways in which supranational EU 
regulations are interpreted and implemented by those administering, 
sponsoring and regulating the trials? In the first part of the chapter, I 
discuss the organisation and structure of regulation of FIHCTs in the UK. 
This section draws on data derived from analysis of regulatory documents. 
The second part uses interview data to explore how professionals view the 
regulatory system and the relationship between industry, regulation, the 
state, the market and the public. It discusses the fragmentation of the 
regulatory system by analysing two practices: payments to volunteers and 
volunteer registers. The chapter concludes by exploring how the interests 
of healthy volunteers are side-lined in a regulatory process that is driven by 
corporate interests and how this is symptomatic of the relationship 






As outlined in the literature and context-setting section of this 
thesis, the pharmaceutical industry is more closely linked with global 
politics today than ever before in its history. There are profits and lucrative 
gains brought into economies of rich countries and even emerging 
economies such as India and Brazil by the pharmaceutical industry (Rajan 
2006). In the following section, I outline how the regulation of FIHCTs is 
structured and organised at a global level by international agreements. A 
great deal of research into the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry 
has been carried out by Abraham and Lewis (2000) and Abraham and 
Davis (2012). This chapter builds on some of their observations to focus 
on the regulation of FIHCTs. I begin by describing the processes and 
structure of regulation using data derived from my own documentary 
analysis.  
Existing regulatory structures – a fragmented regulatory 
system 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, the regulations of 
FIHCTs can be traced back to the 1947 Nuremberg Code, which has been 
revised over time and given rise to many other guidelines such as the 
WHO 1993 Good Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines. This was followed by 
the 1994 Council for International Organisations for Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS). Both agreements were aimed at improving the practice of 
medical research. In 1997 came the International Conference for the 
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for registration of 
pharmaceuticals for human use (ICH). These were followed in the EU by 
the Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20/EC. Today in the UK the regulations 
of FIHCTs and other trials for medicines are governed by the Medicines 
for Human Use Act 2004 (amended). By 2011 the Act had been amended 
five times. In a broader sense, regulation of clinical trials is done at national 
and supra-national levels. Each government has signed up to international 
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protocols that prescribe how research should be conducted in their 
countries. The EU directive has instructions on the production, 
monitoring and administration of drugs. FIHCTs come under the 
production part of this directive.  
The regulatory system can be summarised as follows: the UK 
regulation of clinical trials, FIHCTs specifically, is shaped by the EU 
directives on the conduct of clinical trials. At the apex of this structure is 
the European Council of Ministers. The council is responsible for setting 
overall policy direction on issues affecting all countries that cannot be 
resolved at micro-national levels. It sets EU priorities and gives political 
direction. With regard to clinical trials and other matters, the council often 
votes on the directives as part of the ratification process that decides if 
directives should be used at national levels; these define what is required 
before permits are given to market a product and conduct research in the 
EU. The regulatory approaches of the EU take varied forms, namely 
regulations, recommendations, proposals, directives and council decisions 
(Abraham and Lewis 2000) among others. A clear demonstration of the 
approach and attitude that regulators are expected to take when regulating 
clinical research is outlined in Directive 2001/83/EC which states that 
“(2) The essential aim of any rules governing the 
production, distribution and use of medicinal products 
must be to safeguard public health. 
(3) However, this objective must be attained by means 
which will not hinder the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry or trade in medicinal products 
within the Community” (European Commission 
2001:1). 
The directive explicitly states that disparities and variances in 
regulation in member states have impeded the market for medicinal 
products. These regulatory disparities are also thought to affect the EU 
internal market and the directives were aimed at removing these 
impediments (European Union Council 2001). Using Schutz’s system of 
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relevance to explain the policy focus of the council shows that the 
motivational relevance – that which is of significance and worth acting on 
by the council – is the protection of the pharmaceutical market within the 
EU; this demonstrates how regulation, public interest and the market 
interact as issues of public safety and risk are taken as normal or secondary. 
By focusing on enhancing the market, the council showed where its 
interests lay. How this has shaped its response to issues such as payment to 
volunteers and safety, is discussed in a later section. Their position 
inevitably puts them on a collision course with public interests as these do 
not often tally with corporate interests. 
The arm of the Commission responsible for medical and health 
policies is the European Medicines Agency (EMA), whose main functions 
are to protect and promote public health and animal health by appraising 
and supervising the use of medicines meant for human or animal use in all 
member countries. The agency is responsible for issuing marketing 
authorisations of drugs for use and sale in Europe in accordance with 
directives from the Council of Ministers. It is also responsible for 
monitoring safety of medicines (or pharmaco-vigilance, as it is termed in 
the literature) in the EU. The EMA also oversees the conduct of clinical 
research in member states. It provides guidance and issues directives on 
standards of practice. The agency is led by an executive director, with 
specialised divisions such as expert groups on human medicines, veterinary 
medicines and information technology and administration teams. These 
groups are in turn divided into small specialised groups (see appendix three 
for organisational chart). With regard to clinical trials, the EMA’s 
Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) is responsible 
for dealing with matters relating to medicines used in humans (EMA 
2007). It issues guidelines on how medicines should be used and has the 
mandate to withdraw medicines deemed unsafe. The committee is 
comprised of members nominated by the regulatory bodies of each 
member state as well as Norway and Iceland (Vogel 1998). At a national 
level the EMA does not act directly on breaches of rules by industry; 
rather, such issues are addressed by the member states’ regulatory bodies. 
However, countries are subject to directives issued by the Commission that 
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are then transposed into member states’ law, which must be complied 
with. Of interest here is that the members of the committees are mostly 
people working in regulatory bodies in their member states. This suggests 
that practices at a national level are protected from independent scrutiny 
because those regulating at national level are also part of the team that 
issues directives on standards at the EU level.  
The UK parliament may convert directives into acts or incorporate 
directives into existing legislation as part of the revision or compliance 
process. Within this framework the role of the state in regulation is seen as 
being the guardian of public health with respect to the conduct of clinical 
trials and the marketisation of pharmaceutical products for healthcare. In 
this role, issues of topical relevance (Schutz 1970) to the state are ensuring 
safety, equality and the welfare of those who, without positive action, may 
be excluded from benefits or even be exploited. The guardianship of the 
state includes supporting and maintaining an environment that facilitates 
the pursuit of research. This can put regulators in a difficult situation, as 
they have to ensure the safety of participants in research on one hand and 
facilitate the growth of the industry on the other (Nuffield Council of 
Bioethics 2011). Balancing public and industry interests can be awkward 
for regulators because industry is influential and powerful. While industry 
brings many benefits to the health of populations, pharmaceutical research 
is highly lucrative. This can raise issues of topical and motivational 
relevance (Schutz 1970), including public safety and the ethical conduct of 
clinical trials (Abraham and Lewis 2000). The task of ensuring compliance 
is assigned to the Department of Health (DoH), which works through the 
National Health Service (NHS), the Health Research Authority (HRA), the 
National Research Ethics Service (NRES) and national research ethics 
advisory panels (NREAPs) (HRA 2013). These are instituted in legislation. 
Among the roles of the NRES and NREAPs are to organise research 
ethics committees (RECs) and to oversee implementation of legislation. 
Their main responsibility is to ensure the ethical practice of medical and 
pharmaceutical research by safeguarding the rights, dignity and general 
wellbeing of research participants. Some RECs oversee reviews for clinical 
trials of investigational medicinal products (CTIMPs) involving healthy 
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volunteers (commonly referred to as type 2 RECs). Type 3 RECs review 
applications of CTIMPs but of phases other than phase I trials involving 
healthy volunteers. There are also site-specific review processes that 
consider the suitability of the principal investigators, investigate whether 
facilities are adequate and appropriate for the proposed trial and other 
issues such as prospective participants’ insurance and healthcare 
(University of Brighton 2008 ethics guidance).  
Alongside the RECs is the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA), an executive agency of the DoH responsible 
for regulating the safety, quality and efficacy of all medicines and medical 
devices. Within the MHRA there are several divisions but of interest to 
this research are the Licensing Division and the Inspection, Enforcement 
and Standards Division. The Licensing Division has four subdivisions 
which are in turn divided into four groups (see appendix three). It is 
responsible for ensuring the safety of medicinal products; its focus is on 
the composition of medical drugs, proposed dosages and routes of 
administrations. Of particular interest is the unit that is responsible for 
assessing applications for clinical trials; its focus is on the safety of the 
investigational medicinal products (IMPs) to be tested. Another 
subdivision of the MHRA, the inspectorate group, polices compliance with 
good clinical practice (GCP) guidelines. It inspects clinical trials units to 
check on the training of staff, emergency preparation and accommodation 
of volunteers, among other matters. Other organisations within this 
process represent the pharmaceutical industry. In the UK one such 
influential organisation is the ABPI, a government-recognised industry 
body representing research-based biopharmaceutical companies big and 
small. Their members are key producers of medicines used in the NHS. 
ABPI’s main role is to lobby the government on issues of pricing and 
regulation (ABPI 2013). It also produces guidelines of good practice for its 
members; these are often endorsed by regulators and sometimes by the 
government. These guidelines are however not legally binding.  
Other players in this process are NHS hospitals, with and without 
clinical research facilities (CRFs). NHS hospitals have several functions in 
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this system: acting as a source of patients for some early phase and almost 
always for later-phase trials and providing space and equipment for 
commercial research in some trials. Some CRO trial units are sited in or 
close to hospital premises. Alongside the CRFs are the CROs that 
specialise in organising and conducting clinical trials on behalf of 
pharmaceutical companies. The CRFs are publicly owned. They conduct 
mostly later-phase publicly funded clinical trials. They also lease their units 
to CROs which might need to use certain equipment and the specialised 
staff of the units. CRFs and CROs are at the frontline of clinical trials in 
the UK, though some pharmaceutical companies occasionally carry out 
research. Another category is charitable organisations, mostly disease-
specific, that promote the interests of patients and research participants, 
such as Cancer Research UK and HIV and AIDS advocacy groups. A 
noteworthy omission is the lack of organisations that represent healthy 
volunteers. This is why healthy volunteers are often conflated with 
patients. The implication is that their needs – that is, of topical or 
motivational relevancy (Schutz 1970) – are thought to be the same as those 
of patients. But it is also a sign that they are seen as capable individuals, 
able to give rational consent and represent their interests. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
The structure of regulations in clinical trials is summarised in the 






Figure 4.1: Structure of clinical trials regulatory system 
The organisation and structure of the regulatory system is 
described and discussed in some detail to illustrate how complex it is and 
where gaps might develop within the system between international and 
national bodies, resulting in a fragmented system in which international 
regulations are not appropriately reflected in national legislation or are 
insufficient to address local/national issues. Even at a national level, 
regulatory bodies are disconnected from each other. Figure 4.1 portrays an 
orderly system of regulation. In practice, however, the regulation is not 
orderly and free-flowing; rather, it is complicated and fraught with political 
tensions and conflicting motivations (Schutz 1970) at almost all levels. 
Figure 4.1 does not clearly show the influence of member states and the 
industry on the regulatory process. As outlined in Chapter 2, member 
states have an interest in the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry as it 
is a major source of Western governments’ tax revenue. The structure and 
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organisation of the regulatory process is more accurately shown in Figure 
4.2 below. 
 
Figure 4.2: Convoluted Structure of clinical trials regulatory system  
Another aspect of the regulatory process, discussed in the following 
section, is the relationship between science, uncertainty and professional 
work.  
Science and uncertainty in the regulatory process 
The practice of science should involve regular engagement with the 
issues that are of topical and motivational relevance to the public. Scientific 
and public interests are sometimes shared but at times they conflict. The 
public hopes for improved healthcare while the motivations of the 
commercial companies are to maximise profits; governments must attempt 
to strike a balance between the two. The drug development process is 
always imbued with uncertainties and shrouded in the politics of ethics.  
The CHMP requires that the process of drug development follow 
strict procedures for safety testing. In determining whether a drug should 
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be administered to humans for the first time, regulators consult previous 
outcomes of the scientific testing of drugs in the production process. The 
process, discussed in Chapter 1, starts with testing of IMPs in animals, 
which must be done to an adequate standard, to ascertain toxicity and 
levels for human exposure. Once this is ascertained, FIHCTs (phase I) are 
carried out, in which the IMP is tested on healthy volunteers. Following 
phase I, if the IMP passes, are phases two and three in which the drug is 
tested on patients. The trials are done on small numbers of patients to test 
the effectiveness of the drug on the target health condition. After the drug 
is deemed suitable for human use, further tests and reports are required 
and further monitoring is done during the post-marketing licensing period 
referred to as pharmaco-vigilance. This process can be summarised in a 
figure 4.3 as illustrated by Abraham (1997: 157): 
 
Figure 4.3 Drug Development process: Adapted from Abraham, J. (1997), 6. The science 
and politics of medicines regulation. Sociology of Health & Illness, 19: 153–182 
Of interest in this research is the uncertainty that surrounds the 
conduct of FIHCTs. As mentioned earlier, decisions on whether to test 
IMPs on humans depends on the nature of the tests in animals and the 
results. This involves identifying potential risk factors from the data (EMA 
1998). For example, the mode of action of the IMP, including its nature 
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and intensity with regard to durability and reversibility of effects, would be 
carefully noted. Researchers might also consider whether a given 
compound and evidence from animal models regarding potential 
pharmacological toxicity pose risks for humans (EMA 2007). Further 
consideration is given to the nature of the target in the human body such 
as tissues and cells, and how this might vary between individuals. 
Moreover, researchers may query the relevance of applying the animal 
model to humans in terms of its “homology, signal transduction pathways 
and the nature of the pharmacological effects” (EMA 2007:5). There must 
also be assurances that reliable methods will be used in determining the 
starting dose in humans and the formulation in which it will be 
administered, as there are risks of overestimating the starting dose. In 
summary, the studies involve testing of drugs “in vivo” (in living whole 
animals) and “in vitro” (in cells in petri dishes in the laboratory) (EMA 
1988: 2007) with a view to ascertaining the toxicity of compounds for 
humans. These studies provide the basis for decisions for regulators as to 
whether a study should be carried out in humans. While the 
pharmaceutical industry organises the clinical testing, tests for toxicity 
often involve the wider scientific community, from which experts, mostly 
the licensing team at the MHRA, give their opinion as to whether 
formulations can be safely tested on humans. In general, in FIHCTs and 
other phase trials, testing of drugs takes the form of double-blind trials to 
ascertain the actual effects on the drug in humans (EMA 1998).  
This summary of how safety concerns are addressed in the drug 
testing process illustrates possible areas of uncertainty in FIHCTs. It has 
become clear that animal testing is not always a reliable indicator of how 
human subjects would react to compounds (Litchfield 1961; Posvar and 
Sedman 1989), as the 2006 Northwick Park incident and others attest 
(Hanke 2006; A. Hedgecoe 2013). Differences in animal and human 
physiology and biology mean that some drugs might not work as expected 
in humans and trials sometimes do go wrong. This is something that the 
regulators rightly acknowledge: 
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Qualitative and quantitative differences may exist in 
biological responses in animals compared to humans. 
For example, there might be differences in affinity for 
molecular targets, tissue distribution of the molecular 
target, cellular consequences of target binding, cellular 
regulatory mechanisms, metabolic pathways, or 
compensatory responses to an initial physiological 
perturbation. (European Medicines Agency EMA 
CHMP expert group 2007:6) 
Some animal studies with highly species-specific medicinal 
products may not produce the expected effects in humans and may also 
result in incorrect predictions of pharmacokinetic and pharmaco-dynamic 
outcomes (EMA CHMP Expert Group 1988). The process of transitioning 
drug testing from animals to humans is complex since it is difficult to 
ascertain risks to humans (EMA 2009; EMA 2007). It makes FIHCTs very 
risky, too. However, the regulators are often quick to argue that this does 
not necessarily mean that FIHCTs have increased risks. Their arguments 
are often based on the views of teams of scientific experts involved in the 
process. It is their reports, reviews and assessment from this process of 
drug development that regulators use to make decisions about licensing or 
issuing of permits to conduct clinical trials (Abraham 1997). However, 
other issues relate to the potential to extrapolate studies in animals – for 
instance, the fact that only a small portion of the human population is 
given the IMP – means that the outcomes from such studies cannot be 
extrapolated to the wider population. In addition, although volunteers are 
examined before being admitted to the trial, people’s states of health differ 
according to their age, weight and other factors, and they may thus 
respond differently to drugs during and after clinical trials. Obviously, 
there is the argument that tests are done to check for toxicity during the 
post-marketing phase of drugs testing (Abraham 1997). However, as 
Litchfield (1961) and more recently Posvar and Sedman (1989) and 
Abraham and Davis (2007) find, the outcomes of toxicity testing in clinical 
trials cannot be relied upon to produce consistent results. Even today these 
issues are still cause for concern, as can be seen in the discussion among 
global experts on drug discovery and the results from animal testing as a 
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basis for human trials (Clotworthy 2012). In addition, there may be 
different scientific criteria applied to how these three sources of data – the 
pre-clinical, clinical and post-marketing – may be interpreted (Abraham 
2007). This adds to the uncertainty in these processes.  
In summary, it is crucial to appreciate the interaction of science 
and politics of regulation in this process; these uncertainties do not occur 
in a vacuum. The entire process is imbued with competing and sometimes 
conflicting motivations. Pharmaceutical companies may want a fast-track 
process to approve drugs in order to maximise profits; governments are 
the custodians of public health but see the pharmaceutical companies as 
sources of economic growth. Then there are patient groups and individuals 
who may demand access to new and better treatments but are also wary of 
health risks. These interests may conflict, but they are not exclusive.  
The above discussion and the data derived from documentary 
analysis in the chapter so far have revealed the multiplicity of actors and 
processes involved in both the regulation and the business of clinical trials. 
Regulation is responsible not only for ensuring fairness from a social 
justice perspective but also for defining, positioning and legitimising forms 
of agency. As Zhao (2005) observes about the role of classifications, 
regulation institutes, authorises and legitimises the practice of clinical trials. 
Regulation assigns different actors roles and responsibilities and defines 
who is responsible for what and thus contours issues that are relevant to 
them (Schutz 1970). Through regulation the discourse of bioethics, which 
is associated with autonomy, informed consent and volunteering, has 
become a central part of clinical trial governance. This discourse creates 
boundaries by defining how far ethics committees or licensing teams can 
go in their operations, as clearly illustrated in the quotes from Directive 
2001/83/EC (cited in this section, above). In doing so, regulation 
represents political power that is used to define and create boundaries 
(Zhao 2005). Thus, regulation needs to address questions such as how the 
pharmaceutical industry, as a dominant force in the business of clinical 
trials, influences the roles of different players and the terms on which they 
are dealt with. It is also important to note how uncertainty is part of the 
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clinical trial process. Though experts are involved throughout the clinical 
trial processes, there are no assurances that outcomes of trials will be of 
benefit or relevance (Schutz 1970) to the public. Nor can guarantees be 
given about the outcome of clinical trials involving healthy volunteers. 
Having set out these organisational complexities, in the following section I 
focus on professional views of the clinical trial regulatory process. 
PART II 
4.3 Professional views on the regulation of first-in-human 
clinical trials  
I refer to participants in this research who work for CROs as 
corporate professionals and those working for regulatory bodies as 
regulatory officials. Part I discussed the structural organisation of the 
regulatory process, based on documentary data. Drawing on data from 
interviews conducted for this research, I now discuss how professionals in 
the field of clinical trials view the existing regulatory process. Having 
reviewed the structure and organisation of the regulatory process, it is 
important to provide a critical analysis of the views and experiences of 
professionals and healthy volunteers in regard to the adequacy of the 
process, to show how the regulatory system operates in practice. 
Professionals in the pharmaceutical industry and regulatory bodies were 
interviewed in two groups. Those in the industry tended to believe that 
regulatory frameworks were more than adequate. They often expressed a 
fear that anything more would constitute over-regulation, which might 
drive business away:  
initially I think everyone was apprehensive about the 
new requirements that were put in place in 2004. There 
was a general view that it’s too much regulation 
(Corporate Professional 1). 
I think the process is brilliant now and I am satisfied 
with the requirements, though somehow some of the 
things border on over-regulation and could put business 
off (Corporate Professional 2). 
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These concerns and attitudes were echoed by an official with a 
regulatory body who talked about the response of the industry to the 
changes in the clinical trial approval systems in 2004, when the government 
introduced compulsory submissions to the MHRA and to ethics 
committees for FIHCTs: 
concerns from industry when we started this in 2004 
were on how much that affected their business … in 
terms of how fast the turnaround of applications would 
be and whether it would slow down the process for 
them (Regulatory Official 5). 
Issues that were of topical and motivational relevance (Schutz 
1970) to professionals from the industry were mostly that the regulatory 
process could make it difficult to conduct their business. This has always 
been the response by industry to regulation and shapes the interactions 
between corporations and regulators. Abraham and Lewis (2000) observe 
that the industry’s interactions with governments and regulatory bodies are 
aimed at reducing time and costs and influencing the regulatory process. 
Some professionals felt that regulations were not excessive but were useful 
in bringing about confidence and trust in the industry, supporting the idea 
that it is safe to do business in the UK. One participant said incidents of 
trials going wrong – such as the Northwick Park incident and the death of 
a healthy volunteer in the US in 2000 from hexamethonium, a drug 
previously used in the 1950s and 1960s to treat high blood pressure 
(Savulescu 2002) – made people question the clinical trial process: 
having said that [that regulation could impede business] 
… for me the feeling is that the process this brings 
about changes, and much needed changes, which I think 
restores public trust … in the industry, on the other 
hand (Corporate Professional 1). 
Fragmented regulatory system 
For those involved in the regulation of the industry, there was a 
common feeling that while the framework was effective, there was room 
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for improvement. A regulatory official who has served on ethics 
committees said: 
[The] MHRA has been good in that they have raised 
awareness in areas where people thought they were 
doing fine but who probably would not understand that 
the rules and regulation applied to them … Shall we go 
back to unregulated clinical research? I don’t see why 
we should. Now I am not saying the system is excellent. 
We could do better but things are now better than 
before (Regulatory Official REC 11). 
Of course the system is better than before. There are 
things that need improving and we are heading in the 
right direction (Regulatory Official 9). 
The participants talked of regulation being better now than the system that was in 
place prior to 2004. By this, the participants’ were referring to how the existing 
process provided what they considered to be a systematic process of accountability 
compared to the previous system where little if not no review of FIHCT applications 
was done by regulators. In the previous system as outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, 
investigators conducting FIHCTs were not required to submit their clinical trial 
applications for review; instead these were often reviewed internally. The 
introduction of the 2004 medicines for human use regulation, outlined in the 
regulatory context in chapter one of this thesis, required that all clinical trials 
including FIHCTs be subject to systematic regulatory review. One official, while 
welcoming the improvements, was critical of the way the existing system works: 
I think the problem with the existing system, good as it 
may be, is that there is a lot of lack of clarity on who 
does what. For example, the Northwick Park incident 
highlighted, in my opinion, that there was this 
assumption that everyone gives peer review to everyone 
and there was no flow of information to others. 
Obviously things are improving but we can do better 
(Regulatory Official REC 10). 
This reference to the 2006 Northwick Park incident illustrates how 
the regulatory process operated on an assumption that everyone was 
checking what others were doing but without clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities. The fault is seen to lie with the system of regulation and 
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not with individuals or institutions. The above quote also illustrates the 
disconnected nature of the regulatory process – what I call the 
“fragmented regulatory system”. While some parts of the process are 
clearly defined, other aspects are not well integrated, leaving gaps that can 
be exploited by industry. Some argue that some elements of the process 
are conveniently left out of the regulatory process in the interest of the 
industry (Abraham and Lewis 2000; Davis and Abraham 2011; Davis and 
Abraham 2013). In other words, it is of topical and motivational relevance 
to both regulators and the industry (Schutz 1970; McGoey 2012). An 
example is the lack of clarity regarding payments to volunteers, which 
works in the industry’s favour.  
Staff involved in assessing applications and inspection of clinical trial units 
felt that the system had generally improved and would continue to 
improve:  
Obviously things are better now but we can do better. 
But overall I am satisfied with the way things are going 
in regulation and there has been improvement in 
practice in many areas (Professional 6). 
 Participants responding to questions about the adequacy of 
regulatory frameworks tended to take an official line. Getting them to 
express their opinion on the subject was challenging: 
Mwale: How satisfactory is the regulatory system today, 
in your opinion? 
P: Well, what do you mean? Um, it is good. I’m happy, I 
can say it’s not bad at all and I think we do a good job. 
That’s why we are here. If you ask everyone here they 
will tell you the same. You are not going to quote me, 
are you? 
Mwale: Well, I might. 
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P: Well, I think the system works well. Might need to be 
improved in some areas but it’s working well 
(Regulatory Official 8). 
I don’t think I want to answer questions about the 
shortfalls of the existing system, because I think that the 
regulation of first in-human studies is very good and, 
um, you could not possibly put any more into the 
current review process to make it any safer or to make it 
… um … I think it’s very robust as it stands. I don’t 
think anything else that you can put in would make it 
more robust (Regulatory Official REC 10). 
The last quote was the initial response to the question about the 
adequacy of the regulatory system. This shows how much the professionals 
tried to avoid questions about the regulatory process. To answer these 
questions, they required a great deal of probing. 
Some participants spoke of the challenge of making EU directives 
work in practice. EU directives were often thought to be inadequate –
hence the need for supplementary guidelines for practitioners on the 
frontline:  
Oftentimes the EU directives are not sufficient or may 
not be clear or relevant to staff in units so we have to 
make additional guidelines to help people put in practice 
EU guidelines … In some cases we used to find that 
what was for us an obvious thing for practice, such as 
making sure that each unit has an easy access area for 
ambulances clearly marked out, was not in place, or 
having a crash trolley always ready and restocked 
(Regulatory Official 8). 
This comment indicates the challenges of international regulation 
while strengthening the case for a contextualised regulatory approach. 
Varying socio-economic conditions and cultural circumstances make the 
application of the harmonisation principles problematic; member countries 
have different problems and in some cases different cultures of working, 




Participants generally felt that the system was adequate in dealing 
with regulatory issues, but there was some apprehension about regulatory 
frameworks, and some concern that too much regulation could slow down 
the approval of applications and increase costs. It was also acknowledged 
that the guidelines and regulations in place were not adequate and some 
participants believed that certain issues could not be regulated. There was 
also a feeling that the EU directives are not always clear and needed to be 
supplemented by local in-house instructions.  
The following section focuses on aspects of regulation in the UK 
which are of particular concern for this thesis: payments and prevention of 
over-volunteering.  
4.4 Regulating monetary rewards to volunteers 
Although there are concerns about the potential for exploitation 
when rewards are offered in clinical trials, there are no clear guidelines 
about how much volunteers should be paid. The bioethical discourse about 
payments to volunteers regards them as compensation for their time and 
inconvenience, not as wages (Abadie 2010; Geissler 2011; Cooper and 
Waldby 2014); healthy volunteers are considered capable participants who 
are able to represent their own interests. Opponents of this view argue that 
inequality in society predisposes some people to take part in clinical trials 
because of their straitened financial circumstances (Lemmens and Elliott 
1999b); hence the need for guidance and protection for vulnerable groups. 
While legislation in the UK acknowledges the possibility of exploitation, it 
does not provide explicit guidance on how much volunteers in FIHCTs 
should be paid. The issue is mentioned only as a matter that RECs have to 
take into account: 
(5) In preparing its opinion, the committee shall 
consider, in particular, the following matters – 
(a) the relevance of the clinical trial and its design; 
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(b) whether the evaluation of the anticipated benefits 
and risks as required under paragraph 2 of Part 2 of 
Schedule 1 is satisfactory and whether the conclusions 
are justified; …. 
(f) the quality of the facilities for the trial; 
(g) the adequacy and completeness of the written 
information to be given, and the procedure to be 
followed, for the purpose of obtaining informed 
consent to the subjects’ participation in the trial; …. 
(k) the amounts, and, where appropriate, the 
arrangements, for rewarding or compensating 
investigators and subjects; (Medicines for Human Use 
Act 2004 part 3, 15 (5). 
Among professionals working on ethics committees, accounts of lack of 
clarity were common. One noted: 
There is no guidance, rules or regulations about how 
much people should be paid for taking part in clinical 
trials. The only arbiters of it are the ethics committee 
because you have to tell an ethics committee how much 
compensation you are going to give in a study and they 
consider that to be an inducement and hence an ethical 
issue. But then how [to] come to that decision is not laid 
out in any detail. It is possible that … there … is … 
some variance in the way that different ethics 
committees decide on the same issues. Whether state 
involvement would make it any better I doubt (REC 
Official 11). 
No, there are no legal or set guidelines on how much 
volunteers have to be paid so it is hard I think for 
researchers to know. Most researchers go based on what 
they can get in a grant, for example, they have been 
awarded, but that is for academic trials. For commercial 
ones it is at their discretion to determine and we just 
have to ask how they arrived at the fee (REC Official 9). 
It is noteworthy that while for industry the issue of payment is seen 
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as compensation, ethics committee members in particular talked of 
payments as inducement. The difference shows how industry tries to 
downplay the implications of payment, while ethics committee members 
were acutely aware of the problems that payments to volunteers give rise 
to in clinical trials. The lack of clarity on guidance is felt at national and 
international levels (Lemmens and Elliott 1999). The quotes above show 
that ethics committees hold different views about what reasonable 
payment means which means variable practices (Petryna 2009) among 
ethics committees. This is indicative of the differences in topical and 
motivational relevances among professionals, industry, regulators and the 
public. The only clear view on payment comes from the ABPI, which in its 
2012 guidelines (and previous versions for clinical trials) states that: 
So it is right to pay subjects – healthy subjects and 
patients – who volunteer for Phase I trials more than 
just any expenses that they incur. The amount should be 
related to the duration of residence on the unit, the 
number and length of visits, lifestyle restrictions, and 
the type and extent of the inconvenience and 
discomfort involved. As a guide, payments should be 
based on the minimum hourly wage … and should be 
increased for procedures requiring extra care on the part 
of the subject or involving more discomfort. Payment 
must never be related to risk (ABPI 2012:20).  
The first part of this statement arguably disqualifies the second part 
relating to risk because once payment is linked to discomfort, it is likely to 
increase. That “discomfort” and the link to risk occur in the same guideline 
also raises questions. Does “discomfort” mean only needle pricks and the 
frequency with which the subjects give blood, or does it include side 
effects? If it includes side effects, is risk a consideration? The dearth of 
comprehensive guidelines on payment to volunteers is paradoxical because 
it is generally agreed by academics and regulators, among others, that 
healthy volunteers are predominantly motivated by the payments on offer, 
and yet it is contended that the rewards should not be the primary 
motivation (Schutz 1970; Lemmens and Elliot 1999; (McNeill 1997; 
Macklin 1989). By contrast, the focus in medical and pharmaceutical 
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discourse positions healthy volunteering as an act of altruism. The 
tendency to avoid discussions and to provide clear guidelines about 
monetary rewards is widespread. In the Northwick Park incident, for 
instance, payments are said to have played a major part in recruiting 
participants who could not resist the proffered rewards (Spielman 2007), 
but the ensuing investigations and reports of the MHRA and the DoH did 
not raise the issue of monetary rewards. The concerns were mainly about 
safety in the development, transportation, administration and monitoring 
of the test drugs and subjects (MHRA 2006, DoH 2006). The only guide to 
payment, that given by the ABPI, is not legally binding or a practice which 
CROs are obliged to observe. This was confirmed by one of the 
professionals:  
The guidelines are not regulation; they are 
recommended best practice and also serve to signpost 
the reader to the relevant regulations – you can clearly 
see these listed in the appendix. Regulation is set by the 
medicines regulators – MHRA, and EMA. The 
regulators are independent of ABPI (Corporate 
Professional 4). 
UK legislation does not cover issues of payment to volunteer 
participants in research. Rewards to volunteers are mentioned in the 2011 
Nuffield Report on organ donations, which supports the idea of payment 
to volunteers and alludes to the need to ensure that payments are 
appropriate. It also regards payment as a form of benefit for volunteers, as 
in the gift relationship, discussed in Chapter 2, between the researchers, 
research and participants (Nuffield Council Report 2011). The view is that 
researchers and participants both benefit. The concept of payments given 
in the Nuffield Report and discussed among professionals is influenced by 
the Belmont Report (1979), which construes payments as benefits to 
research subjects. Though not a legal document, it has influenced policies 
and guidelines on ethics widely among research participants. Like many 
regulatory instruments, the Belmont Report emphasises the assurance of 
informed consent and the avoidance of exploitation of research subjects. 
Legitimate as these concerns are, however, there are conflicting 
139 
 
assumptions. Construing payments to volunteers as benefits represents 
monetary rewards in clinical trials as virtuous, and so obscures the 
inequality and risks that certain groups of participants encounter 
(Lemmens and Elliott 1999; Geissler 2011). As shown in Chapter 2, the 
concept of informed consent sees individuals as autonomous beings in a 
market economy who are at liberty to accept money to put their bodies at 
risk. But if individual liberty is worth upholding, in this case it is at odds 
with the principle that individuals should be protected from exploitation 
and harm (Lemmens and Elliott 2001; Jonsen 1989). This observation 
emerged in my research; several corporate professionals and regulatory 
officials felt that payments were problematic in clinical trials, as the 
following quotations showed: 
Yes, I think payments do affect and may actually coerce 
volunteers into participating … Yes, I think that’s 
always a concern, I do think that is exactly what 
happens (Corporate Professional 2). 
Of course in any culture that pays people to take part in 
studies there is always this debate as to whether they 
take part for the money or they are taking part in 
research because they have a greater understanding of 
things like research processes. So obviously, when you 
start paying people thousands of pounds to take part in 
research, then you really have to think of that. Is this 
more of an inducement rather than that they are taking 
part for compensations, and people have to think, is it 
about that? (Regulatory Official REC 11). 
There were different views about what should be done to address 
the problem. REC members generally saw the need for corporate 
professionals, academics and regulators to discuss the issue. For one such 
official the problem was that issues of payment are often not of topical 
relevance among professionals in the field:  
I think it’s something that we should be talking about in 
the research community much more than we do. We 
don’t talk very much about issues of compensation, we 
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often teach [people] we are teaching about research that 
any compensation must be seen to be appropriate and 
not too excessive. But we rarely talk about or ever put 
figures on it and perhaps we need to as a unit, as 
professional groups, as multi-disciplinary professionals. 
We need to discuss what is appropriate and what is too 
much. Where is the line crossed? (Regulatory Official 
REC 11). 
The discussion on payment would ideally influence not only 
legislation but also best practices of dealing with payments and the 
recruitment of volunteers.  
No-man’s-land of regulation 
Corporate professionals and regulators in this research were 
generally resigned to the anomalies in the issue of payment. They all saw 
the problem of payments as inevitable, something they had nothing to do 
with and could do nothing about; in other words, payments were not of 
topical and motivational relevance. As one remarked:  
Oh, yes, payments and coercion do concern me … but I 
have had to live with it and … I don’t think there is 
anything I can do about it. What can you do? I mean, 
you can’t bar poor people from taking part because 
that’s discriminating against poor people. You can’t pay 
rich people more than you pay poor people because that 
would seem even more unfair on the poor people. Erm, 
so we pay everybody the same and that means it is more 
of an incentive for poor people, which is a fact. So … 
yes, it’s always been our … my concern but it’s not one 
that I certainly know the answer [to] … and I don’t 
think they [ethics committees] know the answer either, 
so it’s just a difficult question we have to live with 
(Corporate Professional 2). 
If we stop paying them, who will want to take part in a 
clinical trial as a volunteer? It would be easy for me to 
say here, let’s stop paying people for volunteering, but if 
we don’t pay people, we may not have studies because 
no one will volunteer (Regulatory Official REC 11). 
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Such comments show how issues that directly affect volunteers 
seem to be of little significance to regulators. They also show how 
regulation limits and defines roles of participants and how free market 
considerations permeate the regulatory process. Payments to volunteers 
seem to present a dilemma to the professionals running and regulating 
clinical trials. They all felt that whatever changes they brought about would 
disadvantage participants one way or another. Members of ethics 
committees can do nothing about the problem because research has to 
take place regardless. Regulatory officials with the MHRA and corporate 
professionals with the ABPI avoided talking about payments, referring 
such questions to ethics committees:  
Well, interesting question about payment but I can’t say 
anything about that because we do not deal with 
payments to volunteers. The best people to answer 
those kind of questions are the ethics committees 
(Regulatory Official 6). 
The questions you pose [about the payments] are ethical 
questions, best answered by the National Research 
Ethics Service. We have nothing to do with that and so 
I will not be answering those questions (Regulatory 
Official 8). 
Professionals generally regarded payments as a “street level” 
problem or as something they would consider at some unspecified point in 
time. There was also a tendency to “pass the buck”, as shown in the 
foregoing extracts, and a suggestion that ethics was the remit of a specific 
group. Ethics committee members felt that it was not their role to deal 
with payment issues. Payments are obviously of different topical and 
motivational relevance to the different professional groups represented in 
this research. In the following extract, the rationale for disregarding the 
issue was compliance with anti-competitiveness rules:  
These guidelines are not legally binding and they are not 
obliged to follow these – they are just guidelines 
highlighting best practice. We can’t prescribe what they 
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should do because we do not want to breach anti-
competiveness rules (Corporate Professional 4). 
By invoking anti-competition rules, the interviewee clearly situated 
healthy volunteering in the market economy; any attempt to define or 
restrict payments to volunteers is seen as interfering with the market. 
Meanwhile, ethics committee members, although they recognised that they 
have the authority to ask questions about payment, talked of feeling 
powerless to deal with issues of payment because of restrictions on what 
they were allowed to ask. Some of them felt that the problem with 
regulating payments was that money meant different things to different 
people, which demonstrates how topical and motivational relevances can 
be imposed by wider institutional factors: 
Money has different significance to people who are in 
different life situations. So if you are struggling 
financially … there is more of an inducement to some 
people than others. So the studies are better value for 
some people, there is greater incentive. The money is a 
bigger incentive to people who are poor. And so if you 
are unemployed you … would value the payments that 
[are given] much more highly than … a well-paid 
person. And I … don’t think there is any way around 
that (Regulatory Official REC 11). 
What this means is that payments to volunteers are shifted into the 
margins or what I call the “no-man’s-land” of regulation, resulting in 
varied practices and placing financially vulnerable individuals at risk of 
coercion and exploitation (Petryna 2009). Corporate professionals on the 
frontline mostly believed the problem of coercion had less to do with the 
inducement of higher payments than with how ethics committees failed to 
see the payments as coercive most of the time: 
…but I don’t think it actually happens because the 
ethics committees are very worried about coercion … 
but if anything, ethics committees encourage us to pay 
more. We very rarely, if ever, have been asked to reduce 
a payment – if anything the reverse. Ethics committees 
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don’t seem to see the coercion risk. I don’t think it’s 
coercion, I think, as I mentioned just now, the 
volunteers, if anything, think that if it’s big payments 
then they think it [the clinical trial] must be dangerous, 
but it’s not (Corporate Professional 1). 
For corporate professionals generally it was the healthy volunteers’ 
views of payment that seem to be of relevance. What was of topical 
relevance was that healthy volunteers interpreted being paid more for their 
involvement in a clinical trial as an indication that the study was high-risk. 
The focus was on protecting the image of clinical trials; that way they 
might be inclined to pay slightly less:  
So they say things like they know there are risks and 
some of them think they get, genuinely get, more money 
because it’s risky. And of course, all those things are not 
the case, erm, because you don’t get more money 
because it’s risky. In fact they are remarkably safe but 
the volunteers don’t necessarily think they are … if we 
were giving them danger money we wouldn’t be, erm … 
erm, that means that the study isn’t safe and so we 
wouldn’t be doing it. But, erm … many of the 
volunteers don’t really see that; they think that these 
things; they don’t realise perhaps that the studies are as 
safe as they really are (Corporate Professional 2). 
They argued their payments bore no relation to the risks involved 
but rather depended on the length of time spent in the trial. That risk is a 
consideration for volunteers was confirmed by one REC official: 
People tend to factor in additional payment such as [for] 
discomfort and time. For instance, if you are spending 
24 hours in a unit and you are having loads of blood 
samples taken [or if you had] a bronchoscopy, just for 
argument’s sake, then is it right that you get paid the 
same amount of hours in the unit as when you give two 
blood samples [on a short visit]? Then I would say no 
because actually they have got the pain and discomfort 
of all of the procedures and risk associated with the 
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procedures. So the risk is greater. Therefore, we should 
recognise that risk (Regulatory Official REC 10). 
When asked how payment for clinical trials was calculated, a regulatory 
official replied:  
…you might say this is not minimum wage work. You 
are exposing yourself to more risk. People would argue 
you need to be paid more for that. This is not just like 
stocking shelves in Tesco’s; this is more. There is 
potential for a problem here. You have calculated those 
risks and you are making an investment in it. So I could 
see the argument for that (Regulatory Official REC 11). 
In interviews, professionals were asked to considered ways in 
which additional procedures – linked in the ABPI guidelines to 
“discomfort” – conferred risk. CROs and pharmaceutical companies 
would rather not admit that the trial payments were linked to risks because 
they would want to be seen to be protecting volunteers from risk; besides, 
it would discourage people from taking part in clinical trials.  
 This section has highlighted the differences between written 
guidelines and what participants in the study say about the situation 
regarding risk and payments. In addition the discussion has highlighted 
how certain views about payments to volunteers permeate the regulatory 
process of FIHCTs to those feeling they have little influence on how this 
should be changed are clearly reflected in the accounts cited above. The 
difficulty of ensuring public safety on one hand and creating a climate in 
which industry can flourish on the other can clearly be seen in these 
accounts. In the process, issues of public safety are shifted to the “no-
man’s-land” of regulation as industry interests take priority.  
The following section looks most closely at the fragmented nature 
of the regulatory system and at measures to stop over-volunteering. 
4.5 Safety: the role of volunteer registers 
Another issue that is often shifted to the “no-man’s-land” of 
regulation is that of monitoring and reducing over-volunteering. Due to 
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the amount of money on offer in clinical trials, there are concerns that 
some healthy volunteers may be enrolling in a succession of clinical trials 
without a safe interval. Abadie (2010) talks of “career volunteers” in 
clinical trials. The phenomenon is of motivational relevance to regulators 
and researchers alike because there may be some drug interactions that 
affect findings and thus trial outcomes. It also poses a danger to the health 
of the individuals if there is a drug interaction or if they donate too much 
blood. In any case, legislation requires researchers to demonstrate that they 
are checking on the health of the research participants: 
(h) arrangements for the recruitment of subjects, 
including the materials to be used; 
(i) the criteria for inclusion and exclusion of patients, 
including justification for recruiting from vulnerable 
groups; 
(j) in the case of Phase I trials, methods for recording 
and verifying health status for healthy volunteers; 
(k) procedures for checking simultaneous or recent 
involvement of potential subjects in other trials … 
(Medicines for Human Use Act 2004; schedule 3, part 1 
(1).  
The requirements do not specify how this should be done. 
Nonetheless, in response the industry has reluctantly devised a system of 
how to address them – healthy volunteer registers. As one professional 
noted: 
Some things we have done like the over-volunteering 
strategies … the MHRA was making threatening noises 
about things and we have had to do something about 
those things (Corporate Professional 2). 
The healthy volunteer registers are intended to function as a 
database that CROs use to screen recruited participants prior to admission. 
146 
 
A passport number or other suitable identifier is used to check if the 
individual has been on a clinical trial within, say, the last six months. In 
Europe, the best-regarded register is one used in France, the Fichier 
National/Volontaires Recherches Biomediclaes (VRB). It is a single 
national register used for all research run by CROs there. By contrast, in 
the UK there are multiple registers kept by different CROs and no 
coordination between them. Other measures are the “over-volunteering 
prevention system” (TOPS) and the National Volunteer Register (NVR), 
which maintains data to a certain national level and is rarely used, and the 
Volunteer Inclusion Period (VIP) register, which is available for use in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, but at a fee. Some CROs access 
the VRB to check on international volunteers. Such databases store 
information such as age, gender and passport numbers and check for 
recent involvement in clinical trials. They are organised and managed by 
individual CROs. Regulators do not regard the registers as part of their 
remit; rather they emphasise that something is being done demonstrably to 
avoid over-volunteering: 
We do not see how this register works. I mean, we do 
not regulate the register. Obviously, what is of interest 
to us is that they are doing something to mitigate against 
overuse of volunteering (Regulatory Official REC 8). 
Asked if there were concerns that the registers might fall short of 
their intended purpose, the official responded: 
Well, we are aware that it’s not 100%. You know, if 
people want to beat the system they can actually do it 
… but at least it’s there.  
There was no consensus among professionals in the field with 
regard to the effectiveness of registers or which was best suited to dealing 
with over-volunteering. That is borne out by the fact that there are 
multiple registers. Proponents of TOPS argued that their system was 
effective and had reduced the problem of over-volunteering. This group of 
participants had analysed data over a period of four years and they were 
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able to identify about one percent of the 7,000 people they had checked in 
that period as having come from another trial within the previous two to 
six weeks:  
We knew it was working because the rate at which we 
detected over-volunteering has since been going down 
(Corporate Professional 2). 
However, proponents of the NVR argued that TOPS did not work 
and was not best suited to detecting over-volunteering because using 
passport or national insurance numbers was always suspect. They argued 
that the system allowed for multiple registrations, and the argument that 
detection rates had declined could be seen to be a result of people finding 
ways round the system to avoid detection. The other issue that causes 
conflict is the organisation of the programme itself. Registers maintained 
by individual CROs might give competitors access to their contact lists of 
volunteers, which has prompted the development of alternative registers. 
For proponents of NVR, the database approach to monitoring over-
volunteering was not ideal. Instead, they favoured a search engine system 
in which details would not be shared but show the result of a search 
indicating whether a volunteer was suitable for trial:  
The whole TOPS business is not ideal at all. I think we 
need an independent system, not one run by your rivals, 
because I wouldn’t want to share the details of my 
volunteers with my competitors. We need a search 
engine system and not a database where all details are 
revealed. You just want an indication, is this person 
suitable (Corporate Professional 1). 
It is clear that there are tensions and discontent over the use of 
volunteer registers. The implications for safety are that people can go 
through the system undetected. For instance, if they have been tested in a 
unit using a different system, their details would not show in a subsequent 
trial unless data from all units were synchronised into one register. The 
problems with volunteer registers are heightened by the differences in 
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views about the topical or motivational relevance of registers among 
professionals, both those in regulation and those running clinical trials. 
This highlights an important issue about competition in the industry. The 
registers are problematic because they are sponsored by pharmaceutical 
contract research companies who do not want to share the details of 
volunteers with competitors. For regulators generally, over-volunteering 
was not of great concern in the UK. It was, however, seen to be a problem 
in the US:  
I think there probably are people like that but I think it 
is less of a problem in this country than it is in other 
countries like the US, where the culture of paying 
people to do research is embedded in their way of life 
(Corporate Professional 2). 
There was also an implicit view that there was little need to address 
over-volunteering in the UK:  
Nobody really wanted to do it, because they didn’t think 
there was a problem [with over-volunteering] and they 
did not want the … one extra thing…[which is] to 
check in TOPS. Yet it’s very easy but it’s still an extra 
thing, so they didn’t do it (Professional 2). 
There are others who believed that over-volunteering should be 
taken seriously. They cited the fact that people can cross borders in 
Europe and enter the UK to take part in clinical trials at any time. 
Most people in industry do not think this is a problem 
but I have seen with my own eyes we have a lot of 
people that cross borders to take part in clinical trials 
and this presents a challenge for us but also even local 
people who overdo the trials (Corporate Professional 1). 
These participants saw a need to bring about an EU-wide register 
to deal with cross-border over-volunteering; failure would compromise 
efforts in the UK to prevent people from enrolling in multiple trials: 
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… because if you do not address this [volunteers from 
across the EU] it is self-defeating. If you get people that 
have just been in a trial coming to you and you have no 
mechanism to check for that except their word, which 
may not always be accurate … but I also understand the 
challenges that are there to bring such a register into 
place (Regulatory Official REC 10). 
The lack of regulatory clarity on this issue is linked to the neoliberal 
view, discussed in a previous section, of individuals as rational actors who 
are free and capable of making rational decisions and to resistance to 
restricting volunteer involvement. At the time of writing, regulators had 
responded to the idea of being involved in volunteer registers. The Health 
Research Authority (HRA) has taken over the running TOPS (HRA 2013). 
The impact of this change remains to be seen, and the idea of an EU-wide 
register remains unaddressed. 
The use of registers and greater state involvement in issues of 
payment to volunteers conflict with the ideals of the free market. Lack of 
state involvement in the regulation of these issues means the state is not 
seen to be actively infringing on individual liberties (Sayed et al. 2014). 
While the professional view of clinical trials regulation is focused on 
process and systems, there is a need to consider how these work in practice 
and how they affect healthy volunteers (Hochschild 2003).  
This section has shown how the regulatory system runs largely on 
self-regulation. It is clear that CROs and CRFs are expected to put in place 
measures to prevent over-volunteering, such as volunteer registers, but the 
measures are not clearly defined. Clinical trial units and pharmaceutical 
companies are expected to devise their own systems, which are 
subsequently accepted by the regulators. This is one example of how 
science and politics collaborate to create self-regulation. Regulators allow 
industry some freedom to determine how they will be regulated, 
highlighting another shortcoming in the regulatory regime.  
4.7 Summary 
This chapter has illustrated the relationship between the state, 
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industry (the market) and healthy volunteers. It has shown that the 
organised and seamless regulatory process portrayed to the public is 
actually a complex activity fraught with conflicting interests and 
shortcomings. Uncertainty in the science of clinical trials is equally a part 
of this process and adds to its complexity. The chapter critically examined 
the concept of healthy volunteers, commonly held throughout the 
regulatory system, as rational actors capable of advancing their interests in 
market-oriented clinical trials. However, such tendencies contribute to a 
“fragmented” regulatory system, and the responsibility for protecting 
healthy volunteers in clinical trials is often left in a “no man’s land” of 
clinical trial regulation. The research found that some issues that might be 
expected to be regulated and overseen were left to the industry to deal 
with, resulting in a lack of clear guidelines on payments for volunteers and 
the inadequacies of volunteer registers. This allows industry the freedom to 
deal with volunteers on their own terms and pay whatever is convenient 
for them or sometimes subject to ethics committee advice. For the 
regulator, on the other hand, having unclear guidelines and viewing 
volunteers as rational actors is useful as they feel that they are no longer 
directly responsible for the outcomes of volunteer involvement in research 
in clinical trials as they are “rational beings” who make rational choices to 
participate.  
The chapter has also shown how Schutz’s system of relevances can 
be applied to the analysis of both individual and institution motivations. 
Like individuals, institutions too have motivations that drive their policies 
and responses to social issues. As shown in the discussions in the chapter, 
issues of topical and motivational relevance to institutions are shaped by 
the market-oriented context in which these institutions are situated. 
Response to issues of payment and other regulatory blind spots for 
example, shows how commercial motivations seem to influence regulatory 
responses on these issues.  
In the following chapter, I explore the idea of rational actors 
further by looking closely at the demographics of healthy volunteers in the 
UK and their motivations for involvement in clinical trials.  
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Chapter 5  
Who takes part in clinical trials and why?  
5.1 Introduction 
Demographic profiles for patient groups who take part in clinical 
trials are easily available. In the US, the Centre for Information and Study 
on Clinical Research Participation (CISCRP) has information on numbers 
of patients and their age, gender and ethnicity, but well-documented 
demographic profiles for healthy volunteers in early phase studies are not 
available in the UK. As mentioned in Chapter 2, while it is possible that 
CROs may have this information, it is certainly not available for public 
scrutiny.  
In medical research, demographics are of vital importance as they 
help to structure and organise the recruitment process (Frank 2004). 
Precise demographic information (for example, assessing age, gender, 
employment and educational attainment) is key to successful research for 
pharmaceutical companies because it influences planning, distribution and 
marketing strategies. Having a highly accurate knowledge of the target 
population is also useful when developing educational and recruitment 
tools (McAllister 2009). More importantly, adequate numbers of volunteers 
are essential for robust evidence and wider testing of drugs (Frank 2004). 
A close study of clinical trial demographics also reveals disparities in 
representation of marginalised groups in clinical research and the 
ramifications of such unequal representation (Epstein 2008b). If no 
consideration is given to who takes part in clinical trials, then certain 
groups are bound to be exposed to exploitative recruitment; they may have 
little say in their protection from undue risk or exploitation and lack advice 
and support in the trial process. In most cases there is little understanding 
of problems that such groups face in terms of health experiences and the 
prevalence of certain diseases (Armstrong, Crum et al. 1999). Well-defined 
demographic data about healthy volunteers enrich debates about their 
involvement in clinical trials. 
With regard to healthy volunteer motivations in countries like the 
152 
 
US, barriers to healthcare (Fisher 2007) are likely to be a motivation for 
taking part in clinical trials. In the UK, healthcare is free at the point of 
delivery. Therefore, the problems that such groups face need to be viewed 
in a wider context, in relation to social inequalities rather than only to 
access to healthcare. Some quantitative medical research has found that 
altruism and the desire to learn more about therapies are major motivating 
factors for volunteers (Aby, Pheley and Steinberg 1996; Truong et al. 
2011). One study showed that access to health benefits during a trial was 
an important incentive for cancer patients (Nurgat et al. 2005). But social 
science academics who have explored motivations for participation in 
clinical trials generally agree that monetary rewards are the major 
motivating factors for healthy volunteers (Lemmens and Elliot 2001; 
Emanuel and Miller 2007). In a mixed methods study conducted in Brazil, 
it was found that the most frequently cited reasons for involvement in 
clinical trials were monetary benefits and access to health (Nappo, Iafrate 
and Sanchez 2013). Research cited earlier in this thesis (Abadie 2010; 
Fisher 2009) has also pointed to financial rewards as motivations for 
involvement. While these findings are encouraging signs of interest in 
healthy volunteer involvement in clinical trials, there has been little focus 
on the context in which these motivations become relevant.  
In the literature review it was demonstrated that in the past 
subjects for first-in-human studies were often vulnerable groups, even 
slaves (Epstein 2008b; Hornblum 1999), and how this changed following 
the Nuremberg ruling, which outlawed the use of captive populations and 
encouraged the use of voluntary participants (Scocozza 1989). The 
introduction of volunteering brought with it other concerns to do with the 
exploitation of poor people desperate for money. Such individuals are 
thought to be willing to subject themselves to health risks in order to make 
a living (Abadie 2010; Petryna 2007). Even bioethics literature seems to 
consider healthy volunteers as coming from low-income households with 
low educational attainment (Hornblum 1998; WHO 1995), and who might 
be coerced into taking part in clinical trials. In the health promotion and 
bioethics literature there is a widespread assumption that people need 
more information and education to improve their health but also to make 
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informed decisions. Other literature on motivation examines why patients 
rather than healthy volunteers seek to take part in clinical trials; while this 
is useful on its own terms, the motivations for healthy volunteers’ 
participation, which may potentially be altruistic as well, are very different 
from those of patients as they have nothing to gain in health terms. Where 
healthy volunteers have been considered, such studies have explored 
motivations using quantitative approaches to ask respondents to select pre-
defined answers (Stunkel and Grady 2011).  
This chapter draws on data from a survey questionnaire and 
interviews with healthy volunteers. The first part focuses on the 
demographic data drawn from my survey; the second examines the 
motivations for involvement using data from both the survey and 
interviews. Based on this sample, it seems that people who take part in 
clinical trials come from a variety of backgrounds – it is not just the poor 
who volunteer for FIHCTs. While financial rewards were an important 
motivation, there is a need to consider wider social circumstances and how 
they encourage people to volunteer. The chapter argues that socio- 
political, socio-economic and social structures should be part of the 
analysis if we are to understand why people take part in clinical trials.  
5.2 Demographics 
Data for this section were obtained from questionnaires that were used as 
a participant recruitment tool for this research. A CRO with over 80,000 
volunteers on its register sent out questionnaires to healthy volunteers on 
its panel on my behalf and 187 healthy volunteers responded.  
5.3 Results 
Gender and age demographics 
Of the 187 that responded to the questionnaire, only 122 healthy 
volunteers responded to the question about their gender. The rationale of 
the question was to find out if there are any gender differences in healthy 
volunteering. 42.6% (52) were male while 57.4% (70) were female, contrary 
to most research to date, which finds that risk-taking activity like that 
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associated with clinical trials is dominated by males (Byrnes, Miller, and 
Schafer 1999; Gardner and Steinberg 2005).  
Respondents were asked to state their age; the hypothesis being 
that young people are more likely to volunteer for clinical trials. Again, 
there were 122 responses of which 4.9% were aged 18–21, 44.3% were 
aged 22–29 and the rest – 50.8% (62) – were between 30 and 40. None of 
the respondents indicated they were older than 40.  
Based on the sample for this research it seems that the respondents 
volunteering in clinical trials were from a variety of backgrounds. First, 
contrary to observations that young men are more likely to engage in risk-
taking behaviour (Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer 1999; Gardner and Steinberg 
2005; Cohn et al. 1995), respondents in my sample were most likely to be 
30 or older, followed by those in their twenties. There were only six 18–21-
year-olds. It is also interesting to note that there were more female 
respondents in this sample than males. This challenges the view that risk 
taking behaviour is the preserve of young men because they are prone to 
feel invincible, reacting to peer pressure and searching for the “buzz” 
(Gardner and Steinberg 2005). However, clinical trials involve different 
levels of risk it is not clear what types of clinical trials attract which age and 
gender categories the most. The type of clinical trial chosen was not asked 
in the questionnaire but it was raised in subsequent interviews. 
Education 
I set out to find if clinical trials were topically relevant to the majority of 
healthy volunteers who had minimal education (secondary school or less). 
Sixty-five volunteers did not respond to this question. Of the 122 who did, 
15.6% (19) had achieved no more than GCSE-level education, 37.7% (46) 
had achieved A-levels and 46.7% (57) had university degrees or higher 
qualifications. A chi-square cross-tabulation was conducted to find out if 
there was a correlation between level of education and willingness to take 
part in a hypothetical clinical trial if £1000 were offered for a five-night 
stay, despite potential risks. It found that 74.7% of those with a degree or 
higher qualification were more likely to express willingness to engage in the 
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hypothetical trial compared to 12.7% of both those with A-levels or 
equivalent and of those with GCSEs or lower. However, the difference 
was not statistically significant (P=0.375, X2=1.960). 
Academic debates tend to reflect the view that taking part in 
clinical trials is more topically relevant for people who are uneducated 
(Horblum 1998, Cooper and Waldby 2014), so I found it interesting that 
most of my respondents had attained A-levels or a higher qualification. 
Though there may be sample bias, willingness to engage in a hypothetical 
clinical trial with above-average risks does not seem to be associated with 
educational attainment. This contradicts assertions that taking part in 
clinical trials is more likely to be topically relevant to people with low 
educational qualifications and challenges the prevailing view that lack of 
education leads to risk-taking behaviour. This view underpins most health 
promotion approaches and is central to the idea of informed consent in 
research participation in that provision of information is seen as educating 
the public so that individuals are able to make informed decisions. In 
Schutz’s terminology, it would be considered aiding the interpretational 
relevance in the decision-making process.  
Employment: income and dependants 
The respondents were asked whether they were employed, in order 
to ascertain whether their socio-economic circumstances were topically 
relevant to the decision to take part in clinical trials. They were asked what 
they did for a living besides volunteering in clinical trials, in order to see if 
this makes taking part in clinical trials topically and interpretationally 
relevant (Schutz 1970). Fifty-nine (or 48.4%) of respondents worked full-
time, 31.1% (38) worked part-time and 20.5% (25) were unemployed. It 
should be made clear that the question on employment concerned what 
the volunteers were doing at the time of completing the questionnaire as 
opposed to what they were doing at the time they started doing clinical 
trials, a question that was raised in interviews. 
To ascertain whether working full-time meant financial security, 
respondents were asked to state their annual incomes. Eighty-three chose 
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not to state how much they earned annually, but among the remaining 104 
respondents 18.3% (19) earned less than £10,000 a year and 19.2% (20) 
earned between £11,000 and £15,000. A further 14.4% (15) earned 
between £16,000 and £20,000, while 48.1% (50) earned more than £21,000 
a year. There was no significant correlation between annual income and 
willingness to take part in a clinical trial if paid £1,000. This is not 
conclusive because there were many non-responses to the question on 
income and the sample size was small. The respondents were also asked to 
state whether they had dependants at home, the rationale being that for 
people with such responsibilities, taking part in clinical trials becomes 
topical because they might feel pressured to provide for their dependants if 
their incomes were marginal. The data showed that only 10.2% (19) had 
dependants. The survey found that there was no significant relationship 
between having dependants and willingness to take part in a clinical trial if 
paid £1,000 pounds for a five-day trial (x2=2.519, P=0.284). 
The limitations of the sample were that it could have 
underrepresented the unemployed or people on low incomes and that it 
was too small compared to the population. Nonetheless, it was surprising 
that most respondents answering the survey were employed and earned 
around £20,000 annually, with 48.1% earning more than £21,000. The 
findings seem to challenge observations that healthy volunteering is 
topically and interpretationally relevant often to those who are unemployed 
or in low income jobs. Most of the respondents could well be earning 
incomes above the recognised level of poverty in the UK, which is defined 
as less than 60% of the national median income (Padley and Hirsch 2014). 
Rather, healthy volunteering is topical to people from a wide variety of 
backgrounds.  
 Nationalities and Ethnicities of healthy volunteers 
Common assumptions, even among professional participants in 
this research, were that healthy volunteering was topically and 
motivationally relevant mostly to young, unemployed travellers, and that if 
they were British citizens they would probably be uneducated people from 
a working class background. In the words of Corporate Professional 2: 
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The British contingent is more reduced to people who 
do not have jobs and to some people who can fit it 
among their working days. So some employed people 
and, um, some people who are technically unemployed 
but might as well be like musicians, actors who … in 
other words might not have consistent work to go to … 
Also it’s changed a little bit over the years, as regards 
nationality … [Previously] a lot of this work was done 
mostly in students [though] the students have faded 
away [and been] replaced by… a large part of healthy 
volunteer[s] … those on one- or two-year working visas 
coming from the Commonwealth like New Zealand, 
South Africa and Australia. And … when the eastern 
European countries joined the EU, we then start to get 
people from the Baltic regions from countries like 
Lithuania, Latvia and also from Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Romania. 
Most respondents to the survey were British citizens (77, or 67.0%), while 
EU nationals accounted for 18.3% (21) and British residents of non-EU 
nationalities accounted for 14.8% (17). However, care must be taken when 
looking at this result as non-Britons may not have responded to the 
questionnaire, reducing their representation in the sample, and people with 
immigration issues could have avoided answering this question or even 
avoided responding to a questionnaire probing their nationality. What is 
more, the questionnaire was sent out by a CRO. It is possible that cross-
border healthy volunteering within the EU takes place but that was not 
shown in the responses. Regarding ethnicities of healthy volunteers, only 
117 respondents answered this question. Based on this sample 75.2% 
described themselves as white Caucasian, with Asian Indians making up 
about 7.7%, and those who described themselves as mixed race making up 
5.5%. Black Africans made up about 4.3%. The rest were small 
percentages of Asian Pakistani, Asian Chinese and African Caribbean. 
Likewise, the same practical considerations and observations apply here; 
results should be taken carefully as the sample may have been biased.  
In short, the findings ran counter to widely held views of the 
topical and motivational relevance of healthy volunteering in FIHCTs. The 
images of poor, vulnerable and uneducated people taking part in clinical 
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trials did not emerge in the responses of the healthy volunteers in this 
research. Nor did they show that volunteers recklessly subject themselves 
to risks. However, the reality is that healthy volunteering is possibly 
topically and motivationally relevant to people from a variety of 
backgrounds, and my data suggest that reasonable numbers are educated 
and in employment. The significance of the findings is that they provide an 
opportunity to reassess understandings of ethics (Rajan 2006) in relation to 
people seen as vulnerable subjects in medical research and views about 
healthy volunteering in general. To do this we need to understand why 
taking part in clinical trials is topically, interpretationally and motivationally 
relevant to these rather unexpected categories of people. In the following 
section I focus on motivations for people’s involvement in clinical trials 
using interview data to elaborate on the findings from the sample survey. 
5.4 The reality: life events and motivations for getting into 
clinical trials 
This section outlines how life events interact with socio-political 
and economic circumstances to make taking part in clinical trials topically 
and motivationally relevant (Schutz 1970) in people’s decision to take part 
in clinical trials. By life events, I mean adverse circumstances such as ill 
health, loss of jobs and increasing debt, and their relevance in influencing 
individuals to become healthy volunteers in first-in-human clinical trials.  
As observed in the previous section, contrary to common 
assumptions, healthy volunteering is not topically, interpretationally and 
motivationally relevant only to students, the poor and uneducated. Rather, 
the survey showed that some are educated and holding relatively well-paid 
jobs. This reality illustrates the complicated nature of the relationship 
between money and social circumstances. Research suggests that that 
people who are in debt take desperate measures, borrowing more money 
and getting deeper into debt (Kamleitner, Hoelzl and Kirchler 2012; 
Montgomerie and Williams 2009). Recently in the UK, the government 
brought out policy directives to address growing levels of over-
indebtedness among certain groups (Wallace 2012). The same may be said 
of people who take part in clinical trials: in the economic downturn, many 
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have lost their jobs and livelihoods and have failed to find other work. 
Some believe they have no choice but to volunteer for clinical trials.  
Monetary reward as motivation 
From the data in this study and from the literature (Stunkel and 
Grady 2011; Emanuel and Miller 2007), it is clear that for most 
respondents money is the motivational relevance for getting involved in 
clinical trials. That is acknowledged by most of the healthy volunteers and 
professionals who took part in this study, as the following extracts show.  
The money is very important. If they put something in 
my body, they have to pay me (HV 9). 
Obviously for me it’s about the money. That’s why I am 
doing it (HV29, aged 25 self-employed, media). 
Well, it is obvious that these individuals get involved in 
our studies because of the money that is on offer. That 
is mainly the reason (Corporate Professional 1). 
This is also supported by findings from the questionnaires. The 
respondents were asked to answer a series of hypothetical questions. When 
asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the statement “Monetary 
compensation was important in my decision to take part in clinical trials”, 
51.2% (62) agreed and a 38.0% (46) strongly agreed with the statement 
compared to 0.8 % (1) and 4.1% (5) disagreeing and strongly disagreeing 
respectively. The respondents were also asked how extremely likely or 
extremely unlikely it was for them to take part in clinical trials if there was 
no monetary reward. Most of the respondents were not willing to take part 
in clinical trials if payments were not included. 52.8% (66) stated that it was 
extremely unlikely and 23.2 % (29) that it was unlikely compared to 1.6% 
(2) and 4.8% (6) who stated they were extremely likely and likely 
respectively, to take part without payment. The remaining 17.6% (22) were 
unsure. Of added interest was the fact that though the survey sample may 
have been biased, even higher-income respondents acknowledged 
160 
 
monetary reward to be a strong motivation. 
Most discussions about motivation for volunteering in clinical trials 
stop at this point, acknowledging that people are motivated by financial 
rewards and then adding a list of other reasons that include altruism. As 
Fisher (2007) observes, such studies tend to see volunteers as individuals 
who willingly come forward when invited to take part in clinical trials. Such 
views of willing subjects are in keeping with the concept of individuals as 
rational actors, a topic covered in detail in the next chapter. A problem 
with such a view is that it results in a smooth narrative of motivations 
which negate the contexts and circumstances of people’s lives and their 
relevance for people’s motivations to volunteer for clinical trials. 
Relationships between money, the body and risk taking are complex and 
often contradictory; decisions to take part in clinical trials often involve a 
system of relevances (Schutz 1970; Bloor 1995) rather than a simple cost-
benefit analysis. Corporate Professional 1 saw it this way:  
I think … that money has different significance to 
people who are in different life situations. So if you are 
struggling … um, or let’s say if you come from Poland, 
a small amount of money in this country, if you send it 
back to Poland … uh … can buy a lot more, and 
similarly for other eastern European countries, maybe 
South America, too. So there is more of an inducement 
for people in certain situations. 
Understanding healthy volunteering in FIHCTs requires looking 
beyond the signed consent form to explore wider issues that can otherwise 
be taken for granted (Schutz 1970; Bloor 1995). This involves presenting 
both the contradictions and similarities in people’s explanations for 
motivations. In the following section, I consider how different factors 
shape people’s motivation for involvement in clinical trials. 
Financial crisis 
For most of the respondents in this project, volunteering in clinical 
trials was not something they wanted to do. Rather, it became topically 
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relevant because they considered their financial situations to be beyond 
their control:  
I was in some debt that really needed to be paid off, 
otherwise I was going to be in some shit if I didn’t, you 
know. So it was kind of a situation where I had to do 
that to get myself out of the sticky situation I was in 
(HV4). 
The first one that did I [pause] um, I think I was in a 
sticky situation, just out of a job at the time, and I 
needed a little bit more extra cash obviously to survive 
and it was a good way to make, a quick way to make big 
sum of money, and yeah [laughs] (HV1). 
Before becoming involved in clinical trials, volunteers usually tried 
other options, such as finding a job. In Schutz’s framework, this would be 
interpretive relevance. This either failed to solve the problem, or there was 
no job to be had. It was at this point that clinical trials become 
motivationally relevant. Even some of the respondents who had jobs 
believed that their earnings would not solve the problem and that it would 
take a long time to pay off the debt.  
At the time, I had a job, the pay was good and 
everything and I had some debt that I had to urgently 
pay off. I would never have managed to pay off the debt 
if I had relied on the job so the only way was taking part 
in a trial (HV 11). 
My main motivation is to help me with things like fees, 
accommodation and things of that sort associated with 
my life at university. You know, I can’t afford to pay 
these fees if I just worked the regular student jobs. So I 
got started after I decided to retrain after losing my job 
in Ireland, so you know, I had no savings to pay for fees 
and things like that. So this for me is a good way of 
meeting those demands. I have tried looking for jobs. I 
just can’t find any (HV25). 
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HV9 said he “had no choice” but do clinical trials. He had been 
unemployed for a long time, he could not find a job and his debts were 
mounting up.  
Also of interest is how participants use accounts of their social 
circumstances as topical and motivational relevance for taking part in 
clinical trials; their decisions seem intended to deflect criticism for risky 
behaviour: 
I was in a transition of my life. I had left my home 
country, Brazil, lived in Europe but could not find a job 
and then came to the UK. During that time I was 
unemployed and was, well, let’s say I was struggling 
financially and I didn’t have much of a choice but to 
volunteer in clinical trials because I badly needed some 
money to pay bills, rent etc. I also had credit card bills 
to settle that were going out of control. I looked for 
normal jobs but couldn’t find any. You know, it was 
really hard situation for me (HV9). 
HV12 had a job, but spoke of the temporary nature of jobs such as 
modelling and acting, which involve short-term contracts: 
I do clinical trials when I am not on set to supplement 
my income. As you may know, work in my field can be 
erratic, so, yeah. So at the time when I decided, right, I 
am just going to have to do this, bills were creeping up 
and I just needed to, you know, get them sorted ASAP. 
I tried other temping jobs but it was going to take too 
long to get them paid off (HV12). 
Some respondents would deflect imputations of greed by 
emphasising that they were in such dire financial straits that they had no 
choice but to take part in clinical trials. Others said they volunteered for 
clinical trials in response to media adverts or after friends had told them 
how much money they had earned in a short time. 
I started taking part in clinical trials in 2006, because at 
the time my friend was doing this. He told me about 
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clinical trials and how much money you can make in a 
short time, such kind of thing, and then I registered 
(HV9). 
Well, my boyfriend started first, so he told me about it 
[pause] and [pause] told me that it was safe and that it 
was a good thing to do … [ I ] thought it was an 
opportunity to help other people [winks] and make 
some money at the same time [laughs out loud at the 
mention of money]… yeah! (HV6). 
The participants who had heard about clinical trials from friends or 
relatives talked of how easy it was to decide to volunteer. For them the 
trust they had in the individual who was encouraging them was crucial. 
Such participants seemed to have little problem transitioning from topical 
to interpretive relevance as they had the assurance of someone they trusted 
who was not a medical professional. It is interesting to observe here how 
lay accounts and experiences of health and risk can influence decisions and 
behaviour. 
For others, it was encounters with advertisements or media reporting that 
made clinical trials topical and interpretively relevant. The Northwick Park 
incident aroused widespread interest (topical relevance for some 
participants who noted how much reward had been offered to volunteers 
in the trial). 
To start with, I got interested in trials after that one that 
went really badly wrong [Northwick Park]. It got me 
thinking so I started to look out for more trials. This 
one they actually contacted me. There are a number of 
websites such as trials4us.co.uk … you fill out, like, a 
basic application. You say how old you are, whether you 
smoke, you drink, if you take exercise regularly, um, if 
you have any abnormal conditions, like wear a 
pacemaker. (HV 7). 
In general, the preceding discussion illustrates how monetary rewards 
coupled with their personal financial circumstances made taking part in 
clinical trials of topical relevance to some healthy volunteers in this 
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research. Participants talked of considering other options to resolve their 
financial problems, which upon interpretation made monetary rewards in 
clinical trials a motivational relevance for taking part in clinical trials 
(Schutz 1970). The financial situation of some respondents was so serious 
that they felt they were caught “between a rock and a hard place”. 
Nevertheless, the decision to become clinical trial volunteers was not easily 
taken. 
I had not worked regularly during that particular year 
and bills were alarmingly building up, you know. So it 
was a must-do-something situation for me because I 
couldn’t bear the thought of what was coming if I 
hadn’t done something at that time. Not that the 
decision was easy to do this – both options were hard. 
It was like bite the bullet and live, or fall of the cliff or 
face the hungry beasts, that bad … you know, but like a 
short stop-gap (HV 30). 
Most participants did not intend for clinical trials to become a 
regular practice; it was rather an impromptu response to a situation 
thought to be running out of control.  
Oh yes, I did not have the job at the time … So I got 
into this [volunteering] you know, as a sort of, um, one-
off solution, um, like last resort but not to be done 
again, that kind of thing (HV5). 
I would never have managed to pay off the debt if I had 
relied on the job so the only way was taking part in a 
trial … At the time the pay was good enough for me to 
cover for that. I did not intend to do a trial after that, 
though … It was intended to be a one-off thing, pay the 
debt and move on to normal life (HV13). 
One case that deserves mention is that of a new immigrant who was forced 
by the man she was in a relationship with to participate in clinical trials. 
She was warned that if she dropped out of the trial without being paid or 
talked to anyone she would be beaten or reported to police and deported. 
165 
 
Fearing for her life, she took part in two clinical trials and could not even 
tell the research team of the threats. This case is an extreme and hopefully 
rare occurrence. 
I didn’t know anything about clinical trials before then 
… I was just taken into this (trials unit) by somebody. It 
was like … I had to do it, not that I wanted to do it … 
It didn’t have anything to do with a lack of a job on my 
part because he needed the money. I was forced into 
doing two clinical trials. This person needed the money 
and registered me and took me to this trial centre and 
took me in, and waited outside … I was so scared (HV 
3). 
However, the shared sense of “no other option” in the accounts above 
should not be overlooked. It seems whether coerced by someone or by 
social circumstances, participants in this research felt that taking part in 
clinical trials was the only way out of their problems. 
Continued participation in clinical trials is examined in Chapter 6. 
However, the preceding discussion about the role of financial pressures 
and incentives can be linked to the demographic make-up of healthy 
volunteers as outlined in the first part of this chapter. It was observed that 
the demographics of people who take part in clinical trials are not what we 
have been led to believe either by popular discourse or previous research. 
In the survey for this research healthy volunteers were mostly aged over 
25, and in their explanations for taking part in clinical trials they list being 
unemployed and/or in debt. But also the sample bias alluded to earlier in 
this chapter would have contributed to the accounts given by participants. 
However, the findings show how periods of unemployment, unpaid bills 
and rising debt can combine to make taking part in clinical trials topically, 
interpretively and motivationally relevant (Schutz 1970) for some people 
even when they subsequently have paid work. These situations the 
respondents may find themselves in explain why certain groups of people 
take part in clinical trial. Looking at healthy volunteers in this way, 
therefore, challenges the presentation of healthy volunteers by what Fisher 
(2007) observes as being the portrayal of healthy volunteers as “willing” or 
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“ready to recruit” participants and sheds light on how their financial 
vulnerability makes them available for research. 
On the whole, the participants seemed to take a “pragmatic” 
approach in response to social situations they felt needed to be addressed 
as quickly as possible. For them, failure to do so would have seen them 
faced with serious problems such as fear of violence or bailiffs at the door. 
These individuals had to do something to avoid the consequences of 
continued financial problems that seemed to be spiralling out of control. 
Reviewing the respondents’ reactions to difficult situations reveals how 
their actions are shaped by normative conceptions about unacceptable 
responses. Some saw their attempts to find jobs as a response to social 
definitions of acceptable sources of income and taking part in clinical trials 
as morally suspect:  
Mwale: Are you saying they [parents and family] were 
morally judging you? 
HV 22: You can see how that was linked to work and 
what they thought was good use of my time … [they] 
were sort of anxious that I was putting myself in harm’s 
way by doing clinical trials and not looking for normal 
job. 
I just felt violated … what’s worse I couldn’t tell anyone 
doing trials, I just didn’t want anyone to know, because 
they think I am just careless or not keen on getting a job 
(HV3). 
Look at me, someone like me with a master’s degree 
would have a reasonable job (HV29). 
These comments link concepts of morality and motivation to what 
society deems acceptable ways of making a living (Forsyth and Deshotels 
1998). Taking part in clinical trials is considered to be something that 
reckless individuals do; for most of the respondents, taking that step was 
difficult. This challenges common perceptions of volunteering as dubious 
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morality and risk-taking behaviour. In the extract above, HV29 implies 
there is something shameful about being a volunteer when one has a 
master’s degree, confirming that s/he took part in clinical trials because of 
circumstantial pressures. But more importantly the “look at me” statement 
demands that we move beyond a focus on stereotypes to consider actual 
social class origins, including educational attainment and social status and 
identity in order to understand why people take part in clinical trials. 
Furthermore, the invitation “look at me” also seems to suggest the 
individual feels this should not be happening to him/her or that people 
who share their characteristics do not normally take part in risky 
behaviour. It is here, therefore, that morality as part of healthy 
volunteering becomes evident. 
Health crisis in the family and heath checks as motivation 
For some respondents, taking part in clinical trials was prompted – 
and became topically relevant – not only by their financial problems but 
also by setbacks in other areas of their lives, such as the declining health of 
a family member. Such crises seemed to intensify the realisation of their 
own fragility. Taking part in clinical trials was a solution – in addition to 
earning money, they would be medically examined, increasing the chance 
of early detection of a serious illness. Their motivations were less altruistic 
than personal, and even selfish. Asked if they would take part in a clinical 
trial for free if invited, one replied: 
I think my dad had just been diagnosed with late onset 
diabetes which really affected him badly, so I was 
starting to think more about my own health and 
worrying about things that I did not know about my 
health that could be, you know, going haywire. So I 
thought doing such things would provide an 
opportunity for them to do a test, like an MoT [Ministry 
of Transport check for roadworthiness] like on your 
body, you know. You see, because I see my body as 
such [a machine], I started thinking, you know, just in 
case I may need something, a part of me that needs 
oiling, you know, and I wasn’t aware of it (HV22). 
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Of course, one could always go to a GP for a check-up, but some 
respondents thought that GPs would not have enough time to examine 
someone without an obvious illness. They preferred clinical trials to 
accessing primary care because they felt that the nature of encounters with 
the GPs meant that they could not be thorough enough or have the time 
to see them if they did not have any physical illness. Healthy Volunteer 25 
shared HV 22’s view of medical check-ups:  
… like a car MOT, you know [you] can get that from 
your GP but it’s something you have to push for. 
Besides, I don’t think they [GPs] can do it as often as I 
would like to have it done for obvious reasons, you 
know, time and budgets. You also get a sense of rushing 
when you are talking to GPs but in hospitals on a trial, 
it’s more thorough (HV25. 
… but GPs are not thorough. They have 15 minutes 
and then you have to wait for a long time before you 
could hear back from them. It’s not just worth the time 
and they may not tell you more about the results either 
(HV22). 
[the]…initial “screen” prior to a study can be like an 
MOT, it usually acts to reassure me that things are 
generally OK [in the body] before I then take the 
plunge and accept the trial. Which is odd as I rarely visit 
the GP, so I suppose this “screen” acts as my check-up. 
Not sure if that makes sense. Because GPs are generally 
slow and the procedure is just cumbersome … but on 
the clinical trial it’s thorough and quick (HV13). 
So I kind of get [my health]check but also contribute to 
helping someone at the same time if the drug is 
developed kind of thing (HV14).  
For one participant, the decision to take part in clinical trials came about 
after a family member wanted a child but was struggling to conceive. This 
made the participant think about issues in a broader sense:  
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I guess partly the reason I started doing the studies that 
I am doing now is that it was about a fertility study … at 
the time my brother was having his first child after 
some struggles so I was kind of attuned to it a bit more 
(HV1). 
This section illustrates that although people appreciated the reward 
on offer in clinical trials, some were also willing to do clinical trials for 
some kind of health benefit. For these people doing trials was a way of 
dealing with uncertainties about their health. For others the trial was a way 
of checking on their health along the lines of what they called a body 
“MOT”. The family problems included, among others, health problems of 
genetic origin or those that might arise if they did not check their health 
status regularly. For one participant it was health issues experienced by 
other family members that prompted them to think of taking part in 
clinical trials. For these respondents, in addition to debt and 
unemployment, health issues were a motivational relevance. Analysis of the 
accounts in this section shows that participants saw taking part in clinical 
trials as a way of avoiding risk rather than taking additional risks. Also of 
interest is how the accounts seemed to be used as a careful way of claiming 
altruism as can be seen in the last quote. This is interesting as participants 
felt that this was a justifiable way of engaging with risk. 
Biographical situation 
 
As in the preceding section, for a minority of participants, in 
addition to financial rewards, their biographical situations also had 
motivational relevance for getting involved in clinical trials. In using 
“biographical situation”, I refer to Schutz’s analysis of how one’s 
socialisation provides the basis for beliefs, views and knowledge of the 
world around oneself. For some respondents, taking part in clinical trials 
was an opportunity to act on their beliefs, as expressed in the quote below:  
… also, I do clinical trials because I do not believe in 
animal testing, so you know, you can’t be against 
something if you cannot come forward and do 
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something about it. So I am interested because I want to 
do my bit in stopping animal testing. Animals should 
not be used to solve our own problems that we bring on 
ourselves (HV12). 
This seems to be a different expression of altruism, one of “doing 
one’s part” to develop safe, effective drugs while protecting animals. 
Another volunteer was motivated to take part in clinical trials to achieve 
certain personal goals and to use the opportunity to build contacts, 
particularly with medical researchers, in a chosen field of work. Others 
chose to participate because of their interest in the role and function of 
medicines in the developing world.  
… So yeah, it’s not just about the money … well, I do 
need the money badly, obviously… I want to work in 
clinical trials in the future so I hope to build contacts 
but I feel someone has to help others and at this time I 
feel it’s my turn to do that [volunteer in the clinical trial] 
(HV15). 
It’s not just about the money [laughs] … it’s also about 
helping others to some degree. Medicines are needed 
everywhere in the world to help the sick so I play that 
small part in a way (HV 12). 
Some of these accounts are noteworthy for the undertone of self-
justification. The respondents did not want to be stereotyped, but rather to 
be viewed as reasonable people with varied interests and aims. Most of the 
interviews were done in public spaces and possibly the participants would 
have wanted to be seen in a positive light, especially when being asked 
questions by a stranger, as I discussed in chapter 3 (Callon and Rabeharisoa 
2004; Will and Weiner 2014) (see p. 114). Others rejected the idea that they 
had to justify themselves in any way. They stated clearly that their 
involvement in clinical trials was purely for the money. 
I do this and others do it purely for money and if 
anyone says otherwise I disagree, it’s bullshit excuses. 
People do this for money, not to help science or 
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develop medicine. This is like any other job, you give in 
your day’s work and they pay you. I actually find it 
annoying when people talk to me about my 
volunteering in medical trials and make me feel like I am 
a lazy, selfish person … it is hard work doing clinical 
trials (HV4). 
Of interest here is that the participants questioned normative 
assumptions about “normal” ways of earning money (West 2000; Forsyth 
and Deshotels 1998). 
On the other hand, healthy volunteering can constitute resistance 
to social expectations as people get involved in what is normally seen as a 
risky and even reckless venture and in so doing challenge these social 
expectations of acceptable ways of earning a living. This is an aspect of the 
“moral economy” (Scott 1977; Edelman 2005; Daston 1995) and positive 
public views of risk taking (Lyng 2009), discussed in Chapter 2, that relates 
to the desperate nature of volunteers’ social situations and circumstances – 
their conception of work and social justice, what it takes to survive in a 
market economy, and how these factors interact to drive them to risk their 
health. To understand better why people become involved in clinical trials 
requires accepting, first, that their decisions are dictated by the need for 
survival. Then one should investigate the interplay of relationships and 
encounters with the state, professionals and corporations on one hand, and 
interactions with family and society on the other. These interactions are 
analysed for their relevance in driving, influencing or obstructing 
involvement in clinical trials. Obviously this means reframing a range of 
issues, notably trust between experts and lay public, and informed consent, 
which are examined in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
   Scott’s concept of “moral economy”, introduced in Section 2.4, 
can be applied to people – individually and not collectively – who decide to 
volunteer for clinical trials. The healthy volunteers in this research held 
strong beliefs about the right to have enough to survive as independent 
individuals. They also wanted to live up to social standards of acceptability 
and to avoid the shame associated with failing to earn enough. They also 
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demonstrated an antipathy to the risks (Peretti-Watel and Moatti 2006; 
Peretti-Watel et al 2007) inherent in participating in clinical trials. For most 
of the respondents, the goal was not to become rich but rather to avoid the 
problem of unemployment and the shame of being unable to support 
themselves (and possibly their families). Therefore, to construe healthy 
volunteers as aspiring to become rich fails to appreciate the reality of 
everyday dilemmas in their quest for survival in a market economy.  
Scott shifts resistance from the periphery, where it is likely to be 
viewed as the actions of a few disgruntled individuals, to the ways in which 
society produces certain forms of agency. The surprising findings in the 
above analysis of the demographics of healthy volunteers may reflect the 
nature of the market economy, which flourishes amid the widening gap in 
incomes and increasing social inequality (Stiglitz 2012). Increasing 
unemployment among graduates means that many approach their 30s with 
inadequate incomes and without a job. The high cost of living in London, 
where most of the participants in this research are from, could also qualify 
what a “reasonable” income might mean for different people. 
The participants’ desire to live up to social expectations and having 
an “acceptable” job is of interest here, as it shows up the contradictions in 
market-oriented economies. While individual liberty should be protected 
from undue state and outside interference (Sen 1993), liberties are also 
subject to social definitions and expectations. This may explain why most 
of the participants in clinical trials in the sample surveyed in this research 
were in their mid-20s to their 40s. As most people in this age category 
could have been at a stage in their lives where, for instance, they should 
have had a house, a stable job, among others, which at the time they 
probably did not have hence taking part in clinical trials becomes a way of 
keeping up with expected standards. However, it is also possible that the 
bias in the sample of this research would have contributed to the over 
representation of people in these age categories. Nonetheless, having 
insufficient income is undesirable and thus taking part in clinical trials 
becomes motivationally relevant. This raises the questions of what is meant 
by vulnerable subjects, and how this relates to ethics. The positioning of 
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volunteers as vulnerable is clearly an ethical issue. The definition of 
vulnerable people in ethics and legal guidance in relation to healthy 
volunteering focuses on mental and physical abilities (Lemmens and Elliot 
2001; Fisher 2007). Important as these may be, there is no additional 
consideration of the social circumstances in which individuals find 
themselves and how that contributes to their vulnerability. Instead, the idea 
that someone with a sound mind should be able to make a decision is used 
to guide definitions of vulnerability. The ethical, political and economic 
nature of clinical trials is typified by the variety of players, from wealthy 
corporations and government institutions to ordinary citizens (or non-
citizens). Addressing ethical concerns in such settings requires a broad 
concept of ethics that takes into account the interactions of regulatory and 
clinical trial processes between these players as well as the power relations, 
including economic power, that characterise such interactions. Using 
Schutz’s system of relevances, there is a need to analyse how these 
interactions are structured and how they in turn structure ethical views 
about who is considered vulnerable and to whose advantage it might be to 
consider certain people vulnerable and others not.  
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has looked at the demographics of healthy volunteers 
in FIHCTs. The findings from the data showed that many healthy 
volunteers were educated and held well-paid jobs, challenging assumptions 
that it is mostly the unemployed, students and young people travelling 
through cities like London who take part in clinical trials. The healthy 
volunteers surveyed in the sample came from a variety of backgrounds and 
most of them were in stable employment at the time of volunteering. 
It was clear from the accounts cited in this chapter that monetary 
reward was nevertheless the major motivational relevance for getting 
involved in clinical trials, but motivations were shown to be much more 
complex than just a desire for quick money. Most of the respondents 
acknowledged that they had volunteered mainly to address their financial 
problems; they had failed to find other solutions and believed that their 
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only option was to take part in clinical trials. Others, asked about their 
motivations, seemed keen to justify their choice and gave other reasons for 
having participated in the trials. Some did not wish to be seen as reckless; 
others saw taking part in clinical trials as being like any other job. The 
participants generally seemed to reject the notion that they had 
“volunteered”.  
I argued that healthy volunteering is a means of survival for most 
participants, and that conceptions of vulnerability in legal and regulatory 
discourses should therefore be broadened to include people who may be 
financially disadvantaged. The argument highlights how regulation and 
ethics play a role in defining agency and legitimising certain forms of 
agency. Drawing on Schutz’s system of relevances, the chapter has also 
shown how institutional contexts of personal debt, rising costs of living 
and unemployment act as topical relevance for individuals resulting in 
healthy volunteering becoming a motivational relevance. The participants 
in this research talked of looking for conventional means to resolve their 
financial problems (interpretational relevance), before deciding to take part 
in clinical trials (motivational relevance). In addition, looking for other 
options before taking to healthy volunteering is in keeping with what Bloor 
(1995) calls the “polythetic” nature of decision making in which individuals 
explore various possible options that may be available as a response to 
social stimuli. Furthermore, the participants’ accounts of unemployment 
and debt among others as precursors to healthy volunteering (becoming 
topical relevance) illustrates how relevances may be imposed by wider 
socio political and socio economic contexts. Using this framework has 
shown that understanding healthy volunteering conceptions of risk 
requires the researcher to look beyond the concept of rational choice or 
cost-benefit analysis theories. In the following chapter I consider healthy 




Economic Exchanges or Gift Relationships? 
The Body in First-in-Human Clinical Trials 
6.0 Introduction 
 This chapter examines the complex nature of the relationships and 
interactions that take place in clinical trials. I analyse how volunteers and 
professionals view clinical trials, whether as an economic or a “gift” 
exchange. The success or failure of early-phase or FIHCTs relies to a great 
extent on the recruitment of sufficient numbers of suitable participants 
(Mirowski and van Horn 2005; Fisher 2007a). The introduction of laws 
and regulations governing the use of human participants in medical 
research in the 1970s brought about a shift in the conduct of clinical trials: 
seeking consent from participants meant that from this point participants 
could only be volunteers (Bolton 2005; Mirowski and van Horn 2005; 
Hedgecoe 2012). The literature review discussed how changes in these 
policies and the desire for a fast turnaround of results saw a growth in 
contract research organisations. CROs pride themselves on being effective, 
efficient in recruiting the right kind of people and competent in managing 
studies. Recruitment of participants has become a lucrative business for 
the CROs and has brought economic gains for countries where such 
research takes place. The increasing numbers of CROs has intensified 
competition in the global search for healthy volunteers and increased the 
rewards for participating in clinical trials.  
 In the same way that the previous chapter problematises the idea 
of an “autonomous volunteer”, this chapter questions the notion of 
“altruism” in healthy volunteering. The chapter examines the following 
topics: financial incentives in healthy volunteering; how regulators and 
managers of clinical trials view healthy volunteers; how healthy volunteers 
view their bodies as valuable assets; ways in which the body is 
commoditised; and the gift exchange in healthy volunteering.  
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6.1 Becoming “valuable data” 
Participants in this study spoke of noticing a change of attitude on the part 
of the research teams once they were admitted into the trials. The 
experienced a sense of being depersonalised and institutionalised, in an 
echo of Goffman’s (1961) concept of “total institution”. Being recruited 
for a clinical trial is fairly easy as outlined in chapter 1; it simply requires 
entering one’s details online, receiving an advertisement and expressing an 
interest in one of the clinical trials being advertised, and then being called 
in for an assessment. The assessment confirms whether the individual fits 
the requirements of the study in terms of height, weight and other vital 
signs. It is upon admission into the trial that participants experience 
“becoming data”. By this they referred to the changes in the way they were 
treated, pre- and post-admission into the clinical trial. This process is 
closely linked to the sense of becoming depersonalised and 
institutionalised. 
Depersonalisation and institutionalisation 
Depersonalisation refers to a loss of subjective identity, feeling that one is 
reduced to being a mere component in a system (Hochschild 2003; Tracy 
2000; Goffman 1961). The concept is linked to what is commonly referred 
to as “biovalue” (Rajan 2006; Cooper and Waldby 2014), or the way people 
are seen in terms of the value of their biological mechanisms. Most 
participants described their experiences during clinical trials as 
dehumanising.  
… I think the other issue is that trials, once you enrol, 
you become just a number; you are just there, you are 
not you. So it can be quite hard to deal with sometimes, 
and the powerlessness as well … because basically to 
them you are just data, you know, but have value in the 
form of data and the money it represents, not the 
human being I am (HV19). 
Some participants spoke of “becoming a number” or “becoming just data” 
and feeling loss of identity; others of feeling like laboratory rats:  
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… I also felt much like a laboratory rat, like a testing 
animal, especially when you are not treated well by the 
nurses …Sometimes you are treated like a number on 
their sheets and not a person … (HV9). 
… to them we were just numbers on hospital beds and 
not people. It’s quite strange, not that it was obvious, 
but in subtle ways. But you know, it does really feel that 
you are just a specimen on the trial (HV 12). 
Yes, I felt abused, like I am a secondary human being. 
Like, ah, like, um, not even a human being, like a lab rat. 
And it’s quite extreme and it goes against all of my 
objective reasoning – that kind of emotional, rational 
feelings … because I know that I am a human being, 
there are other human beings and that we are different 
but we are all equal. But this made you feel unequal. It’s 
like while you are in that experience and this kind of 
emotional feeling I had afterwards was very … it’s very 
strong … it’s very arbitrary. It’s not something that I 
believe, um [grimaces] … I felt really, like, insane, like 
quite mad (HV5). 
The depersonalised nature of such experiences is significant in two ways. 
First, for the participants this demonstrated the economic nature of 
healthy volunteering and how healthy volunteers become commodities. 
Volunteers felt they no longer had control over what happened to them 
and realised that their feelings would not be taken into account. Second, 
they experienced a loss of power and control and felt like unequal objects, 
their humanity unacknowledged. The research team controlled their 
movements, diets and intake of food and contact with the outside world. 
The participants were given a rigorous schedule detailing every procedure, 
minute by minute, which added to feelings of powerlessness and the 
challenge of enduring the procedures they were subject to. However, not 
everyone experienced these negative feelings:  
I am fascinated by medical research … but … you must 
go in ready to deal with that mentally before going in, 
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also be ready to cope with the food because it’s not 
pleasant food. So go in ready to eat shit food (HV11). 
… So I go into trial ready to deal with whatever comes 
so I don’t feel used at all and I don’t mind those who 
try to boss or their rules, because I go in mentally ready 
… and it does not bother me … I mean the research 
team or their rules. I am also captivated by science, so 
that gives me a chance to see it close by, you know (HV 
18). 
These two participants were evidently so intrigued by the processes 
involved in the clinical trial and so prepared mentally for the experience 
that the power dynamics were of relatively little concern.  
 Institutionalisation refers to ways in which individual behaviours 
and actions are defined and limited by an institution (Goffman 1961). 
While a small section of the participants found relationships during the 
trial to be cordial, each day was structured strictly around fixed rules. They 
were given a schedule detailing every procedure, minute by minute. So in 
addition to being depersonalised, and perhaps as part of the 
depersonalisation process, they were subject to in-house rules that were 
non-negotiable. The participants felt that by this time they had been 
reduced to being a small yet valuable part of the clinical trial. 
… They are just interested in my body and the results 
that my body will give them. After which they will 
discharge me and they will not be interested in what 
happens to me. They kind of dehumanise you in many 
respects. But they also have a lot of power over you. It 
comes in different ways, like you know, they do what 
they want to your body at any time but also you have to 
eat all your food and there are no negotiations. It’s like 
you’ve signed over all your control of things … besides 
you know we don’t have a choice of food. You eat what 
is given to you (HV9). 
It should be pointed out here that the depersonalisation and 
institutionalisation did not take place separately; rather these occurred 
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synchronously in the clinical trial process. Dealing with the changes 
associated with becoming institutionalised made the situation “topical” and 
so participants started to think of the institutional motivational relevance 
to justify certain rules and actions that were being imposed. This relates to 
Schutz’s view that the relevances and subsequent actions people take can 
also be imposed. Coming to terms with rules such as “you must finish the 
food given to you”, regardless of whether they liked it, the participants 
found themselves thinking of the reasons, or interpretations, of why the 
research team would impose such rules. The participants generally took a 
non-questioning and non-critical approach to dealing with the situation 
and became resigned and compliant. 
The food was absolutely awful. I wouldn’t give that 
food to a dog, but I couldn’t question that. I thought 
maybe it was part of the trial or that surely they 
wouldn’t give us such food for no reason. They must 
have had a logic for that (HV29). 
I did not understand why I couldn’t be allowed to 
access my makeup or such small things. I thought 
maybe it was safety, but it was really bad. But I thought 
they had a rational reason for that. It’s stupid, thinking 
about it now (HV13). 
[What] was really strange is that I felt like a novice. 
Some people are really used to doing this and they did 
not see the problems that I saw. They seem to be 
coming regularly for trials, something which was quite 
unnerving for me (HV 12). 
Some participants were shocked by this shift in the way they were 
perceived. One participant who had experienced an illness which required 
medication from the GP was eliminated from the trial. Instead of receiving 
sympathy from research team members, she said, they were displeased that 
their trial data and results had been affected. 
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… they were not pleased that I had fallen ill and [was 
required] to take antibiotics and therefore I could not be 
allowed to take part in the trial. It meant that they 
couldn’t get their results … You could see the 
disappointment on their faces because I was going to 
drop out of the trial …no sympathy for me at all … 
These doctors, they are looking for results. They are 
paid for their results and so the focus is on the results, 
and by that I mean positive results, and so they will not 
tolerate anything that will spoil their outcomes. 
Otherwise, their product will not go to the market 
(HV5). 
The above quote and preceding discussion illustrate ways in which, by 
taking part in clinical trials, healthy volunteers became valuable data for the 
research. In doing so, they were subject to rules, regulations and study 
regimes that ensured the data was not compromised, which is of 
motivational relevance to the institutional (Schutz 1970).  
6.2 Negotiating personal interest and company procedures 
The changes in the way they were viewed by the research team gave the 
volunteers different ideas of what it means to be a good volunteer. For 
some, being a seasoned volunteer meant being able to put up with the 
situation and its consequences; the changes in the way they were viewed 
were seen simply as risks of the trade. Healthy volunteers tended to look 
down on fellow participants who were, in the words of one, “fussy about 
things”. Participants who insisted on better treatment found themselves 
isolated while their colleagues simply got on with things.  
… I just couldn’t cope with her [talking about another 
HV]. She was always bitching, moaning, whining and 
complaining about everything from 6 to 6. We had a 
few words, you know … because you see, if someone 
decides to come on a trial you must be ready for what it 
brings (HV11). 
The “ideal” volunteer, therefore, was one who could cope with the 
situation without feeling inconvenienced by aspects of the clinical trial. 
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Volunteers who complained were often looked down upon. A lack of 
reaction to the challenges was often seen as mark of experience in doing 
clinical trials. This is linked to Lyng’s (2009) view that today risk taking is 
viewed in a positive light. Of interest is how being in such situations 
produced different types of agency among volunteers. Some questioned 
the rules and restrictions; others accepted the status quo. Most participants 
were aware that there were forums for airing grievances but they believed 
that their complaints would be ignored because the staff members to 
whom they would complain were responsible for administering the trial. 
The topical and motivational relevances of the staff were seen to be 
protecting the interests of the companies they worked for: 
let’s face it here, their aim in the trial is to pass the drug 
and market it to make money from it, … others [staff] 
are absolutely obsessed with their positions of power. 
They are, like, this is a scientific trial, this is, and they 
didn’t care what you felt … some staff did make sure 
you felt that way. If I met some of them in my life 
outside of the trial, I would have words with them. I 
would say, “That was not acceptable, the way you 
treated me or spoke to me”. The thing with the trial is 
that they do dehumanise you, you sort of become a 
number on their sheets and not you anymore and that is 
very painful to take (HV29). 
It was clear to many participants that they had become valuable objects of 
research even while they were devalued as human beings. The participant’s 
view that they would have a word with one of the researchers outside of 
the clinical trial is very telling; the power context of the trial itself 
prevented the participant from airing those views during the trial itself. 
Some participants said the research teams had downplayed volunteers’ 
unpleasant experiences because it was bad for business to have 
documented evidence of complaints or extreme side effects.  
… yes, they said that: “Okay, tell us if it gets worse”, 
but you know, they said they keep a close eye on you 
and they said, “We will look at you” … they try as hard 
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as they can to keep the trial going because if they do tell 
this [about side effects] the trial may be cancelled … If 
not, I mean, they can’t stop trials going bad – you know, 
it may hurt their business or profits (HV 25). 
Staff members were often seen to come up with “tactics” to keep the trial 
on track, as HV 29 found when experiencing side effects:  
They tried to explain what we were feeling, saying it was 
psychosis and that’s what the psychiatrist on the ward 
said to us. So I was like, confused, because we went in 
there without any such problems and when we felt the 
drug effects, we were diagnosed with psychosis. I think 
it was a tactic for them to try and ignore the effects we 
were feeling, because obviously their aim is to pass the 
drug and market it …, and if they can try and explain 
away as much as possible of the side effects, they may 
then continue to the next stage, because if they report 
extreme effects they may have to stop the trial. 
 The complex nature of the transactions that healthy volunteers 
have to negotiate in clinical trials is clear from the foregoing extracts. The 
process of becoming a “data point”, involves depersonalisation and 
institutionalisation coupled with the loss of control or power over what 
happens to their bodies. They lose their identities, becoming mere research 
data, yet valuable assets on whom the progress or failure of the trial 
depended. 
6.3 Market exchange?  
 As the participants’ value in the eyes of the trial team changed, 
some of them came to see their involvement in clinical trials as a market 
exchange, by which I mean that the healthy volunteer’s body is exchanged 
for monetary reward offered by the research company. The healthy 
volunteers’ topical and motivational relevance was the monetary reward; 
the corporate motivation was the value of these participants for research 
(Schutz 1970; Douglas 1987). The economic and symbolic value of the 
FIHCTs is made explicit in the Nuffield Report (2011) on donations of 
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body parts. In addressing the role of healthy volunteers, the report talks of 
mutuality in the exchange between volunteers and CROs – both parties 
gain benefit from the relationship. The report recognises that volunteers 
have a significant role and acknowledges that they have an interest in the 
result of the research (Nuffield Report 2011). Human involvement in 
clinical trials is seen to be part of the “bio-economy” (Cooper and Waldby 
2014; Waldby 2000; Rajan 2006). Cooper and Waldby refer to healthy 
volunteering as a form of labour, although it is not usually considered as 
such by the industry.  
In interviews, the participants spoke of ways in which the value and nature 
of the exchange were made explicit during the trials.  
… and it’s part of the things you sign up for and I am 
aware of what is being used of me and I am aware of 
what I am taking away from them. So I was equally 
aware of the fact that it’s some kind of a transaction 
here (HV29). 
The volunteers were well aware of the nature of the contract they had 
agreed to. HV14 replied to a question about why people take part in 
clinical trials: 
I think the money is the motivation for everyone. I 
don’t think the people volunteer for the sake of science 
or health concerns. I think if you take away the money, 
I think the number of volunteers will shrink extremely. 
[Money is] … very important I don’t buy the idea that it 
was to help science or help people. I just wanted the 
money and that was it. They use the body and you get 
the cash (HV4). 
Whether you like it or not, money is the motivating 
factor for me, because if you do damage to your body 
the money plays an important role. Because they are 




 These participants understood that their involvement centred on 
an economic exchange: their bodies for money. That their bodies were 
being “used” denoted not simply a function but also exploitation for the 
purpose of obtaining results. For the volunteers, the “use” of their bodies 
would not be permitted without any compensation. The participants’ 
experiences will be discussed under the following headings: healthy 
volunteering as a passive job, the body as resource and the dilemmas of 
market exchange. 
Healthy volunteering as “passive” labour 
  For some participants, volunteering in clinical trials was just like 
doing any other job with terms similar to a contract or a quotation from a 
plumber: one is free to accept the quotation from the plumber who offers 
the best deal. This perception emerged in response to questions about how 
they saw the risks to their bodies and whether volunteering for a clinical 
trial was like selling their bodies. Both assumptions were seen as misplaced 
– doing trials was an economic exchange.  
… it’s like calling a plumber or builder. You call out 
one, give the job description [and] they are going to give 
you all the details of what they do and price. Then if you 
are not happy, you go away. I have not actually known 
anyone feel that way [like a prostitute] but each job has 
risks you have to face (HV4). 
 Of interest here is how participants seemed to draw on daily 
discourses in which risk was seen to be an occupational affair and thus 
acceptable (Lyng 2009), and reference to selling their bodies prompted 
them to ask what was meant by “work”; their interpretation of healthy 
volunteering as being like any other work conveyed adequate motivational 
relevance for taking part. The participants questioned prevailing 
assumptions and expectations about employment – that “good work” 
involves working in an office or conforms to what society defines as a 
“normal job”. In addition, as discussed in the literature review chapter, 
some forms of labour such as sex work attract forms of stigma as they are 
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seen as immoral or reckless work. For some participants in this research 
the general perception was that all forms of work involved selling one’s 
body in the form of labour in that it involves the notion and reality of 
exchange as well as the use of the body, though in different ways. 
You know, people think being a volunteer is easy. That 
pisses me off a lot because it’s really “hard work” [raises 
fingers to indicate inverted commas]. You have to put 
up with a lot of stuff, you know, like the needles and 
discomforts, and it’s just demanding being woken up at 
odd hours. It’s just like work, you know (HV4). 
 Clinical trials were seen to be easier and more rewarding than, say, 
working in Tesco; the challenge was to endure being kept indoors subject 
to strict rules and to give blood regularly. 
It’s easy, you know [pause]. Accommodation is 
provided and they give you food and pay you for sitting 
around. So, yeah, it is hard work enduring the needles 
and all that stuff like bloods [giving blood]. But of 
course, it’s better than working in a bar. You won’t get 
paid that much (HV13). 
When you are blessed with good health you … you 
don’t have that time or that resource to plough a 
mountain to be working really hard because you are 
busy doing other things and … you know here you just 
have to sit or lie on your bed and they pay you, better 
than stacking shelves in Tesco. It’s not actual physical 
labour, it’s more inactive, like (HV5). 
 It is from the participants’ use of expressions such as “easy”, 
“sitting or lying on your bed” or “not physically doing anything”, yet 
earning money and creating value for the pharmaceutical industry, that I 
derive the term “passive labour”. The term parallels Marx’s concept of the 
production of value based on the exchange of objects for money rather 
than on relationships between people (Marx 1975). Though most 
volunteers acknowledged actively looking for clinical trials and doing that 
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entirely for the reward on offer, most of the participants regarded 
themselves, ironically, as experienced rather than as “professional” 
volunteers. 
Mwale: Would you describe yourself as a professional 
volunteer, then? 
P: What’s the other option? If I am not professional, 
what am I? Um, not really. If I have to make more 
money I have to do more trials … I think I am 
experienced and realistic [about the] risks involved. Of 
course, the money is important but I think I look at the 
what [of what] they are asking of me (HV14). 
Mwale: So seeing the number of and frequency of your 
involvement in clinical trials, will it be fair to describe 
you as a professional healthy volunteer? 
P: Well, no not really. I am more experienced. I know 
what it takes and what is required. Yes, money is 
important but I am not running around looking for 
trials to make money. That’s more like a professional, 
isn’t it? Yes, money is what I do this for but not in that 
sense, I have a [day] job (HV4). 
  While it was clear that participants talked of doing clinical trials as a 
result of their socio-economic circumstances, they still wanted to be seen 
as principled and in control of their situations, they acknowledged the 
difficulties associated with the exchange entailed in clinical trials, such as 
the pain, emotional strain and powerlessness. The rules are set by the 
CRO, which has the power, and participants are reminded of it when they 
complain or raise issues.  
… You see, they tend to think … like, “We are paying 
you money and so why are you complaining?” So they 
do not pay attention to the things that we say. They 
would say things like, “This is not a five-star hotel and 
you are being paid to do this” (HV9). 
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 The last extract reveals how pointedly the participants were put in 
their place, in a way that suggests bullying to ensure compliance. 
 Bodies as “resource” 
 The economic exchanges entailed in volunteering for clinical trials 
changed participants’ views about their bodies. For some, the body became 
topical; it was no longer taken for granted but treated as a resource. This 
change was manifested in their efforts to improve their chances of 
enrolling in the trials and prolonging their participation in them to earn 
money. It was therefore motivationally relevant to see their bodies as 
machines that needed careful maintenance: 
… because I see my body as such, just in case I may 
need some part oiling, you know, and I wasn’t aware of 
it (HV22). 
I am a healthy person, you know, I am not unwell. 
Doing trials has not changed anything … I know that 
you can’t take this medication and they have side 
effects, and if they have long-term effects the body can 
recover and bring you back to where you [were before 
taking part in the clinical trials] (HV19). 
 These quotations bring to mind the concept of “biovalue” (Waldby 
2002) in the ways in which the healthy volunteers worked on their own 
bodies to maintain their value in the context of clinical trials. Biovalue 
becomes explicit in relation to how the materiality of the body provides 
possibilities for both individuals and institutions to challenge prevailing 
ethical, sociological and legal understandings of the role of the body in 
medical research. Biovalue is linked to how prevailing socio-political 
economies of the body interact with social conditions to bring about 
certain forms of agency. Nor is it connected only to the biomedical 
developments from which it arises but also to socio-economic status and 
how this influences the individual’s willingness or capacity to engage with 
risk. For healthy volunteers deep in debt, for instance, it is motivationally 
relevant to view their bodies as constituting biovalue with earning 
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potential. Many volunteers interviewed for this research saw their bodies as 
assets that needed to be maintained if they were to make money. They did 
regular exercise, ate less junk food and generally changed their lifestyles.  
I don’t drink coffee or fizzy drinks. I make sure I eat a 
lot of fruit and veg and do a lot of exercise, and you 
know, keep the body free of illnesses, because if I do 
not get into these trials then I cannot earn the money. 
So I don’t drink any alcohol and I don’t take 
recreational drugs. I tried before in Romania, but you 
see, I have to look after myself. I think my body is 
valuable and I am lucky to have this body (HV 10). 
… we don’t eat in KFC anymore. Maybe the first weeks 
we did, but now it’s fresh produce. If we are not fit, 
they will not accept me at the trial. Then I lose a lot, so 
I have to do more exercise and so I don’t eat burgers, 
Coca-Cola. We eat chicken or fish so we can buy from 
markets and negotiate prices (HV6). 
I have become more aware now of my health and 
somehow do pay [more] attention to my body than I did 
before. You know, when they turned me down it was 
like an awakening that I needed to change. I am happy 
to do the trials because I now have health checks and 
… it does help put things in perspective that the body is 
me, but much more, if I don’t look after it well I cannot 
make the money that I need, so yeah, my body, I must 
look after it well (HV4). 
 It is noteworthy that the body becomes topically and 
motivationally relevant, to use Schutz’s (1970) concept, as “capital”, often 
after the individual is turned down for a clinical trial because he or she is 
not fit. The rejection made the body interpretively relevant; volunteers 
started to think about their bodies differently, which triggered lifestyles 
changes in order to make their bodies “marketable” for exchange in clinical 
trials. 
  The body is topically and motivationally relevant as a valuable 
resource not only to the pharmaceutical companies; it is equally so to the 
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individual who embodies and offers it for exchange. But notice the 
contradiction: while the volunteers took greater care of their bodies 
through diet and exercise, for instance, taking part in a trial put their bodies 
at greater risk. The participants seemed to draw on discourses of risk in 
everyday life to interpret or explain what they were getting into. These 
complexities are explored in details in the following section. 
Exchanging the body for the reward in clinical trials 
 While money was motivationally relevant, it also shaped and 
perhaps even distorted the experiences and views of participants in the 
trials. Due to the monetary reward on offer the participants lowered their 
guard against risks and resigned themselves to situations they would 
otherwise have challenged: 
Money was very important for me. I wouldn’t go in 
there for free, you know. I just need the money, but 
what happens with the money issues is that it changes 
your experience and maybe your expectations … you 
start to put up with people not being nice, or if things 
go wrong you start thinking there must be a rational 
reason why they are doing this (HV29). 
I think the first trial I did, I was very careful, but from 
the second onwards … money also played a part in 
making me stop worrying about the whole process 
(HV5). 
 In addition, being paid also seemed to influence the participants’ 
topical and interpretational relevance of adverse effects or to generally 
having a negative experience on the trial. Some participants interpreted the 
payment as a reward for coping with being confined indoors for long 
periods. Others felt they had no choice but to endure the hardships.  
Money was very important and you cannot deny that, 
because as you do these things you meet all sorts of 
people who show you around things and remind you to 
focus on the money … They [staff] also explain it to 
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you: “It’s just simple, we take a bit of blood and a bit of 
some examination here and there, and then you get the 
money.” This looks very straightforward, but it’s hard 
(HV9). 
 One participant observed that the exchange evoked feelings of 
physical vulnerability and powerlessness:  
I thought about that for a while. I think volunteering is 
a kind of violation of your body and you can’t really 
separate it from your body … because that’s just me, 
you know, part of me (HV5). 
Your body is who you are, and as a result, you may 
become very sensitive, just like this woman [a volunteer 
who became ill as a result of the food] may have 
become upset about it [the trial process]. But there are 
worse jobs to do for money (HV29). 
 The participants seemed to find themselves in a conflict between 
their decisions to become subjects of the trial and allowing things to be 
done to their bodies for reward while struggling to come to terms with the 
hardships they had to endure. At this point they seemed to view their 
bodies as closely linked to their identity. Participants spoke of how they 
started to redefine their bodies as “who you are”, a self-image that can be 
detached from one’s sense and experience of oneself. Though the 
participants were aware that they were involved in some kind of exchange, 
part of their struggle seemed to come from contending with the idea of 
selling something and giving it up completely, and the idea of selling 
something and yet still possessing it, in a sense (they gave up their bodies 
for research and yet were still embodied beings with a strong sense of 
physical embodiment). In everyday life once items are sold and have new 
owners, their original or first owner no longer has any say over what 
happens to those items, no matter how much they might have meant to 
them. However, with the body in clinical trials, they retained a sense of 
owning their bodies in a form of “passive labour” – the concept I 
introduced in the previous section – in that while manual labourers put 
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their bodies to work, volunteers in clinical trials see their bodies worked 
upon as they sit and observe the process. At this juncture, ethics of 
volunteering come into play as conflicts associated with rights emerge: 
when does the body in such transactions lose its private dimension and 
become “public” or even “corporate”? While ethical debates mobilise the 
discourse of “ownership” and/or “property” with regard to individuals’ 
bodies in clinical trials, the topical and interpretive relevance for most 
volunteers in clinical trial transactions is to do with the loss of control over 
their bodies. They have the right to withdraw from a trial, but pulling out 
can have serious consequences.  
It’s all very uncomfortable, erm … very invasive. You 
know, like the doctors can pick you up, put a needle in 
you, take your blood and do what they want with you. 
And you have to comply, because you signed a consent 
form at the beginning which says you will comply. I 
mean, obviously you can walk out, but then you lose 
everything. Like I, erm, withdrew myself from the trial. 
Later I didn’t receive any compensation for the five 
days that I did, nothing… (HV5). 
 The above quote illustrates the complex nature of the role of the 
body in clinical trials. Doing clinical trials for these participants involved 
complicated negotiations over power relations. In addition to exchanging 
the body for money, participants also found that in giving their bodies for 
research they inevitably gave up control and power over their bodies as 
they were reduced to objects from which data could be obtained. Although 
the process is subject to regulation, the exchange is weighted in favour of 
the research companies – they have the power to set the terms of the 
exchange.  
 For some participants the loss of power, vulnerability and hardship 
made them feel that they were engaged in a kind of prostitution.  
… but after the first one I had this strange feeling, you 
know, I felt like a prostitute, because I was feeling like I 
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was using my body, because I felt I was giving my body 
to someone in exchange for money (HV9). 
Such feelings often evoked guilt, a questioning of the “right” way to make 
a living, and were a deterrent for some; others came to terms with it. 
Feelings of vulnerability prompted one participant to reflect on issues of 
identity and the meaning of work. Making her body available for clinical 
trials was at odds with her job as a model and actor, for which the body is 
equally central in the exchange, although in a different way. What was most 
topically relevant for her, however, was the loss of power and control 
during the clinical trial.  
I also did have this little disturbing feeling, considering 
what I do for a living. I felt like I was sinking low and 
cheap, like I am going in there, sign off things, take a 
drug and give my blood, you know, like using my body 
like a prostitute. Like really, how cheap am I? Is this 
what it takes to hire yourself out like that? Then I sort 
of started to get myself out of that feeling by thinking of 
how useful my actions were in someone’s life at some 
other point. It wasn’t just for me and the money, if that 
makes sense. But living in London as a girl and working 
in the show business, that kind of work, you tend to sell 
yourself, so you kind of get used to that. But it was so 
strange for me to feel that way when I did the clinical 
trial. But obviously here there is a lot of control that you 
give away wilfully, you know, and that’s what made this 
whole experience even worse. Yet despite all that, you 
sign up for it because you think, here is something I 
could do to make some money easily and still help 
someone else (HV 12). 
 However, for other participants comparing healthy volunteering to 
prostitution was taking the challenges of clinical trials too far. They 
compared healthy volunteering with work in other settings and argued that 
participating in a trial was not comparable.  
 Others rejected the comparison with prostitution. While 
acknowledging how topically relevant (Schutz 1970) the issues they faced 
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in clinical trials were, and how they could be associated with prostitution, 
they saw healthy volunteering as a personal choice and believed they knew 
what was being asked of them. Others compared healthy volunteering with 
any conventional work. Besides, prostitution was beset with gender 
politics. 
So I didn’t feel that way [like a prostitute] about myself 
at all, but I can see how and why they felt that way … 
And it’s part of the things you sign up for and I am 
aware of what is being used of me, and I am aware of 
what I am taking away from them. So I was equally 
aware of the fact that it’s some kind of a transaction … 
I mean it’s not a sexual power domination. It’s not 
domination because I am sitting there and interacting 
with other female doctors and female nurses. There is 
an invasion of my body, but it’s nowhere near that 
which happens in prostitution, you know. That is about 
power and control, and the interaction I am having is 
about resources, money and knowledge. I mean there is 
power in some way in that you are made to [finish] your 
food, when you sleep and when you wake, and just 
when they want to do what they want to do in terms of 
schedule procedures, but is nothing in comparison to 
what happens in prostitution. On that level then, they 
are not comparable, on the level that my body can be 
used for, then, yeah, but for me I think we have to be 
careful about that comparison. The sexuality thing is 
about the value of oneself and goes deeper for me 
(HV29). 
[laughs] No, absolutely not. For me this is a transaction. 
They know what they are getting from me and I know 
what I will be getting from them. I understand the 
similarities [between prostitution and healthy 
volunteering] in that people resolve to do trials due to 
their economic issues they face, which is the same as in 
prostitution, but for me it’s like any other work. People, 
we use our bodies, don’t we? HV4. 
  Most of the participants who spoke of healthy volunteering in 
positive terms had not experienced unexpected side effects while taking 
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part in clinical trials. They had explanations for the side effects that did 
occur, and often seemed to accept them simply as occupational risks (Lyng 
2009). The risks and loss of power were therefore not as topically relevant 
for them as for other volunteers. However, those who invoked the 
comparison with prostitution had all experienced unexpected side effects, 
making risks and powerlessness topically relevant and consequently 
requiring an interpretation. The experiences changed their perception of 
clinical trials.  
 The economic exchange entailed in healthy volunteering changes 
the perception of work and the body. The changes give rise to dilemmas 
associated with the relationship between institutions, market exchanges 
and the body. The interview data demonstrate the limitation of the free 
market exchange model when applied to healthy volunteering in clinical 
trials. The model is problematic in that there are major power differences 
at play in the transactions. While participants were clearly aware of the 
nature of the exchange in which they were engaged and their rights, it is 
undeniable that professionals and institutions wield the definitive power to 
control the terms of the exchange and to shape the nature of the exchange 
itself. The following section considers healthy volunteer accounts of 
voluntarism.  
6.4 From market exchange to gift relationship? 
 In the literature review chapter, I discussed the gift relationship 
(TGR), a concept drawn from Richard Titmuss’s ground-breaking work on 
altruism. The gift of blood in regard to blood donations has fuelled debates 
in social policy about the nature of our interdependence as a society. TGF 
has been widely used in sociological discussions on the role of human 
involvement in medical research such as genetics (Tutton 2002), organ 
donations (Nuffield Report 2011) and research involving patients as 
volunteers (Hallowell et al. 2010). The concept is used as a point of 
reference in discussions about the moral significance of charity and the act 
of giving when nothing is expected in return. More recently, the concept 
has been applied to donations of body parts, while tissue banks are viewed 
as a public good (Waldby and Mitchell 2006; Waldby 2006; Axler et al. 
195 
 
2008). This section explores how healthy volunteering can be understood 
as a form of TGR. I also analyse the relationships between volunteer 
research participants and research teams in CROs.  
A few of the participants in this study gave accounts of volunteering free 
of payment. They first became involved because they were in financial 
difficulty, and continued to volunteer when they no longer needed the 
money. For these individuals, volunteering became a gift relationship.  
… well, depends really. One unit was particularly good 
to me, you see, when I was in a sticky situation. So I 
think if they urgently needed me, I can see what I can 
do. [It] also depends on my time and work schedule 
(HV9). 
… it depends. Some researchers are good and they were 
good to me, so if they are doing a study and they said to 
me, “We have little money, we can’t pay you.” I know 
them. I would say, “Yes, I will help you”, because they 
helped me when I had a bad time. They ask you, call 
you by name and make sure you’re okay (HV16). 
 These accounts are in sharp contrast to the preceding quotations 
about economic exchange and unequal power in which participants spoke 
of feeling exploited. The above accounts illustrate how power works in 
subtle ways – rather than overtly coercing participants, making them feel 
special made them want to come back to “help”. Most participants 
continued to volunteer after their financial situations had improved. The 
positive change in their circumstances brought about a change in their 
attitude to volunteering. A small minority volunteered again as a way of 
thanking the research team that had admitted them to a clinical trial; 
reciprocity became the motivation. Some participants seemed to feel 
indebted to the research team for having been “helped” when they were in 
financial difficulty. Research teams could be seen as deliberately fostering 
such feelings.  
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They call me and have often told me I am a model 
volunteer, and they often call me first when they have a 
new clinical trial and they start recruiting. So I am 
among the first to know about this [giggles] (HV1). 
 Such feelings of loyalty or willingness to cooperate affected how 
the participants interpreted follow-up calls from the CRO’s recruitment 
teams who checked on their wellbeing after they had completed a trial. 
Participants who were invited for another trial were more likely to commit 
to repeated participation, and some started to think of themselves 
differently. An invitation to volunteer was seen to come from a 
trustworthy and caring professional who had their best interest at heart. At 
this point, lay sources of information were less likely to be used and 
participants were less likely to research the drugs they would test. In 
making the participants feel wanted and appreciated, the research team 
were able to influence the participants’ views about volunteering. Some 
participants talked of the researchers as “being good to me”. This 
demonstrates how the relationship between volunteers and researchers 
changed from an economic exchange to a gift exchange. It also 
demonstrates the subtle ways in which relevances – topical or motivational 
– may be imposed by institutions or powerful figures to influence 
individual agency. 
I would say that money is not as important as it 
was before. It depends on how much they 
would require of me. If it was a day or two or a 
couple of hours here or there, it is not too bad. I 
mean for me, at the moment I only have Fridays 
off from work, so I can’t actually take time off 
to do it. So if they want it to be over a long 
period of time I would not be able to do it, but 
if they want to do a couple of hours – Mondays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays – I would say okay 
then. So yeah, I would do it as a one-off, but I 
don’t think [I would] do more [giggles]) … 
more than one, you know. It’s time (HV1). 
… sometimes it depends. If it’s a unit where I 
had good rapport with staff and I have time and 
they called me for trial and they are offering 
little or nothing for a short study, I would say, 
197 
 
“Yes, I can help”, because basically they were 
there for me when I needed help, really (HV10). 
It seemed that the participants interpreted an affirmation of their suitability 
for the trials as a sign that the research team cared about them, highlighting 
the complex interplay between the notion of the gift, gratitude and 
altruism.  
… they have called me a few times and actually 
they have told me I am good and reliable, so I 
am among the first people they always call to 
check if I am available for a trial. So it’s a good 
relationship (HV1). 
 Doing clinical trials was seen as a moral obligation by some. They 
viewed volunteering as giving without expecting a return. A few 
participants cited personal beliefs, for example, their opposition the use of 
animals in developing drugs. 
… yes, because I don’t really need the money. In fact, I 
did it because I am against animal testing [for drugs for 
humans]. So I thought, if I oppose that then I better just 
do it myself (HV 12). 
… yes, I can do it for free if somebody asked me to. I 
mean, my goal is to help people. The money is good, 
but … someone has to give some[thing] to another 
without expecting something back. It’s my duty, I think, 
to help (HV15). 
 The declared willingness of these participants to volunteer without 
expecting anything in return challenges the concept of the gift relationship. 
For Titmuss (1979), TGR should be based on mutual benefit. The views of 
these participants, however, seem to be more in keeping with ideas of 
biological citizenship, biovalue (Waldby 2002) and social responsibility, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, in accordance with which individuals are expected 
to give something back to society. Those who held such views were in a 
distinct minority. Most of the others laughed at the idea of volunteering 
without being paid; some even questioned the sincerity of those who 
claimed to be volunteering for the good of society.  
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6.5 Summary  
 This chapter explored the complex nature of the exchanges that 
take place in clinical trials. In Chapter 2, I had discussed the ways in which 
the role of human participants, especially healthy volunteers, has evolved 
since the 1970s and how neoliberal ideology has influenced the way the 
human body is viewed. In examining the economic dimension of the 
exchange in clinical trials, the chapter showed how healthy volunteers 
entering clinical trials found themselves negotiating a process of 
commodification, which included experiences of depersonalisation and 
institutionalisation. Participants were generally well aware of the nature of 
the exchange, the power relations involved and the cost, both 
psychological and physical, of their involvement. They had to come to 
terms with the idea of having to sell their bodies and were subject to pain 
and emotional distress during the trials.  
 Healthy volunteering was shown to shift from being a market 
exchange to a gift exchange, and was seen by some individuals to be a 
social responsibility. For others the economic exchange was reciprocal, 
involving a sense of connection with the researchers or of a favour owed. 
In analysing the participants’ experiences this way, the chapter 
demonstrated the ways in which relevances may be imposed by institutions 
and those in positions of power. Most rejected the idea of volunteering for 
altruistic reasons; rather, they argued, it was purely a market exchange and 
it was the financial reward that motivated individuals to get involved in 
clinical trials. They tended to dismiss assertions by a minority of their 
colleagues that they felt an obligation to volunteer for the good of society. 
Nevertheless, the idea of a “gift” did occur among some participants in 
this research. Accounts of economic and gift exchanges in healthy 
volunteering in this chapter invoke the notion of biological citizenship 
(Rose and Novas 2004; Petryna 2009). Using Schutz’s (1970) system of 
relevances the chapter has also shown how the contexts in which 
individuals find themselves influence their decisions and behaviour as well 
their interpretive understanding of the institutional structures and 
inequalities they engage with. Here it was suggested that the body itself 
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acquires ‘topical relevance’ in Schutz’s terms, as a resource for making a 
living by taking part in clinical trials. The following chapter considers the 
interaction of risk and trust in clinical trials. 
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Chapter 7  
Risk Strategies, Trust and Constructions of 
Rational Consent 
7.0 Introduction  
 Most debates about the role of healthy volunteers in clinical trials 
in relation to risk focus on volunteers’ management of risk, their capacity 
for rational action, and individual liberties. Most bioethical and socio-
economic understandings of individuals draw on rationalism as the guiding 
principle of human thought and action (Hale 2007; Hayden et al. 2007; 
Montgomerie and Williams 2009). This view is prevalent within 
behavioural economics and widely held in society at large. Bioethicists and 
behavioural economists argue that people are capable of demonstrating 
“complete” rationality, with faultless recollection, and of forecasting 
alternatives and consequences based on their decisions to maximise value 
in a complex world of interactions and exchanges (Lewis 2010). They see 
the key to helping people acquire this capacity as the provision of adequate 
information. This perception is influential in our understanding voluntary 
engagement with risk in clinical trials. Corrigan (2003) suggests that policy 
solutions and debates about risk in volunteering for clinical trials are based 
on the idea of individuals as rational actors who are well informed and fully 
understand the contracts they sign.  
 Individuals in the West have come to understand themselves and 
their experiences in terms of the outcomes of their own actions and the 
rational decisions they are supposedly capable of making (Gill, 2008; 
Layton, 2010; Walker at el 2013); they are perceived as being autonomous, 
rational and creative. The same view is held of volunteers in clinical trials, 
who are assumed to be informed, knowing actors who willingly put their 
health and even their lives at risk, rather than subjects of a complex and 
problematic socio-economic system.  
 This chapter critically examines the relationship of monetary 
rewards and risk in the informed consent process and the concept of 
healthy volunteers as rational actors. The role of trust and its application in 
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healthy volunteer engagements with risk is also considered. While 
professionals may see risks as objective and volunteers as informed rational 
actors, the volunteers’ idea of risk is shaped by their often complex social 
circumstances (Schutz 1970). Information given to volunteers during the 
admission and consent process is shown to be not always of topical or 
interpretational relevance to volunteers when they decide whether or not 
to take part in a clinical trial. Volunteers vacillate between trust and 
mistrust in their negotiation of risk. This is further affected by the 
relationships with others in and outside the clinical trials and by the healthy 
volunteers’ financial circumstances. The chapter demonstrates that in order 
to better understand healthy volunteering and to improve the informed 
consent process, wider social economic issues need to be taken into 
account. 
7.1 Professional views of healthy volunteer conceptions of 
risks and rewards 
Accounts of individuals as rational actors in relation to their 
understanding of the risks involved in FIHCTs emerged frequently in the 
data gathered for this research. It was clear that the professionals believed 
that applicants and volunteers were well informed and fully aware of the 
risks involved in clinical trials; the volunteers were therefore personally 
responsible for the decision to take part in clinical trials and for any failures 
to understand the risks involved. Professionals found it difficult to 
understand why volunteers would complain about the pain, discomfort or 
risks involved in clinical trials: 
No one is forced to enrol into a clinical trial. People 
decide to do it and they understand the risks involved 
(Corporate Professional 2). 
… Well, information is made available and they use that 
to decide to take part so they understand what is 
involved in the trial. No one would complain about that 
[risks] (Corporate Professional 3). 
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Professionals believed that volunteers had a misplaced view that 
the money offered for participation was commensurate with the risks 
involved in clinical trials; the money was meant to compensate volunteers 
for their time and discomfort, but not for any risks.  
Mwale: Why do think volunteers think that way about 
risk and payments? 
P: Erm, I am not sure, your guess is as good as mine … 
why would they be paid so well if it wasn’t dangerous? I 
think that’s one of the things, if you pay them so well 
they think that it must be dangerous [clears throat]. In 
fact, we pay people for turning up and the 
inconvenience and [coughs] discomfort, but we, we are 
not allowed to give them danger money. And if we were 
giving them danger money, we wouldn’t be erm, erm … 
that means that the study isn’t safe and so we wouldn’t 
be doing it. But, erm … many of the volunteers don’t 
really see that; they think that these things, they don’t 
realise perhaps that the studies are as safe as they really 
are (Corporate Professional 1). 
According to the professional view, when volunteers took issue 
with the risks involved in clinical trials, they focused too closely on the 
monetary reward. Corporate professionals do not see the payments as 
inducements and therefore inherently problematic in wider socio-political 
and economic terms, and they are thus not topically relevant. Engagement 
with risk is perceived in terms of individual responsibility rather than the 
result of broader societal factors. Professionals seem to have adopted an 
idealised, abstract and procedural (Douglas 1987) view of healthy 
volunteers. 
7.2 Informed consent and monetary rewards  
The literature reviewed for this thesis highlights that provision of 
adequate information is central to the view of individuals as rational actors 
(Scocoza 1989; Corrigan 2003). Bioethicists see this as the answer to 
ethical problems that may arise from human involvement in clinical trials, 
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but recent policy and academic debates about volunteering in clinical trials 
point to the inadequacy of information for participants about the inherent 
risks (Corrigan 2003; Fisher 2007). There is emphasis on increasing 
awareness and ensuring that individuals are capable of taking responsibility 
for their own decisions to participate in clinical trials (see for instance 
Paragraph 3(1) of Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Medicines for Human Use 
[clinical trials 2004]). The view is that information not only makes issues of 
risk “topical” to participants but that it also helps them in making 
decisions.  
The view that the provision of adequate information is the solution 
to ethical challenges in FIHCTs is also reflected in the development of 
regulatory measures. The 2004 Medicines for Humans Regulation is 
explicit about excluding individuals considered incapable of making 
informed decisions by virtue of physical or mental problems. The 
regulation makes the following provisions:  
(i) Providing information to potential subjects, including 
a contact point where additional information can be 
obtained about the trial and the rights of trial subjects,  
(ii) Providing subjects with updated information during 
and (where relevant) after the trial, and  
(iii) Obtaining informed consent (The Medicines for 
Human Use [Clinical Trials] Regulations 2004). 
The professional participants in my research generally believed that ethical 
problems associated with risks in clinical trials and over-volunteering could 
be resolved by educating volunteers:  
Our consent forms are between 11 and 15 pages. So 
they get a lot of information about the medicines and 
the study which they read. It’s usually distributed to 
them or sent to them before the study via e-mail or 
ordinary mail before they attend the screening, and so 
when they come for screening, they see a doctor, they 
ask questions and the doctor tells them a bit more about 
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the study maybe, and they sign a consent form 
(Corporate Professional 2). 
Let me start by saying that our existing systems of 
dealing with problems like these are actually better now 
than before, and while there is always room for 
improvement, I think there is nothing more that we can 
do. Participants are provided with information and 
there are measures in place to follow these through. For 
the participants in this research there was a general 
satisfaction with the existing systems of obtaining 
informed consent (Corporate Professional 1). 
There seemed to be a reluctance on the part of the professionals in 
this research to consider the role of rewards and the wider socio-economic 
and political factors in shaping volunteers’ perception of and engagement 
with risk in clinical trials. In the aftermath of the 2006 Northwick Park 
cancer drug trial, in which several healthy volunteers suffered unexpected 
and life-changing side effects, the immediate policy response focused on 
the need to review safety systems. The government inquiry was silent on 
monetary inducements and what role they may have played in the trial.  
For the professionals in this study, the individuals involved in 
clinical trials were informed and capable people, but they generally failed to 
take into account how socio-economic circumstances, such as excessive 
debts and loss of jobs, can make individuals vulnerable to exploitation 
(Mandeville 2006; Morris and Bàlmer 2006). The professional view of 
rational actors is based on mental capacity, which is based on an imaginary 
“rational actor”, rather than how wider socio-political circumstances and 
personal financial needs can distort people’s concepts and perceptions of 
risks. As a result, within this discourse people who do not fit the set criteria 
of vulnerable individuals are often construed as “capable individuals” to 
give rational consent. This is a simplistic conclusion and one which does 
not take into account other dimensions of vulnerability which do not relate 
strictly to physical or mental illness. When individuals are desperate for 
money, their knowledge of the risks involved in clinical trials becomes 
irrelevant. While the professionals generally seemed aware that monetary 
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reward attracts people from disadvantaged backgrounds or in temporary 
employment to take part in clinical trials, they saw this to be a normal part 
of the business.  
Obviously, this [issue of monetary rewards] is an issue 
that I think everyone is aware of with regard to 
coercion, but I can’t do anything about it. I can’t say to 
people, “No, you can’t do this because you don’t have 
money or you are poor so to speak (Corporate 
Professional 1). 
In the above extract it is also clear that professionals are aware that 
payments put pressure on participants to take part in clinical trials. 
However, among the limitations to the idea that information provision 
resolves all potential ethical problems is not just that it is topical to people 
in desperate financial situations, but also that efforts to inform participants 
of the risks are contradicted by the interests of or rather issues of topical 
and motivational relevance (Schutz 1970), of certain organisations involved 
in the business of clinical trials such as the pharmaceutical companies, 
CROs and governments.  
CROs pride themselves on their proficiency in recruiting and 
retaining participants. Information about risks might therefore be 
presented in a way that does not make risks of topical relevance to 
potential volunteers. To remain competitive requires that CROs offer 
better incentives to volunteers. Individuals in straitened circumstances may 
therefore overlook vital information when considering the attractive 
rewards on offer. That ethics committee members are aware of this 
anomaly can be seen in this extract:  
So if someone is going to offer participants, say, 
£20,000 and we know that they are targeting 
predominantly an unemployed, out-of-work population, 
because that’s what they want to study, then we could 
have concerns. That amount of money would be way 
more than [they] would be able to get in a year and it 
might blinker them ethically. It might be coercive to 
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make them look at the money [rather] than the small 
print … and that’s what we would raise as an ethical 
issue. So, yeah, money on offer is an issue for certain 
groups (REC Official 10). 
The professionals sampled in this research had two attitudes about 
the role of information. There were those – mostly industry representatives 
and corporate professionals – who felt that it was the only course of action 
available in terms of alerting volunteers to risk and that the system was 
adequate in dealing with any ethical concerns that might arise in practice. 
The problem here is that it clearly (if subconsciously) draws on the concept 
of individuals as rational actors; as people who are able to make “informed 
decisions”. Therefore engaging with risk in these trials is construed to be 
an individual’s responsibility that could only be addressed or alleviated with 
more information. The others, who were mainly REC officials, agreed that 
providing adequate information was a solution to the problems of risk but 
they argued that more needed to be done to improve practices and 
regulation in clinical trials in order to better protect volunteers from undue 
risk. They were sceptical about the effectiveness of the existing approach 
as there were no means of monitoring the sharing of information that 
follows recruitment in clinical trials: 
Mwale: But … how do you know that volunteers are 
informed as outlined in the information submitted to 
the committee for review? 
P: … we don’t have anything or any system or any 
documentation or record that shows me what happens 
during the consent process of a trial. What we have is a 
sheet with tick boxes that [show] the patient has 
understood what it is, but actually if you want your 
money you will tick those boxes regardless, which is 
why we have no record of what the patient person 
actually… understands [in terms of] what the study is 
involved with [in] regard to risks and benefits. Which is 
why I think we should have a patient’s own verbal 
record of what they think they understand the study to 
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be about, and what … they think they are actually 
signing up for (REC official 9). 
Mwale: So how do you make sure this information is 
communicated as outlined in the protocol? 
P: So we look through the papers and see that 
information is clear and that it is in lay language. But 
how this is done in practice is obviously not something 
that we monitor. Sometimes the information is good 
but other times it’s not clear and we have to ask for 
them to change [it]. But I also see what you are trying to 
say – [that] we need to monitor how consent is obtained 
and whether participants decide after information is 
given or not. But we don’t do that (REC official 10). 
These REC participants in response to prompting clearly felt that 
more needs to be done to address the issue and possibly improve ways in 
which information is given to participants, including subsequent 
monitoring of how they understood the information. Given the context in 
which decisions are made and the individual’s financial circumstances at 
the time of deciding to take part in clinical trials, it is difficult to take the 
view that such decisions are always purely and simply a matter of making a 
“well-informed choice”. There is no clear agreement on the impact of 
provision of information on people’s understanding of risks, not least 
because the matter has not been well studied in reference to healthy 
subjects’ involvement in clinical trials. Improving awareness does not result 
in better practices, attitudes and behaviours among healthy volunteers, 
because the provision of adequate information does not solve the financial 
problems they may have (Kamleitner et al. 2012; Mitchell and Mickel 1999; 
Watson 2003).  
7.3 Engaging with risk in healthy volunteer clinical trials 
as a norm 
As outlined in Chapter 5, taking part in clinical trials takes different 
forms. In terms of demographics, it is not just the young and unemployed 
who volunteer for such trials. Rather, as I have shown, participants come 
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from a variety of backgrounds and socio-economic circumstances. The 
number of clinical trials that take place in the UK is also indicative of how 
widespread healthy volunteering in FIHCTs has become. Taking part in 
clinical trials has for some become a habitual and rewarding practice (Lyng 
2009). While they may be driven by factors such as debt and 
unemployment (Lupton 1999), healthy volunteers in this study felt that 
engaging with risk had become normal for them.  
If I worked over the summer or work during term time 
I will work in a bar to raise money for fees and 
accommodation … To make 1500 quid in London, it is 
impossible, or I mean it would have to be a nice bar, 
and you have to work fucking hard … Whereas, if you 
compare to … volunteering in a clinical trial for a week, 
I earn more than what I would get if I worked, you see. 
So I am able to pay uni fees, travel around the city and 
pay my rent (HV5). 
You know, it is normal now to do things like this. You 
know, people I meet on the trials like me are graduates 
with professional postgraduate degrees. Ten years ago, I 
would have had a job, a house, a good car etc., but now 
it’s impossible. That is just a dream. You have no job, 
nowhere to live, maybe going back to live with your 
parents, but who wants that? All you can do is low-paid 
temping jobs. So I am left with no choice but do this 
[being a healthy volunteer] (HV25). 
The participants were generally well aware of the stigma they 
attracted by taking part in clinical trials, but felt that managing and 
engaging with risk in this context had become normal (Peretti-Watel and 
Moatti 2006). What was of topical relevance was the prospect of failing to 
manage and negotiate the risks and the possibility of being seen by their 
immediate families as struggling financially. Such failure was seen to be to a 
source of shame. There was a tendency to look down upon fellow 
volunteers who focused too much on the monetary rewards, who ignored 
risks by taking part in trials indiscriminately and on a regular basis, 
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especially if individuals persistently take part in very FIHCTs. Some saw 
this as a failure of personal responsibility:  
I was a little bit, well, I found it quite strange to be in 
that environment, but what was really strange is that I 
felt like a novice. Some people are really used to doing 
this and they do not see the problems that I saw. They 
seem to be coming regularly for trials, something which 
was quite unnerving for me. They are willing to do any 
trial regardless of the risks. It’s worrying because 
someone needs to think about the implications for this 
… It’s absurd (HV12). 
For me it was about reading the information and 
making sure I know what I am getting myself into. It’s 
shameful because [for] a lot of the people I have seen, 
it’s about the money and they pay no attention to the 
risks … they see how much they were going to get and 
they say, “Oh, yeah, I am going to do that one”. I think, 
yes, money does sway people’s perception of risks in 
these trials. It is interesting that people will do 
everything for money and sometimes people will take 
risks that they will not necessarily take if they will get a 
financial reward for it (HV19). 
Family members of most participants did not see clinical trials as 
an honourable way to make money; rather, it was taken as a sign of 
struggling financially and therefore a source of concern. Some decided to 
keep the matter to themselves. 
I decided not to tell them [the family] because they 
tended to be very worried about me. My brother said 
that I was putting money over safety, that I love money 
too much; why am I putting my life at risk? So I didn’t 
want them to worry, so I decided not to tell them, 
though my wife knows about it and she is very 
supportive (HV9). 
My mum said, “Don’t be stupid, it’s a silly idea. It’s 
reckless. You will make yourself ill and there is no need 
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for you to do that”. I tried explaining that it was safe 
but they said … in a way there was an undertone that I 
should do something productive with my time [rather] 
than getting myself involved in clinical trials. “Get a job 
or something,” she said (HV22). 
A major concern was to avoid being seen as reckless or as a 
“professional healthy volunteer”. Being a “professional volunteer” (Abadie 
2010), as discussed in the literature review, was associated with being 
reckless and greedy. This seems ironic; in a society influenced by libertarian 
concepts of the individual in which individual choice and liberties are 
accentuated, it seems that living up to wider societal expectations is still 
very important; while still motivated by the monetary rewards (Schutz 
1970), the volunteers were very keen to avoid being stigmatised. The 
concern over being stigmatised (Bendelow France and Williams 1996; and 
Peretti-Watel et al. 2007) also seemed to shape or influence the 
participants’ response to questions about risk.  
Yeah, I told them [the family] once. They were a little 
bit afraid for me; they did not have a lot the facts. I 
think they just heard it’s a trial and they were scared. My 
dad asked me to go back home if I was having problems 
with money. He will look after me, he said. Well, so, 
after some explanation, I was able to convince them and 
they reluctantly kind of okayed it [taking part in a trial] 
but still they are concerned [HV6]. 
Mentally I was younger, so I suppose it was like a jolly 
boys’ outing, really. I did not talk to a lot of people 
about it initially because they are not enthusiastic about 
me doing this. Because when I started, they would try to 
put me off. At the end of the day, it’s your life. Probably 
just one to two close friends and obviously [there were] 
some mixed reactions. And so I don’t want them to be 
worried about me so I kept it to myself. Mentally I 
would just close in, really [during] maybe a week in a 
hospital or in a unit (HV5). 
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Other volunteers felt they were failing to meet expected income 
standards and had to do clinical trials to make a living. Most decided to 
take part in the clinical trials upon seeing the advertisement, but mainly 
because of the money on offer; the information provided at admission or 
received before the trial was rarely of topical relevance. Most went through 
the admissions process by which point information had already been given 
and a decision to participate had already been made.  
I do often have the information needed, but you see, 
when you are in dire need of money, food and fees and 
all that stuff … It’s no need to tell me about the risks 
involved, you see. I want the money … that’s all I want 
and I can’t run away from it. It’s like being [between] a 
rock and a hard place (HV 5). 
Such statements highlight the limitations of the informed consent 
process. Clearly, being seen to be able to make informed decisions and 
being provided with information does not mean that individuals are 
making informed decisions. Participants generally responded to risk in two 
ways: those who saw the risks involved in clinical trials as inevitable and as 
comparable to any other risks in life, and those who saw risks as an 
imminent danger to be avoided.  
… but even as you walk in the streets you are taking 
risks and inhaling toxins and smoke and you may even 
get hit by a car but you have to trust that that will not 
happen to you (HV2). 
Well, you know, life is all about risks, even making soup 
in the kitchen is risky, and so [you] cannot be sure what 
will happen next. So that is the same with taking part in 
clinical trials. So every day is risky, even crossing the 
road is. So I am not nervous about it. So what we do is 
keep healthy and live a happy life (HV6). 
Mwale: What about the risks involved in clinical trials – 
how do you deal with that? 
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P: Well yes, there are risks, but so is life in general, one 
has to do what they have to do in life to make ends 
meet, you know, so it don’t worry me at all. Yes, I do 
think about “what ifs” [what if a trial goes wrong] but I 
do that in most things in my life (HV11). 
… I was absolutely fine with that. But I don’t know 
whether it’s because it’s to do with youth and, you 
know, this kind of feeling of infallibility and 
invincibility. And also believing that nothing bad will 
ever happen to you. You will always be fine … and you 
do see things as normal, you know, because they are 
there in all parts of your life (HV5). 
For these participants, being of a relatively young age they felt they 
were thus willing to engage with risk regardless of the potential outcomes, 
which they did not investigate too closely. As outlined in Chapter 5, 
questions about their motivations for engaging with risk made participants 
reflect on their decision to take part in clinical trials. Of significance here is 
how participants draw on everyday discourses when talking about their 
decisions for engaging with risk. The participants saw risk as something 
they engage with in everyday life; hence there was no difference between 
risk on the streets and risk in trials. Others used age discursively as the 
precursor of their involvement in clinical trials. It was common for 
participants to decide to become involved before examining the 
information about the trial.  
… I must honestly say it was pretty much when you see 
the adverts before I went to the screening. I looked at 
the money and looked at the work schedule, thought I 
could fit it around work and decided right away … I 
decided way before the screening that I am going for 
this unless they do not put me in because of tests. The 
first one, I was a bit cautious. I decided at the screening. 
Because the first time I was not sure what to expect and 
after that it became easy. I knew what they wanted. So I 
decided to do this regardless (HV4). 
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… You know, I also have to look at the fees and the 
time. Then I decide. By the time I go for checks I have 
already decided, I must say. I also looked at the details 
… and use that to make my decision. Once I have 
decided I don’t normally have second thoughts. Like 
right now, I have turned down some calls because I was 
too busy in the past. So yeah, I decided the times I saw 
the advert and did not go back on that (HV2). 
The prospect of monetary reward was often seen as 
encouragement in coping with the stresses, and pain and other problems 
they encountered in clinic trials.  
7.4 Trust and past experiences 
Some participants took part in clinical trials whether or not they 
had adequate information. The Nuffield Report (2011) states that central 
to good regulation and practice of research is the need for transparency; it 
is key in establishing the trust so necessary for individuals to volunteer for 
research. They are considered more likely to volunteer “if they are able to 
trust in the integrity, not only of the individual professionals involved, but 
in the organisational systems” that are required to ensure their safety, that 
their rights are protected and that the research will be appropriately 
conducted (Nuffield Report 2011). Some of the healthy volunteers 
interviewed in the study stated that their continued involvement in clinical 
trials was based on their past experiences of clinical trials. 
… there are certain factors that determine your 
involvement, you know. It’s your past experience, level 
of monetary reward, how long you are staying in for and 
whether your work schedule would allow, and on the 
par with money is the facilities and how good the 
facilities [are] (HV4). 
 Adverse experiences such as a trial going wrong or unexpected 
side effects often made participants suspicious of professional knowledge 
and expertise.  
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[After experiencing unexpected side effects]. It makes 
me lose confidence in the trial maker’s ability to know 
everything about the drug and its effects, and I do not 
trust them fully after this. I am becoming cynical. There 
is a limit to what they can know or predict and that 
makes me more hesitant (HV 25). 
On the contrary, incident-free clinical trials tended to lead to repeat 
volunteering.  
… but what was more interesting about the third one 
that I did, ’cause the second one I did no research for at 
all… I actually did the one in September and I did not 
do much research on what the drug was (HV5). 
I did some research on the drug before I got on to the 
first trial … but for the second one, the one which was 
cancelled, I did not even bother. The third again I didn’t 
bother. I thought it was going to be fine. But … the 
mental preparation when it came to staying in hospital 
for five days and all what it meant, I did not anticipate 
that (HV3). 
Previous experiences seemed to make participants comfortable 
with the risks. Some began to believe that the system was actually working. 
As shown in the quotations directly above, participants who had 
experienced no side effects in previous clinical trials generally had more 
trust in the system and did less research on the drugs that would be tested 
on them. This is interesting as it shows the complex nature of trust in 
operation in the professional and lay interactions (Walls et al. 2004). If 
things are going well people are likely to put their guard down and 
postulate that things will continue to go well. In addition, in this study it 
was seen that using past experiences as a measure of what was to come 
could lead to an escalation in the type of clinical trials in which participants 
took part. Some decided to volunteer even for studies which they claimed 
they would previously have shunned. For these participants risk seemed to 
diminish or become less relevant in the decision making process (Peretti-
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Watel and Moatti 2006). In other words if participants had no unexpected 
side effects, risk was not topically relevant (Schutz 1970).  
You start to think, because the people doing it 
[conducting the clinical trial] are professionals, and then 
you know they can be trusted, you know, to do their job 
right … then I am more likely to do it again and worry 
less. I trust that they know what needs to be done 
(HV5). 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Lash 1993; Tullock and Lupton 2003), 
the professional backgrounds of some participants – medical students, 
nurses and medical biological scientists, for instance – seemed to contour 
their views of and responses to risk and trust in clinical trials. They had an 
understanding of what the process entailed and generally had no problem 
trusting professionals to do their jobs.  
I have worked in research within medical settings. It 
means that I view the clinical trial itself differently, you 
know. I am more likely to do it because I know what 
needs to be done and I understand the language. I know 
how research is conducted and it’s easy to understand 
the processes and that dropping out of the trial is not 
good for the data (HV15). 
I know what goes into preparing for a trial. I understand 
what they will be doing and the value to society of what 
they are doing, and the consequences of having good 
participants (HV19). 
Their professional backgrounds also seemed to shape their 
responses to adverse effects during the trials. They understood the 
significance of the data and the implications of dropping out of the 
research. As a result, they often downplayed their experiences of side 
effects and were more inclined to persevere in the trials. 
I was very lucky. I only developed a blood clot at the 
last day and it was only a 12 cm one, which within 24 
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hours was down to 3 cm. So yeah, I was, like, very, very 
lucky but I was very aware of what was going on. … 
Erm, I did panic a bit but at the same time I was, like, it 
was the last day of dosing … I know some had, like, 
five or six blood clots, and really big, so yeah, but the 
progress made me feel better, but the clots were on the 
sites of the cannula stretching upwards, and everyone 
was panicking, saying if it moves to your heart or brain 
you may have a stroke or something like that. It was 
scary, you know, and maybe I am putting it mildly when 
I say we panicked. And I was, like, yes but, like, it was in 
the superficial veins and not deep veins. ’Cause like if 
it’s in your deep veins, that’s when it causes trouble. But 
well, I mean I felt fine about it but I think being in the 
environment had an effect on me as some of the girls 
freaked out a lot … I mean, if I hadn’t been a medical 
person then probably I wouldn’t have been happy with 
it (HV19). 
However, the participants with no medical background based their 
trust on their belief that the professionals were being truthful in the 
interests of professionalism. Most participants saw professionals as truthful 
and honest. However, this trust was often based on taking part in clinical 
trials that concluded without any side effects. 
[Talking about the risk of side effects] Yes, they said 
there were minor [side effects] and I trusted them to tell 
the truth because if not then they are outing their 
businesses on risk too. So they can’t lie. I did not have 
side effects so that was okay. The volunteers were all 
fine. Usually this happens in other trials but the one was 
okay (HV2). 
I trust that they would be honest … and give me the 
support I need. I don’t think they would lie, otherwise it 
will damage their image and reputation (HV15). 
For these participants trust was based on the view that 
professionals will be obliged to tell the truth because misleading 
participants would not be in the interest of the business. In doing so, they 
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positioned professionals as primarily motivated by the need to protect their 
business interests. This is interesting because it shows how different 
conditions resulted in trust. Particularly for participants in the first part of 
this section, the shift from suspicion to trust seemed to emanate from 
becoming familiar with proceedings. However, participants with no 
medical training thought they had no choice but to trust the professionals.  
When you are on the trial, you only have one option but 
trust. They are your friends at that particular moment. 
So you have to trust them. Specifically because it’s just 
medicines … So as long as the drug is fine, that it 
doesn’t matter to me. It brings me some money and 
new medicines are made, then I am fine with it (HV2). 
Furthermore, this shows how complex the notion of trust is in 
relation to risk when it involves lay public and professional interactions. 
Though participants might have been suspicious of professional 
explanations, in this research they eventually had to put their faith in the 
professionals (Walls et al. 2004). The conditions that brought about trust 
therefore were familiarity with research teams, organisational processes and 
routines, inside medical knowledge, and uneventful previous experiences 
on trials, while some felt that their dire financial situations meant that they 
had to trust professionals. This illustrates ways in which trust was born out 
of different conditions and impacted on people’s perception of risk.  
7.5 Risk and trust: negotiating and managing risks  
Engaging with risk generally became routine (Lyng 2009) for 
healthy volunteers. Central to risk and stigma avoidance (Peretti-Watel and 
Moatti 2006) is the ability to negotiate and manage risk. Some participants 
in the study acknowledged that they avoided very risky trials. Accounts 
were common among healthy volunteers participants who had just started 
taking part in clinical trials; similarly those who had been involved in 
several clinical trials talked of feeling the same when they first started 
taking part in clinical trials – that FIHCTs were very risky trials. 
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Yeah, I don’t want to be a complete guinea pig. I must 
say I would rather a drug has been tested on others 
before, or if it’s already on the market or the last stage 
and you are not taking the very high dosages. There are 
different phases, you see, like the phase I and the effects 
that come with it, so for me I wanted to avoid such 
trials because they are always associated with big 
complications. I would like to support science but only 
if it will happen in a safe way for me not being a 
complete guinea pig, no (HV14). 
I don’t think I could do any drug ones [FIHCTs] just 
yet, not with me hearing too many bad things 
happening to people. I don’t think I can do, like, a first-
in-human trial. I would only do it if it’s the very end of 
the stage in which they are trying it in people or they 
have done it several times on other people. I have seen 
drug ones [FIHCTs] before and when I have researched 
into them, they have kinds of side effects that I 
wouldn’t want to take the risk (HV1). 
Drugs that had not been tried first on humans were seen to be 
inherently risky, and mistrust of the system generally coloured the 
participants’ view of clinical trials. As a result, some participants initially 
shunned FIHCTs. 
How do they expect side effects [in first-in-human 
trials] if they have not tested the drug on anyone? But I 
like the other phase trials … They already know that the 
drug works, but even if it was phase three there is a fair 
amount of caution that should be taken when you are 
doing clinical trials. You never know. While I think it is 
really vital … that drugs are tested thoroughly before 
they are made available to the wider public, I think there 
is a toss-up in selling your health and whether your 
health is ever worth any amount of financial 
compensation that you may get from taking part in the 
trial, because you can never be 100%, 100% sure (HV5). 
Initially I thought, “I can’t do these because the risk is 
too high”. This is because the way the human body 
responds to drugs is different to the, say, animals like 
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rats [and] monkeys or whatever. You know, everybody 
has different enzymes and every species has different 
ways of dealing with drugs, so what may happen in a 
dog may be different to what may happen in humans, 
can’t be replicated in humans (HV19). 
When I started I was like “I don’t want to be a complete 
guinea pig”, so is started with drug trials already in use, 
but with time I have found myself doing more very first 
phase drug trials … (HV33) 
Participants had little trust in the institutions and systems involved in 
clinical trials. They tended to do their own research on active substances in 
the proposed investigational medicinal product (IMP) by browsing the 
Internet or consulting somebody they knew in the field. 
I went out of my way to find out about the company, 
found out about the drug, like really find out as much as 
I could before I did it … The first trial was also good 
because I had a friend who looked into the company 
and drug for me. And he assured me that it was sound. 
He himself is a scientist and he said they were an 
independent pharmaceutical company and they were 
being financed by some government (HV5). 
My second trial was with [name omitted]. That ticked 
my nerves because it was less organised in the sense that 
they did not have a schedule right away. Nurses where 
coming late and the instructions were not clear. Having 
those experiences therefore makes you less willing to go 
to certain places (HV4). 
Some participants said they researched a drug to reassure 
themselves that the risks specified by the CROs matched what other 
sources said about the effects on human subjects. This illustrated the 
extent of mistrust that some volunteers had of corporations, though CROs 
provided information about clinical trials, healthy volunteers did not 
entirely trust them. 
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I had already done all the research so I knew there 
wasn’t anything really to worry about in terms of 
anything going wrong. I think it was just going into a 
hospital knowing that I knew some of what they were 
doing … I could have trusted them and just took their 
word for it like that. I was not sure, like, obviously they 
were taking blood and I don’t have very good veins, so 
my blood is, erm, I am rubbish, so I wasn’t sure how 
much that equated to whether I was going to go on to 
complete it anyway so, erm, yeah ( HV5) 
The issue of trust was a consideration throughout their 
involvement in clinical trials. Participants felt the need to trust (Walls et al. 
2004) the professionals while they contended with the idea that 
professionals might not be entirely truthful about the risks.  
For me the most concern was that … even if I trusted 
the guys [professionals administering the trial], how can 
I know this is the drug they describe on paper and the 
effects they say it has? What if they write one thing on 
paper and give me another drug? … In the end, I had to 
convince myself that it is not possible, but even then, I 
struggle with that question every time I go into a clinical 
trial. I needed to be sure. I believe, though, that is it is 
possible, but in the end I just gave myself (HV9). 
I have some trust in these people, in the institutions 
doing their studies. When you are on the trial, you only 
have one option but trust they are your friends at that 
particular moment. So you have to trust them (HV2). 
The vacillation between trust and distrust among the volunteers is 
in keeping with Keynes’s view that individuals are not completely rational 
in their decision making (Keynes 2006). It is also in keeping with the 
argument of Alaszewski and Coxon (2009) that individuals use strategies 
that draw on existing relationships – intuitions that involve trust in 
maintaining relationships and distrust in circumventing individuals and 
events deemed threatening.  
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7.6 Safety in clinical trials 
Trust and risk are central to safety, which is key to determining 
whether a clinical trial takes place. Safety in FIHCTs has been a priority 
since the 2006 Northwick Park incident (Schneider, Kalinke, and Löwer 
2006) mentioned in the first chapter. Among the measures introduced after 
the incident was a process of dose escalation during trials: drugs would be 
administered in small quantities and gradually increased over time. Also 
instituted was a system of dosing participants in staggered intervals 
(Stebbings, Poole and Thorpe 2009). The regulations stipulate that a 
clinical trial will commence only if it has been certified safe by an ethics 
committee and the licensing authority. These institutions must conclude 
that “the anticipated therapeutic and public health benefits justify the risks 
and may be continued only if compliance with this requirement is 
permanently monitored” (Medicines for Human Use [Clinical Trials] 
Regulations 2004). The regulation makes provision for protecting subjects 
from physical and mental abuse and their rights to privacy in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act 1998. However, recent failures in clinical 
trials indicate how easily things can go wrong and the consequences this 
may hold for the subjects and for businesses. The next section examines 
professional and lay (healthy volunteer) views of safety and unexpected 
side effects in clinical trials. 
Professional views about unexpected adverse effects in 
clinical trials 
Among professionals, safety was perceived in two ways. This study 
identified those who looked upon safety as a functional issue independent 
of ethics, and those who looked at it as an element of the ethics process. 
For the former, safety was what they did, and some tended to follow 
procedures more flexibly than others. 
We don’t deal with questions of money and 
volunteering. These are the remit of ethics committees. 
We are focused on the safety of the drugs, you know. 
Questions to do with drug dosages proposed safe for 
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humans and things like that are our focus (Regulatory 
official 4). 
The ethics committees deal with issues of 
compensations. We have nothing to do with that. Our 
focus is safety, making sure units operate in keeping 
with guidelines, you know, and the drugs are safe for 
human use (Regulatory Official 6). 
The view was common among regulatory officials that safety, like 
risk, could be identified and dealt with objectively. For members of 
research ethics committees, safety was of topical relevance, multifaceted 
and closely bound up with ethics.  
I think safety is part of what we look at. We have on our 
committees different professionals to make sure we 
understand these issues well. You know, safety is quite 
broad for us. [It] includes recruitment processes, 
information, target participants and, of course, the issue 
of compensation. So … yeah, it’s quite broad I think 
(REC Official 10). 
Current or past members of ethics committees saw the entire ethics 
process as being about safety and much more complicated than just the 
active ingredients in drugs. It encompassed recruiting, the venue of the 
study, provision of information and especially the participant’s 
understanding of safety in the trial.  
What you want people to know when they taking part in 
a first-in-human study is that they are aware of the fact 
that basically you could die doing this kind of studies. 
And it starts there, I think. Unless people really 
understand that taking a drug that has never been tested 
on humans before … The risks may theoretically be 
very small but time and again we have incidents where 




For me safety is paramount and its starts with how 
people will be treated, including what they will be tried 
on, and ends with aftercare support in place (REC 
Official 9). 
Professionals generally expressed pride in the safety record of 
clinical trials. They felt that apart from the major incident in 2006 
mentioned above, there have not been any fatalities in the last three 
decades. They felt there was no need for the existing regulatory system to 
be changed:  
I have been doing these studies for at least 30 years, 
erm, erm. There is always – although the overall safety 
record is good – there are, of course, adverse events, 
erm, and the adverse events might not be due to the 
drug and other adverse events being things that you 
think are due to the drug. Yes, over the years [we have 
had] plenty, erm, of it [adverse events] but the safety 
records [are] overall good. But yes, you do get adverse 
events… You might be surprised that the most 
troublesome adverse effects come from not new drugs 
but ones that are already existing, that we use for 
comparison (Professional 6). 
…what I am trying to say is that HV studies have been 
going on for a long time without major problems. And 
one of the reasons that they are relatively problem-free 
is because the first doses … are normally low. So the 
whole purpose of … doing the first-in-man studies is to 
determine the safety and also to see the pharmaco-
kinetics of the drug. And so the dose is usually a very 
low dose and that is, erm, agreed by the pre-clinical 
assessors because it is based on guidelines from the 
FDA and recognised guidelines within Europe 
(Regulatory official 4). 
Professionals generally saw the drugs tested in FIHCTs as being as 
safe as drugs on the market. They noted that fatalities in clinical trials were 
very rare.  
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Healthy volunteer views of safety and experiences of side 
effects  
Contrary to professionals’ claims that safety in clinic trials was 
better today than in previous years, volunteers spoke of the fact that for 
them adverse events were common in FIHCTs. 
I have had some experiences like three or four times, 
where some of us were told to go back home because 
someone [volunteers] was experienced or had some 
unexpected side effects. Some of those were quite 
serious but obviously we were not told the extent or 
how serious. So kind of lucky it wasn’t me really but 
yeah it’s common (HV24). 
What we experienced was unexpected and out of this 
world. It was akin to being on LSD [or] marijuana. It 
was noticeable in such things as hallucinations and loss 
of track of time, lying in bed for five hours. And you are 
not aware of it, giggling and laughing … but yeah, it was 
crazy and scary and worried … because it wasn’t 
included in the list. And this is what happens, and I just 
got worried what more you expect (HV25). 
I have had quite a few such events but the most recent 
one was puzzling. But having said that it was a nerve-
racking experience. It is not, like, an enjoyable 
experience. A huge part of me at that time wanted to get 
out coz it was scary. And the worst thing was that we 
were not told about these effects. They were 
unexpected. The people who took the drug with me 
that day were all, like, “Did you feel that or this?” 
Others were hyper or just much more giggly, completely 
out of character (HV 29). 
The above accounts are interesting as they show how common 
experiences of unexpected side effects are in FIHCTs. In addition to 
accounts of experiences of unexpected side effects, participants in this 
research talked of how CROs might circumvent regulatory guidelines by 
avoiding the need to stop the trial. Some volunteers believed that clinical 
trial units managed events of unexpected side effects so as not to attract 
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attention and impede the progress of the trials. As mentioned in Section 
6.2, a participant who experienced unexpected side effects was told she 
had psychosis.  
They try as hard as they can to stop trials going bad, you 
know. It may hurt their business or profits. Whether 
they have concern for people or protect people, I think 
it’s more about protecting their image, interests and 
profits. And the cynical part of me would be to avoid 
such trials in the future but maybe do some reading 
around the trial. But not to put my faith in them 
completely (HV25). 
I was admitted in two trials a couple years ago that were 
cancelled because of the unexpected side effects. I was 
lucky. I was not the first person. We were sent home 
and never got called back for the trial (HV5). 
The above accounts shows how volunteers could be made to feel 
that there was something wrong with them, rather than acknowledge the 
effects of the drug. Slanted information given by the professionals 
(Hillman 1993) in the trial meant that questions of risk did not become of 
topical relevance to volunteers and hence they continued with the trial 
(Schutz and Luckmann 1974). The lack of information about trials that 
have been cancelled due to unexpected side effects was mentioned in 
Chapter 3. Cancellations of trials are said to be common, although there is 
either no record of such trials or such information is not publicly 
accessible. 
Volunteers’ accounts of unexpected side effects were alarming. 
Some felt that their complaints about such experiences would go unheeded 
and hinder their prospects for enrolment in new trials. Many expressed 
concern about the long-term impacts of taking part in clinical trials. 
Professionals responded to such views by noting that the body gets rid of 
drugs in a short time. Men and women alike raised the issue of 
reproductive health, although the women expressed greater concern. 
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I think [giggles] … I am still young, and I haven’t had 
any kids or anything yet. So I don’t want go into 
something that will jeopardise my future life. I am sure 
we all know that. We have seen on the telly people who 
have ended up with all sorts of, erm, side effects, so I 
don’t want to, erm … end up like that (HV1). 
My only worry was on whether the drug did not have 
lifelong effects on the body. I want to have family in 
future and so I was not sure these drugs would affect 
this in the future. So I wouldn’t have done a trial of that 
nature (HV3). 
Some women volunteers avoided FIHCTs, regarding them as 
unpredictable and dangerous, while men regarded the possible effects on 
reproductive as being not of immediate topical relevance. 
I am aware that doing trials may affect your sperm 
count and all such things, you know, but I would follow 
what the trials do. I don’t normally worry about this, to 
be honest. I do not find myself reflecting on the 
possibilities of a trial going wrong or not having 
children. Not my worry at the moment… (HV18). 
This is interesting as it shows how participants were aware of the 
long-term implications of their involvement in clinical trials in terms. 
However, it is also important to note the differences in the relevance of 
the issue of reproductive health between female and male healthy 
volunteers. For some women volunteers, having a family was not a 
prospect. 
It has never crossed my mind [having children] because 
I don’t want to have children and I don’t think I will, so 
really it’s not a problem for me (HV23). 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter has considered the connections between risk, safety 
and trust in FIHCTs. It was found that professionals hold strongly to the 
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idea that volunteers are rational and capable actors who are able to make 
informed decisions when provided with adequate information; it is the 
fault of the individual if he or she fails to understand the risks or fails to 
cope with side effects. Healthy volunteers contend with the widely held 
attitude that taking part in clinic trials is a reckless activity, akin to 
prostitution, and undertaken by morally unsound individuals. Some 
concealed their involvement from their families. Others took steps to 
avoid being seen as desperate volunteers and shunned FIHCTs which they 
considered very risky. Despite the stigma associated with being a healthy 
volunteer, for some participants in this study engaging with risk had 
become a habitual or familiar activity.  
The chapter also examined how trust impacted risk perception, 
showing how previous experiences, familiarity with staff and procedures, 
and prior experience of medical settings were crucial factors in shaping 
individuals’ trust in the professionals conducting the clinical trials. Also 
discussed was how unexpected side effects prompted some volunteers to 
question their safety and to reconsider their involvement in subsequent 
trials. CROs were shown to use the fragmented nature of the regulatory 
system to their advantage, downplaying unexpected side effects and 
slanting the information their staff gave to volunteers in adverse events in 
order to avoid the cancellation of trials. Professionals were generally found 
to view safety as functional issue. For REC officials on the other hand, 
safety was strongly linked to ethics, encompassing, among others, 
recruitment, provision of adequate information and aftercare support for 
participants in clinical trials. Many volunteers were less concerned about 
safety of the drug being tested than about the financial reward on offer. 
Most of them had decided to take part in clinical trials well before the 
consent process. The ethical focus on providing information at this 
moment to inform a rational decision rather missed the point.  
Using Schutz’s system of relevances brings about a nuanced 
understanding of the complexity of trust and risk taking behaviours. For 
instance in dealing with unexpected side effects by sending participants 
home is of topical relevance to CRO as institutions, as it means they can 
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keep the trial going and hence make profit. Therefore, giving slanted 
information becomes of motivational relevance. For the healthy 
volunteers, particularly for those with no medical training background, 
uncertainty of the clinical trials was of topical relevance and to deal with 
uncertainty in these contexts trust in professionals became of motivational 
relevance. Using Schutz’s system of relevances in this way therefore aids 
the analysis of both professional and lay conceptions of risk and safety, 
and also of institutional and individual actions. For instance, structural 
definitions of “normal work” influence healthy volunteers’ perception of 
their involvement in clinical trials including how they feel about 
themselves. In addition, participants’ accounts of trusting professionals or 
relying on previous experiences, which in Schutz’s terminology would be 
their stock of knowledge, relates to what Bloor (1995) refers to as a 
“monothetic” process of decision making in cases where individuals are 




Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction  
In this final chapter, I review the previous seven chapters to 
address the aims of this thesis. In the research, I have attempted to locate 
my analysis of policy documents and interviews with the actors in first-in-
human clinical trials in the institutional and social context that shapes their 
participation. This approach has been useful in developing a nuanced 
understanding of policy context and the experiences of healthy volunteers 
in FIHCTs. Contextualising the topic has enabled me to study healthy 
volunteers as subjects with the ability to resist and negotiate complex and 
often conflicting socio-economic and political milieus in clinical trials. In 
reviewing the steps I have taken in this thesis, I draw out the implications 
of the research as a whole. These centre on the adequacy of existing 
regulatory structures in protecting healthy volunteers and how risk in 
clinical trials is perceived by the actors. 
8.2 Policy and Regulatory Terrain  
I introduced the thesis with a description of the background 
leading to the development of healthy volunteering in clinical trials. It 
considered the commercial and regulatory context in which clinical trials 
take place, the growth of the pharmaceutical industry, public demands for 
cheaper, better and safer medicines and the government’s provisions to 
balance support for industry with adequate regulation and ethical 
oversight. Regulation of human involvement in clinical trials is discussed in 
Chapter 2. It is shown to be influenced by the bioethical conception of 
human subjects as being capable of representing their own interests. An 
increase in clinical trials and the growth of the pharmaceutical industry 
have made healthy volunteers a valuable resource for pharmaceutical 
corporations. In neoliberal terms, the state facilitates such growth under 
the banners of individual liberty and the free-market economy while 
volunteers are exposed to exploitation in an unequal engagement with 
powerful organisations and institutions.  
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The need for a policy and regulatory framework that deals with 
such challenges effectively and transparently is clear. However, business 
and healthcare priorities have undue influence on human involvement in 
clinical research and the role and experience of healthy volunteers. Legal 
and policy frameworks promote autonomy of individuals and markets to 
protect the safety of human volunteers in clinical trials, improve healthcare 
for the public, and foster business growth. However, pharmaceutical 
corporations do not necessarily share these commitments to the wider 
public good (Goldacre 2013; Rajan 2006). 
Policy discourse tends to present healthy volunteers as being 
positioned outside commercial transactions; it overemphasises altruism and 
voluntarism as motivations, as shown in the Nuffield Report (2011), 
despite the highly commercialised context of clinical trials. Anthropologists 
Petryna (2005), (Rajan 2006) and Cooper and Walby (2014) allude to the 
commercial and political contexts in which value is created in medical 
research and the practical challenges they bring, highlighting that healthy 
volunteers need more protection than the industry offers. Discussions 
about regulation and safety centre on the notion of informed consent and 
the need to protect patients, children and those considered mentally 
incapable of making rational decisions. There is also a tendency to conflate 
volunteers with patients, whether they are involved in routine healthcare or 
clinical trials, and to see the provision of adequate information as the 
solution to any ethical dilemmas that might arise in clinical trials. However, 
there is little understanding that the vulnerability of participants might well 
extend beyond matters of physical and mental health to include the socio-
economic and socio-political contexts in which they live. I draw on the 
conceptions of vulnerability of Turner (2010) and Fineman (2008) and 
look beyond the medicalised policy definition of vulnerability associated 
with victimhood or pathology. I argue the need for a broader view of 
vulnerability that challenges the idea of a capable, independent and liberal 
subject.  
Specifically in reference to healthy volunteers, consideration should 
be given to their financial difficulties, the social attitudes they contend with 
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and the routine interactions with professionals that influence their 
encounters with risk. This raises two important questions. First, if the 
regulatory framework ensures that individuals take responsibility for their 
decisions, will it be clear when things go wrong in clinical trials that they 
were deemed capable of giving rational consent? Second, what should be 
made of the uncertainties surrounding healthy volunteers’ consent for the 
use of their bodies in clinical trials?  
The problems raised by the volunteering in clinical trials of 
individuals who are financially needy or desperate and who may not fully 
understand the risks are not resolved in existing policy and regulatory 
frameworks. Regulation should take account of diverse social 
circumstances and of the interactions in which consent is given. On 
another level, the challenge is to ensure a viable commercial milieu which 
establishes FIHCTs as legitimate while facilitating the flourishing of 
science and industry to meet public expectations of better healthcare. The 
problem is that there is a tendency to position healthy volunteer 
involvement as existing outside of and separate from the commercial 
domain. While the potential for exploitation is acknowledged, monetary 
reward for participation is seen as compensation for volunteers’ 
inconvenience, discomfort and time in the trials. I argue for a discourse of 
policy on human involvement in clinical trials that addresses not only 
compliance with regulations, but also the need for a deeper understanding 
of how and why individuals decide to take part in clinical trials in the first 
place, and whether they bear too much responsibility for the risks they 
take. The policy and regulatory framework should consider the wider social 
context and the complex nature of the exchanges to guide human 
involvement in clinical trials.  
Regulatory and policy terrain – “fragmented” regulatory 
system 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the uncertainty associated with results 
and outcomes of trials elevates the importance of technical and practical 
aspects, and less attention is paid to the context in which the trials take 
place. This study exposes the fragmented nature of the regulatory terrain. 
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One reason for this could be that the process of regulating first-in-human 
clinical trials is relatively new. Before 2004, the application process only 
required ethics approval and peer review of the trial proposal (Castle and 
Marshall 2007). It is not clear how this was done in practice, what 
information was given to the ethics committee and whether there was a 
system to police applications. 
 Important changes have happened in the past 10 years and 
especially since the Northwick Park incident of 2006. The application 
process requires safety checks by the MHRA in cooperation with ethics 
committees. Dose escalation procedures are in place. Phase accreditation 
schemes have been introduced in which clinical trial units apply to be 
recognised as early phase trial units. Principal investigators in early phase 
trials are required to hold a diploma in human pharmacology. In response 
to concerns about fragmentation in regulation, the Nuffield Report 2011 
endorsed a proposal to bring about the establishment of a health research 
authority (HRA) to monitor practice, regulation and governance of health 
research involving patients. The institution has been set up, but as an 
authority and not as the agency responsible for organising and co-
ordinating the national research ethics advisory panels and the National 
Research Ethics Service. It remains unclear how the HRA is meant to fill 
in the gaps in the fragmented regulatory process. This is because at the 
core of the HRA is the NRES, which has always been in place, focusing 
primarily on organising and supervising local research ethics committees 
(LRECs). It remains to be seen whether its introduction has made any 
difference to the regulatory process.  
A key focus of the research was professionals’ views of regulation 
– pharmaceutical company researchers and managers, regulators and ethics 
committee members. In the interviews, it became clear that their views 
about the adequacy of measures to protect participants in FIHCTs were 
shaped by the institutions they worked for or were affiliated with. 
Professionals agreed that regulation today is better than before but that 
there is room for improvement. Members of ethics committees in 
particular expressed concern about regulating payments to healthy 
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volunteers, citing a lack of clear guidance. Their concerns were confirmed 
in the analysis of policy documents and guidelines. Some regulators saw 
the issue of payments as matter for ethics committees; members of ethics 
committee acknowledged their lack of influence in the matter. This 
illustrated how the regulatory framework for FIHCTs relegated issues of 
concern to healthy volunteers to the “no man’s land” of clinical trial 
regulation. Professionals working for contract research organisations 
regarded the regulatory regime as adequate. However, issues of topical 
relevance, as might be expected, concerned the impact of over-regulation 
on business. They feared that any more changes to the existing regulatory 
framework could drive business away from the UK.  
8.3 Accounts of motivations for involvement in clinical 
trials 
The study showed monetary rewards to be the primary motivation 
for volunteers. They generally did not want to be involved in clinical trials; 
rather, their decisions to take part were influenced by their social 
circumstances such as excessive debt, unemployment and inadequate 
incomes. For most, taking part in clinical trials was initially seen as a last 
resort or a one-off commitment to address an immediate financial need. 
Many became repeat volunteers, usually after incident-free trials and 
interactions with supportive staff. Participants also tended to feel that they 
owed researchers something in return for helping them when they were 
having financial problems the first time they volunteered. As a result, they 
expressed willingness to come back and volunteer even if, in some cases, it 
was free of payment or for reduced pay. 
A minority of volunteers cited altruism as a motivation. Others, 
motivated by monetary rewards, tended to justify their participation in 
ways that implied social acceptability. The term “volunteers” was found to 
be qualified by the complex social and financial circumstances and power 
relations in which the individuals found themselves. 
8.4 Healthy volunteering as “passive labour” 
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On the other hand, the unseen, and often unconsidered by the 
public, neoliberal forces that shape volunteer recruitment and interactions 
between the public and commercial medico-technological innovations 
contribute to how the public view their bodies in their engagement with 
risk. Bodies have become tools that are used to make a living by taking part 
in clinical trials for alluring rewards on offer from the research companies. 
Important contributions have been made to this discussion by 
anthropologists Fisher (2007), Elliott (2008) and Abadie (2010); their 
works have explored how socio-economic and socio-political forces 
influence healthy volunteer involvement in clinical trials. However, official 
government regulatory – specifically bioethical – and industry discourse 
has situated healthy volunteering as being mainly altruistic and voluntary. 
Human involvement in commercial clinical trials involves an economic 
exchange of the body. The healthy volunteers I interviewed were highly 
aware of the nature of the exchanges they were involved in and explicit 
about how they felt about the process. Those who talked of healthy 
volunteering as an exchange compared it to prostitution – a straight 
exchange of the body for money. 
Arguably, healthy volunteering has parallels with emerging research 
interests in surrogate mothers (Waldby and Cooper 2008; Cooper and 
Waldby 2014). The exchange in clinical trials is what I call “passive 
labour”. Accounts of such “passive labour” have parallels with Waldby’s 
(2004) concept of “biovalue”, in which biological products attain value in 
medical research. The healthy volunteer participants in this research saw a 
need to work on their bodies to maintain their value, even if they did not 
use the term “biovalue” to describe it. 
8.5 Rational consent, trust and risk 
The literature review began by considering how sociologists have 
studied rationality, drawing on the work of Wynne (1996), Horlick-Jones 
(2005), and Kemshall (1998), among others. While such studies have 
attempted to understand how people make decisions and view risk in 
uncertain situations, bioethical conceptions have been influenced by 
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conceptions of individuals as rational actors. Sociological discussions have 
drawn attention to the ways in which individuals are not always seen to 
make rational decisions for they are embedded in a social setting. Instead, 
their decisions, which might as well be rational, are often contingent on the 
context and situations in which they find themselves. Within bioethics, 
which is shaped by liberal assumptions of individualism, the principles of 
autonomy, capability and rational consent are seen as a necessary process 
and part of human involvement in clinical trials (Wolpe 1998). Despite 
many sociological and bioethical debates questioning the suitability of such 
assumptions of rational consent, consent based on the provision of 
information is central to the policies guiding human involvement in clinical 
trials. The consequences of the dominance of bioethics are illustrated in 
the discussion about the social context in which individuals make decisions 
to engage with risk. Factors to consider include relationships of power and 
trust and the socio-economic context, often featuring debt, unemployment 
and even homelessness. As discussed in Chapter 2, the bioethics model 
negates how these factors shape risk perceptions and decision making. 
Clearly, within the bioethical understanding of rational consent, there is 
little consideration of the underlying social processes and of how they 
influence reasoning (Kleinman 1999). 
I used sociological and anthropological research into human 
involvement in clinical trials to illustrate how these contexts shape decision 
making. Substantive research in this area has tended to focus on the issues 
arising out of the role of patients as research subjects in clinical trials – 
their responses, experiences and views, and questions of diagnosis and 
treatment. I showed how human involvement in FIHCTs is closely linked 
to new forms of citizenship and shaped by social and moral expectations 
of citizenship, which in turn influence public views and experiences of 
medical research. Rose and Novas’s (2004) concept of biological 
citizenship was shown to have resonance for human involvement in 
clinical trials. Current developments, such as the UK government’s 
growing support for the pharmaceutical industry in the development of 
science and improved healthcare delivery (Will 2011) and the creation of 
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the Biobank (Tutton 2009; Mitchell and Waldby 2010) are examples of 
ways in which citizenship is being reconstituted to focus not only on civic 
rights but also on the biological aspects of citizenship. In this context, the 
focus is on the duty of citizens to contribute to the development of science 
for the betterment of societal health. The discourse of healthy volunteering 
as a gift relationship has thus flourished. However, assumptions of how 
biological citizenship and gift relationships work in practice preclude wider 
discussion about individual moral reasoning and the milieu in which gift 
relationships and biological citizenship take place.  
8.6 Accounts of safety and risk strategies 
This study has shown how healthy volunteering tends to be viewed 
socially through a moral lens, with the result that those that who take part 
in clinical trials are likely to be stigmatised (Goffman 1963; Peretti-Watel 
and Moatti 2006). The participants in this research took steps to avoid 
such stigma by concealing their involvement in clinical trials. They also had 
to contend with the risk of adverse events, including unexpected side 
effects, from drugs being tested on them. Chapter 7 shows that for some 
participants in clinical trials, the topical relevance of risks is often shaped 
by the social circumstances in which decisions about risks are made 
(Peretti-Watel et al. 2007; Lyng 2009). For instance, when faced with 
mounting debts, they focus less on the risks in clinical trials than on the 
financial problem they are trying to solve. They may therefore not fully 
absorb information about risks. Their perceptions of risk were further 
influenced by the trust (Walls et al. 2006) they developed with 
professionals and institutions administering the trials and by their previous 
experiences of trials, especially in the absence of adverse effects.  
Some regulators – notably those involved in assessing trial 
applications and inspecting clinical trial units – saw safety purely as a 
matter of the composition of the drugs to be tested; safety for them was a 
functional matter that could dealt with objectively (Fiorino 1990). Seeing 
safety as independent of ethics in this way is problematic because the 
narrow technical focus excludes the important influence of power 
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relations, enticement and relative disadvantage in clinical trials. Other 
regulatory officials, ethics committee members in particular, saw safety as 
multifaceted and as encompassing recruitment, rewards and the degree to 
which participants are informed about the risks. The debate also highlights 
a lack of wider communication among professionals about the payment of 
rewards and its impact on the informed consent process.  
Regulatory and corporate professionals generally viewed healthy 
volunteers as capable and rational actors, raising questions about the 
relationship between privilege and agency and the neoliberal framings of 
contemporary notions of choice. Such a view of healthy volunteers is of 
motivational relevance to regulators and industry because healthy 
volunteers are regarded as being responsible for their involvement in trials, 
reducing the extent to which institutions will be held accountable for any 
adverse consequences.  
8.7 Re-reading Schutz: system of relevances and human 
involvement in FIHCTs 
Turning to Schutz’s (1970) system of relevances as a conceptual 
tool for explaining human involvement in clinical trials, introduced in 
Chapter 2, I critiqued bioethics and rational choice theory for emphasising 
rationality and capability in the decision-making process, noting that it is 
contingent upon issues of trust and power which individuals have to 
negotiate. The idea of rationality fails to take into account behaviours that 
may be habitual and thus undertaken without much prior thought. Besides, 
it overemphasises ability and choice. To understand healthy volunteering 
better, therefore, requires a framework that offers a wider view of human 
involvement in clinical trials, one that considers restrictions and resistance 
alongside rational and irrational, active and passive aspects. 
It is against this background that I adopted Schutz’s 
phenomenology of system of relevances in explaining human involvement 
in clinical trials. The theory focuses on actions or behaviours that are often 
overlooked and in doing so explores taken-for-granted behaviours – what 
Schutz refers to as the “world of routine activities” (Schutz 1970:139). 
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Although Schutz has been criticised for his reference to a philosophy of 
consciousness, for being overly subjective and for ignoring individual 
interactions with structures, power and how these constrain human 
behaviour (Goettlich 2011), the concepts he introduces can add to our 
understanding of this broader terrain of decision making. These theoretical 
tools help to analyse institutions, power, individual decision making and a 
range of social contexts. 
The significance of exploring human involvement in clinical trials 
becomes clear when we consider what Schutz calls “intrinsic” and 
“imposed” relevance. By this he means the ways in which relevances can 
be experienced as internal or imposed by external factors, such as laws or 
prevailing attitudes in society, or as voluntary or involuntary. Imposed 
relevances can also refer to the institutional context in which agency takes 
place – the rules, customs and values and the wider political milieu, 
including the capitalist economy – and how they shape how we experience 
and feel about ourselves and the choices we make. 
Turning to the data on healthy volunteering, it was suggested in 
this thesis that the system of relevance provides a tool for explaining 
healthy volunteers’ decision making. Few of them had considered taking 
part in clinical trials; instead, they had done what they could to make a 
living in more conventional ways such as getting a job. However, when 
confronted with mounting bills and excessive debt that could not be dealt 
with by using conventional means such as finding a normal job or 
borrowing money, and when presented with an opportunity to take part in 
clinical trials, healthy volunteering became of topical relevance – they had 
to think of the benefits of this option (in other ways a case of 
interpretative relevance) and its solving of their financial problems. This 
interpretation had to be in keeping with their existing stock of knowledge 
and yet was also shaped by wider institutional influences, such as the 
stigma attached to volunteering, the rhetoric of informed consent, trust in 
institutions, and the idea of the gift relationship and biological citizenship. 
In sum, these factors could be understood as motivational relevances. 
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While this applies to healthy volunteers’ motivations for taking part 
in clinical trials, the same can be said of their engagement with risk. Some 
volunteers saw engagement with risk as normal, simply an occupational 
matter. In this sense, their perception was well within the taken-for-granted 
realm of Schutz’s scheme of relevances, particularly when healthy 
volunteering became habitual and healthy volunteers became accustomed 
to the risks. As long as they were confronted with the same stimuli and 
same processes with the same outcomes, they did not consider the risks to 
be a problem. In fact, the more often they took part in clinical trials the 
less inclined they were to question the process. Additional factors, such as 
the trust they had in the professionals doing the research, provided the 
basis for the stock of knowledge they had regarding the safety of clinical 
trials. For most of these participants, the issue of risk did not require 
further investigation or explanation.  
However, the meaning of risk changed when trial participants were 
faced with unexpected side effects. Then they would question the experts 
who were administering the trial and look for explanations as to what may 
have gone wrong – an example of interpretive relevance. Some volunteers 
assumed there were rational explanations for why certain things were done 
a certain way. Others who experienced adverse events or had misgivings 
occasioned by a lack of satisfactory explanations by staff members 
shunned certain kinds of clinical trials or avoided further involvement 
altogether – an example of motivational relevance.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the decision-making process does not 
always flow in an orderly manner; rather, it is a fluid process. Some 
decisions are not just about addressing problems that can be explained but 
also about resisting conventional means of seeing the world. Some 
volunteers disagreed that their participation in clinical trials was reckless; 
they questioned common attitudes about work and saw their involvement 
as resembling paid labour, which often comes with risks. While a minority 
gave personal values and beliefs as their motivation, most cited the desire 
to resolve personal financial problems.  
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The “imposed” nature of these relevances related to ways in which 
healthy volunteers’ involvement was defined and regulated by institutions, 
which in turn enabled and yet constrained agency. Schutz’s theory is also 
useful in analysing institutional policies in showing that power and 
influence do not rely only on the presence or absence of capability and 
rationality, but also on the degree to which behaviours and actions are 
shaped by the “imposed” nature of the topical, interpretive and 
motivational relevances of everyday life. For instance, the labelling and 
stigma associated with healthy volunteering as an activity undertaken by 
people who are reckless arises from the differences in the relevances 
between those who do and do not take part in clinical trials. For some, 
initially taking part in clinical trials may not be of high relevance. However, 
in a society where what you do for a living is a marker of your success in 
life and reflects your social class and education, taking part in clinical trials 
as a volunteer becomes highly relevant. The supposedly objective 
interpretation by those who do not take part in clinical trials influences 
one’s view of her/himself and defines them as being part of the “in-group” 
– in this case healthy volunteers. Schutz’s theory offers a tool to analyse 
the perspectives of the individual who is subjected to prejudice and the 
institutional context in which healthy volunteering occurs.  
The differences in healthy volunteers’ attitudes about risk and 
strategies for dealing with it, as highlighted in this research, can certainly be 
understood through Schutz’s system of relevances. The healthy volunteers 
who talked of engaging in clinical trials without concern for the risks 
involved could not be distinguished from those who were careful about 
risks because of their differences in risk perception but because of the 
context – specifically their experiences of adverse effects or financial 
situation at the time they decided to get involved in clinical trials. Although 
for many healthy volunteers in this research, risk avoidance was topically 
relevant, they found that their decisions and actions were constrained by 
the social and institutional context in which decisions had to be made. 
Those who avoided risks did so by using strategies which gave them 
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control over certain aspects of the process, though only to a limited extent 
(Bloor 1995).  
Understood in this way, healthy volunteering is an engagement 
with complex power relations in a setting of competing and conflicting 
personal and commercial interests. It becomes clear that use of the term 
“volunteering” can be misleading and obscure the inequalities that give rise 
to the exploitation of human beings for the value that their bodies possess. 
Rather than seeing trial volunteers as reckless individuals, a more nuanced 
understanding of healthy volunteering would take account of the 
circumstances and context in which they decide to participate in clinical 
trials.  
This thesis has used Schutz’s theory of system of relevances to 
explore the ways in which individuals are able to reconstitute themselves in 
responding to their varying financial situations. It was shown that 
participants in this research, particularly healthy volunteers, recognised 
their participation in clinical trials as a commercial transaction, and they 
came to view their bodies and themselves differently. How they 
rationalised the exchange and devised ways of negotiating this complex 
relationship made it clear that they do not take part in clinical trials 
indiscriminately. On the contrary, their decisions were found to be 
contingent on several factors that challenge the normalised conceptions of 
healthy volunteers revealed in Chapter 5, which portrayed them as careless 
and motivated by a desire to make quick money. In fact, the volunteers 
interviewed in this study were found to be mostly educated and held well-
paid jobs. In view of the discussions in Chapters 6 and 7, it appears that 
healthy volunteering in FIHCTs provides a space for individuals to 
experience what it means to have biovalue and to be consumers and 
participants in the Western neoliberal marketplace as they challenge, resist, 
negotiate and exploit the commodification of their bodies in the form of 
passive labour. In this thesis I have highlighted both positive and negative 
aspects by suggesting that human involvement in clinical trials is not done 
out of an entirely free, unconstrained “choice” but that it is an outcome of 
the interaction of personal circumstances with wider socio-political 
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contexts which makes individuals get involved as they reflect on their 
social situations, practices and relationships within neoliberal capitalist 
economies. 
In summary, using Schutz’s understanding of relevances and their 
role in social interactions allows for a sympathetic concept of healthy 
volunteers, rather than the common but incomplete portrayal of volunteers 
as capable, rational subjects or as reckless and greedy. It highlighted ways 
in which involvement in clinical trials gives healthy volunteers space to 
construct identities informed by a sense of their biovalue. At the same 
time, Schutz’s ideas allow us to take into account how social-institutional 
relationships influence volunteer involvement in clinical trials. Far from 
seeing Schutz’s system of relevances as being entirely subjective, 
considering the imposed and involuntary aspects of his theory therefore 
requires taking into account the ways in which the vocabulary of bioethics 
and corporate interests give rise to the creation of biovalue and sets the 
terms on which healthy volunteers and corporations interact in clinical 
trials. However, there are aspects of human involvement in clinical trials 
that this theory cannot explain, an issue I address in the last section as I 
discuss the policy implications of my research. 
8.8 What could be done to improve protection of healthy 
volunteers in medical research 
There is a need to acknowledge that healthy volunteering is a form 
of work, which I have called “passive labour”, and thus to ensure the 
provision of safe and fair working conditions. This should go beyond the 
system in which consent is given, to clarify the processes for dealing with 
CROs to prevent bullying or coercion, problems that were described by 
some participants in this research. A framework in which impartial 
information and advice are made available to volunteers would be useful. 
Support services for volunteers in clinical trials are provided by the same 
companies that administer the trials, and it is possible that many healthy 
volunteers have faced situations they would rather have avoided if they had 
had adequate representation and impartial advice. Ultimately, healthy 
volunteers should have a bigger say in important decisions about the ways 
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in which first-in-human clinical trials are conducted and regulated. They 
have no platform to campaign for better conditions or improved rewards. 
By contrast, patients are represented by patient organisations and charities 
who ensure they get a better deal in clinical trials.  
The study has shown a need for robust discussion among 
professionals, regulators and healthy volunteers on how rewards are 
calculated, to ensure that they are fair and represent good value for the 
volunteers, rather than leaving it to the industry to determine what to pay 
them.  
Healthy volunteers should have a means to provide feedback about 
their experiences in clinical trial units – a web-based platform is one 
possibility. This could also be a forum to rate facilities and report problems 
about contracts, for instance, or payments when dropping out of a trial. 
Follow-up mechanisms after trials could be improved by providing clear 
guidelines about timeframes and for record keeping. The MHRA and 
ethics committees could be responsible for policing this. 
A major concern of mine at the beginning of this project in 2008 
was the lack of industry consensus on the use of volunteer registers to 
avoid over-volunteering. Since then the registers have been transferred to 
the HRA and NRES but the impact this will have in preventing over-
volunteering remains to be seen. Providing an EU-wide register would 
benefit the industry greatly by helping to ensure that volunteers are not 
over-exposed to certain chemical agents when taking part in clinical trials 
across international boundaries. There is also a need to investigate drug 
interactions in healthy subjects who take part in multiple studies and the 
appropriate intervals between studies. At the moment, although three 
months seems to be a standard time limit, there is no consensus among 
experts about drug interactions within this time frame. Such clarity would 
help to direct support and information in the right direction – including to 
human volunteers themselves. 
Clearly, the measures proposed here would provide better 
protection for human subjects in clinical trials. But would the 
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pharmaceutical industry support provisions that might affect its business in 
a system that it regards as adequate? Also, the proposal to give volunteers a 
greater say in decisions about reward and conditions in clinical trials might 
be difficult to implement because they are not found in one place; bringing 
them together, even online, would require a great deal of organisation and 
mobilisation, although databases now controlled by the HRA and NRES 
would facilitate such an initiative. Besides, implementing such changes 
would require substantial funding. 
 Implications for further research  
This was a qualitative study, juxtaposing perceptions and 
experiences of risks in clinical trials by healthy volunteers, regulators and 
professionals in pharmaceutical corporations in the UK. The findings 
reflect the depth and breadth of issues that influence human involvement 
in FIHCTs. Some issues that are not explored in this research deserve 
closer attention. First, a longitudinal study that follows healthy volunteers 
over long periods and through various clinical trials would have added 
another dimension to this study, by examining more closely the behaviour 
and strategies of healthy volunteers to avoid detection when over-
volunteering and of how they move between trials. However, a 
longitudinal study would have narrowed the participants and taken away 
the diversity of participants present in this current study. A strength in this 
study is that the participants were from a wide range of social situations 
and positions, something that is missing in existing research on this 
subject, for example in the US.  
Another topic for further research would take gender as a topic, 
exploring the different ways in which men and women experience being in 
clinical trials. The discussion in Chapter 6 raised the topic only briefly due 
to limited space. A study of the gendered aspects of healthy volunteering 
would draw on interviews and data analysis and would require a different 
kind of recruitment strategy to ensure equal representation. Likewise, this 
study could have considered the issue of race and ethnicity in the practice 
of clinical trials, and the same practical considerations would apply. The 
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sensitive nature of the subject in my study meant that I could not focus on 
this subject. 
A European comparison would also have added to my research by 
demonstrating how EU regulations are interpreted and implemented in 
different member states and by documenting the experiences of healthy 
volunteers in clinical trials across national boundaries and in different 
socio-political and economic contexts.  
Despite these gaps, this study has answered the four questions 
introduced in Chapter 1. It has added to research on human involvement 
in clinical trials in the UK, which mainly focusses on patient groups, by 
providing the first empirical academic account of healthy volunteering in 
FIHCTs in the UK and thus opened the way for further research and 
theoretical work on the topic. The study has raised important questions 
about the practice of regulation and about social justice and the value of 
human bodies in medical research to individuals. It has exposed the ways 
in which neoliberal assumptions frame the conduct of clinical trials 
through bioethical and regulatory discourses and influence the relationship 
between choice, individual liberty and inequality in healthy volunteering. 
This final chapter has reflected on the conclusions we can draw about the 
ways in which the risks and rewards in research participation are 
understood and shape motivation for involvement in clinical trials, and 
about the implications for regulation.  
In concluding six years of challenging but fulfilling work and about 
eighty thousand carefully selected words, it is only appropriate to return to 
what my intentions were in doing this research. My aim was to bring about 
debate that would lead to a reconsideration of how healthy volunteering in 
clinical trials is conceived by the different professionals involved, and even 
the public. I close with an extract of a comment from one of the 




Though you sometimes rather strongly criticised my 
field of work … [reading] this has made me start to 
think differently about healthy volunteers and why they 
take part in clinical trials. Maybe before I was naïve and 
did not consider how complex it is, and that payments 
and other factors have a greater impact on people in 
some financial situations than I had thought … I will 
not look at clinical trial advertisements or even trial 
applications on my desk the same (Regulatory Official 
8). 
I believe I can confidently say that this project provides a platform 
for developing a considered sociological understanding of human 
involvement in clinical trials which has at its root questions of inequality 
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Appendix One: Interview Package 
Interview schedule for ABPI  
1. Talk me through how you got into this job? 
2. What does your job involve? 
3. Have you ever been involved in responding to cases of adverse reactions in first in human 
clinical trials? 
4. How do you deal with cases of AR? 
5. I know the Northwick Park incident park incident is an extreme case, but did this have any 
impact on how you worked with industry? 
6. If so how? 
7. What is your view about the role of monetary rewards offered to volunteers in first in human 
trials? 
8. Does ABPI have any influence on how industry pays volunteers? 
9. What is your view about the argument that payments are an undue inducement on volunteers 
and compromise the informed consent process? 
10. Related to payments is the problem of over volunteering, what has ABPI done about this 
problem? 
11. What is your view about volunteer registers? 
12. Why in your view is there no consensus on volunteer registers in industry? 
13. Has ABPI been involved in discussions on this issue with the industry?  
14. In your opinion how is the current regulatory framework impacting industry? Are there 
too much regulations/ too little, etc. 
15. What would you say to the argument that ABPI has far too much influence on the 
regulatory process and should instead leave some of its roles to MHRA? 
16. What is ABPI’s views about what happens to over volunteers after the study? 
17. In the guidance that you give to industry on first in human trials, do you ever consult with 
volunteers on such matters? 
18. If not why? If yes how? 
19. Do you work with organizations that specifically advocates for healthy volunteer interests 
20. If not why?/if yes which ones? 
21. Are there issues I have not asked you think I should know about your job to better 




Ethics committee  
1. How did you get you involved in REC?  
2. Following changes on how FIHCTs should regulated in 2004, how has your work changed? 
3. Will you talk me through the assessment process? 
4. Are there any differences in your experiences of reviewing commercial trials applications 
compared to your experiences of reviewing academic or investigator-initiated trials? 
5. What is it like assessing reviewing FTIH clinical trials? 
6. What is your view about risks involved in phase I clinical trials 
7. What is your view about monetary rewards offered to volunteers? 
8. How do you ensure that the rewards paid to volunteers are appropriate for each study? 
9. In your opinion how adequate are measures to address this issue to ensure participants are 
not exploited? 
10. What contributions do you make to help applicants with decisions on monetary rewards? 
11. What does legislation say about rewards? 
12. What would you say about monetary rewards compromising the consent process? 
13. What would you say about the view that there is a potential strain on one hand to enforce 
regulations and the other the prospective therapeutic value that a drug may possess 
impacting on your practice as REC members? 
14. I know the 2006 Northwick park event was rare event but how did that make you feel? 
15. Have you ever been involved in investigating or dealing with trials that have gone wrong 
apart from Northwick Park incident 
16. Following the Northwick park incident a lot of work has been done to improve practice, 
what would you say about measures to address the issue of rewards in FTIH trials after the 
incident? 
17. In your work, have you worked or interacted with advocacy groups that represent HV 
interests? (or volunteers themselves?) 
18. If not why do you think it is so? (if yes what are they?) 
19. Recently the APBI issued a compensation guidelines to industry, where you involved in the 
drafting of the guidelines? 
20. Do you know if volunteers were consulted in the formulation of these guidelines? 
21. If not what do you think is the challenge in getting volunteers involved in such 
consultations? 
22. How do LREC network with organizations such MHRA & ABPI?  
23. How do you monitor the implementation of these guidelines in practice? 
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24. How does the LREC monitor the effectiveness and quality of the volunteer consent in 
practice?  
25. Are there things I have not asked you think I should know to better understand the/your 
role of REC or as REC member?  
 
Interview schedule for professionals in CRO’s 
Initial questions 
1. Tell me how you got into this job? ( Prompt What motivates them in doing this job?) 
2. Tell me about your early years in this field?  
Intermediate questions 
3. What is it like working as part of a team involved in first in man studies? 
4. Tell me your experience in dealing with uncertainty? 
5. How do you go about preparing participants for the trials?  
6. Have you ever had to deal with adverse reactions in first in man studies? 
7. Tell me about your experience in dealing with adverse reactions in studies you have been 
involved in? 
8. I know the Northwick Park incident park incident is an extreme case, but what were your 
observations with regards to volunteering in FTIH clinical trials after the incident in terms of 
numbers and interests?  
9. What kinds of people volunteer for first in human studies? 
10. Why do you think? 
11. What is your view about the monetary reward offered to volunteers? How is the reward 
calculated?  
12. What happens to volunteers after the study? 
13. Do you know of organizations that represent or advocate for healthy volunteers interests? 
14. How does your organization ensure that volunteer interests are considered in research? 
15. What are the main regulatory issues that come up in your work? 
16. Could you describe your experience in preparing for an inspection from GCP inspectors? 
17. How has your work changed following the 2004 regulatory changes? 
18. What impact have the changes had on the conduct of first in man studies? 
19. How has your experience with GCP inspectors affected how you deal with/view volunteers? 
20. How do you monitor/report the implementation of these guidelines? 
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21. In your opinion how clear are the guidelines from regulatory bodies with regards to 
monetary rewards to be offered to volunteers? 
22. Do you usually have the same people volunteering? (prompt How do you deal with this?) 
Ending Questions 
23. Are there things that have occurred to you as we were talking that you had not thought of 
before? 
24. Is there something I have not asked that you think I should know to better understand your 
work and experience in first in man studies? 




Interview schedule for Staff at regulatory bodies-Inspectors 
1. Tell me about how you got into this job? (follow up questions: What is your role? What 
motivates you in doing this job?) 
2. Could you describe your views about licencing and regulation of first-in-man clinical trials 
before your organizations got involved in inspecting first-in-man trial units?  
3. How have your views changed now that you are involved? 
4. Tell me what it is like inspecting units were first-in-man studies are conducted? 
5. How has your work changed since 2004 when your organization started to regulate first in 
man studies?  
6. Talk about challenges inspectors face in dealing and inspecting first-in- man units? 
7. Will you talk me through the inspection process? 
8. What is your view about monetary rewards offered to volunteers? 
9. Will you talk about the adequacy of current measures to regulate this issue to ensure 
participants are not exploited?  
10. What contributions do you make to make to help applicants with decisions on monetary 
rewards? 
11. What challenges does your organization face in dealing with this issue? 
12. The 2006 Northwick Part incident involving the TGN 1412 was an extraordinary and 
extreme incident, what were your feelings when you heard about the incident? 
13. What impact did the incident have on your roles as inspectors of clinical trial units? 
14. How does the issue of risk and safety of volunteers fit into your role as an assessors? 
15. What challenges do you encounter in dealing with issues of safety of volunteers in clinical 
trials? 
16. Talk to me about how you balance the potential strains on one hand related to regulating 
practice to promote safety and on the other to make sure the industry flourishes? 
17. How do you network with other agencies, such as LREC’s ABPI etc, in the process of 
regulating first in man trials? 
18. How do you ensure that wider EU policies are implemented on the ground? 
19. How does (name of organization) monitor the implementation of these guidelines in 
practice? 
20. How does (name organization) monitor the effectiveness and quality of information given to 





Interview schedule for volunteers 
1. What is your occupation? Current or previous 
2. What would you describe your ethnicity as? 
3. What would you describe your social class to be? 
4. How did you hear about the clinical trials? 
5. How did you get involved? 
6. What do you think about the recruitment process? 
7. At what stage did you decide to take part in the trial? 
8. Is this your first time as a volunteer or have you taken part in other trials before?  
9. If so, how long have you been doing this? 
10. What motivated you to take part in this/these trial/s? 
11. How important is the monetary reward on offer to you? 
12. Do you think you have all the information necessary to help you make a decision? 
13. What is your view about the risks involved in trials? 
14. Have you ever experienced any adverse effects from trial drugs in your time as a volunteer?  
15. If so how did you deal with that 
16. Do you think you have adequate information about possible effects and what support you 
would have in case of severe effects? 
17. Do you know of any channels of communication/support available for you if you have a an 
issue with during or after the research? 





CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
PROJECT TITLE: Risk, Reward and Regulation: Exploring Regulatory and 
Ethical Dimensions of Human Research Participation In 





I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the  
 project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I may keep for 
records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to  
- Be interviewed by the researcher 
- Allow the interview to be audio taped 
- Make myself available for a further interview should that be required 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I disclose will 
lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by the researcher or by 
any other party. 
I understand that data and interview transcripts will be anonymised to prevent my identity from being 
made public. 
 I also understand that my participation is voluntary, that I am not under any obligation to answer 
questions and I can choose to participate in part or in full of the project and that I can withdraw from 
the project at any time I wish to without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 I also agree that the information obtained in this project can be used in further research 
projects which have research governance approval as long as any information that can be used to 







         
 
Participation information sheet- Healthy Volunteers 
Title of research: 
Risk, Reward and Regulation: Exploring Regulatory and Ethical Dimensions of Human 
Research Participation in phase I (first in man) clinical trials in the United Kingdom 
What is the research about? 
As part of my PhD (DPhil) studies at the University of Sussex I am carrying out a piece of research 
focusing on the regulatory and ethical aspects of first in man trials. I am particularly interested in 
finding out people’s motivation for involvement in clinical trials, the role of financial rewards and their 
impact on the informed consent. Furthermore, I would like to find out if there are existing interest 
and advocacy organizations interested in voicing concerns for healthy volunteers and how presence or 
lack of such institutions impacts on the ethical practice of first in man trials. 
This project and the researcher are independent of the clinical study you are taking part in and your 
involvement or findings of this study will not affect or jeopardize your arrangements or agreements 
with the organization that has recruited you to take part in the trial. 
What will my participation involve? 
There are two sides to your participation in this project: 
1. Observations 
With prior permission to the company running clinical trials, I will be observing you during the time 
you are taking part in the clinical trial. My observations will be focus on the processes and regimes that 
are in place for you during the time you are in this trial and not on your character or behaviour. I will 
also focus on the interactions between staff and volunteers. My observations will not be discussed 
with any of the company officials and will not in any way affect your present or future involvement in 
clinical trials with this company 
2. Interviews 
At the end or towards the end of the clinical study, the second part will be an interview with you. The 
interview will aim at discussing your opinions about your experience of involvement in clinical trial/s, 
your views about aspects of clinical trials such as decision making, availability of support networks, 
risks and benefits. You will choose when you want to be interviewed and how. Therefore, this would 
take a face-to-face conversation or a telephone conversation. We may also talk about your history of 
involvement in clinical trials. 
3. After interview 
I will transcribe the interview, which is to put the interview on paper. If you are willing, you will be 
able to review these texts and highlight anything you think was a misquotation or misinterpretation of 
your account. 
How will the information shared in interviews be recorded? 
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With your permission, verbalised interviews (face to face or telephone interviews) will be audio 
recorded. Only the researcher will have access to them. It is possible that I will also take a few notes 
during the interview. 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
Together with the information gather during observations and interviews with other informants, the 
information you share may be used to inform my DPhil thesis and possibly published articles or 
conference speeches. In each case, anonymity will be ensured. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality: 
In accordance with the Data Protection Act, 1998, all research data, together with any personal 
information which may be collected during the research process, will be securely and anonymously 
stored in password protected files on a password protected system. All information will be destroyed 
once the research is completed.  
Can I change my mind about participation? 
Yes at any time you wish you can withdraw from participating, and if you decide that you do not want 
information that you already shared to be included in the research this will be done. You are free to 
with draw consent until such a time that this is no longer practical. If you wish to withdraw please 
contact me on sm388@sussex.ac.uk 
If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me: sm388@sussex.ac.uk or PG 
Pigeon Holes, Friston Building, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9SP. 
Shadreck Mwale 
DPhil Candidate, Department of Sociology 






       
Participation information sheet- Professionals from regulatory bodies 
Title of research: 
Risk, Reward and Regulation: Exploring Regulatory and Ethical Dimensions of Human 
Research Participation in phase I (first in man) clinical trials in the United Kingdom 
What is the research about? 
As part of my PhD (DPhil) studies at the university of Sussex I am carrying out a piece of research 
focusing on the regulatory and ethical aspects of first in man trials. I am particularly interested in 
finding out people’s motivation for involvement in clinical trials, the role of financial rewards and their 
impact on the informed consent, risk perception and participation in clinical trials. Furthermore I 
would like to find out if there are existing interest and advocacy organizations interested in voicing 
concerns for healthy volunteers and how presence or lack of such institutions impacts on the ethical 
practice of first in man trials, and in turn explore the adequacy of current regulations in the provision 
of protection to UK citizens who volunteer in such trials. 
What will my participation involve? 
1. Interviews 
Your involvement in this study will be an interview with you. The interview will aim at discussing your 
opinions about your experience of regulating in clinical trial/s, your views about aspects of clinical 
trials such as decision making, availability of support networks, risks and benefits and issues associated 
with regulation of first in man trials. You will choose when you want to be interviewed and how. 
Therefore this would take a face to face conversation or a telephone conversation. We may also talk 
about your history of involvement in clinical trial regulation in general. 
2. After interview 
I will transcribe the interview, if you are willing you will be able to review these texts and highlight 
anything you think was a misquotation or misinterpretation of your account. 
 How will the information shared in interviews be recorded? 
With your permission, verbalised interviews (face to face or telephone interviews) will be audio 
recorded. Only the researcher will have access to them. It is possible that I will also take a few notes 
during the interview. 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
Together with the information gather during observations and interviews with other informants, the 
information you share may be used to inform my DPhil thesis and possibly published articles or 
conference speeches. In each case anonymity will be ensured. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
In accordance with the Data Protection Act, 1998, all research data, together with any personal 
information which may be collected during the research process, will be securely and anonymously 
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stored in password protected files on a password protected system. All information will be destroyed 
once the research is completed.  
Can I change my mind about participation? 
Yes at any time you wish you can withdraw from participating, and if you decide that you do not want 
information that you already shared to be included in the research this will be done. You are free to 
with draw consent until such a time that this is no longer practical. If you wish to withdraw please 
contact me on sm388@sussex.ac.uk 
If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me: sm388@sussex.ac.uk or PG 
Pigeon Holes, Friston Building, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9SP. 
Shadreck Mwale 
DPhil Candidate, Department of Sociology 





Participation information sheet- Professionals from Contract Research Organizations (CRO) 
Title of research: 
Risk, Reward and Regulation: Exploring Regulatory and Ethical Dimensions of Human 
Research Participation in phase I (first in man) clinical trials in the United Kingdom 
What is the research about? 
As part of my PhD (DPhil) studies at the University of Sussex I am carrying out a piece of research 
focusing on the regulatory and ethical aspects of first in man trials. I am particularly interested in 
finding out people’s motivation for involvement in clinical trials, the role of financial rewards and their 
impact on the informed consent. Furthermore I would like to find out if there are existing interest and 
advocacy organizations interested in voicing concerns for healthy volunteers and how presence or lack 
of such institutions impacts on the ethical practice of first in man trials. I also want to find out about 
the interpretation and practical implementation of regulatory guidelines by CROs. 
It is also important to stress that this project is independent of the CRO and your participation in this 
project will not be discussed with your employers neither shall it jeopardize your current or future 
employment. 
What will my participation involve? 
There are two aspects to your participation in this project: 
1. Observations 
With prior permission to the company running clinical trials I will be observing you during the time 
you are administering/supervising the clinical trial. My observations will be focused on the processes 
and regimes that are in place for you during the time you are administering this clinical trial and not on 
your character or behaviour. I will also focus on the interactions between staff and volunteers. My 
observations will not be discussed with any of the company officials and will not in any way affect 
your present or future employment with this company or any other 
2. Interviews 
 During the course of the clinical trial there will be an interview with you. The interview will aim at 
discussing your opinions about your experience of administering in clinical trial/s, your views about 
aspects of clinical trials such as decision making, availability of support networks, risks and benefits, 
how you implement guidelines. You will choose when you want to be interviewed and how. Therefore 
this would take the form of a face to face conversation or a telephone conversation. We may also talk 
about your history of work in clinical research. 
3. After interview 
I will transcribe the interview, and if you are willing you will be able to review these texts and highlight 
anything you think was a misquotation or misinterpretation of your account. 
How will the information shared in interviews be recorded? 
With your permission, verbalised interviews ( face to face or telephone interviews) will be audio 
recorded. Only the researcher will have access to them. It is possible that I will also take a few notes 
during the interview. 
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What will happen to the information I provide? 
Together with the information gather during observations and interviews with other informants, the 
information you share may be used to inform my DPhil thesis and possibly published articles or 
conference speeches. In each case anonymity will be ensured. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
In accordance with the Data Protection Act, 1998, all research data, together with any personal 
information which may be collected during the research process, will be securely and anonymously 
stored in password protected files on a password protected system. All information will be destroyed 
once the research is completed.  
Can I change my mind about participation? 
Yes at any time you wish you can withdraw from participating, and if you decide that you do not want 
information that you already shared to be included in the research this will be done. You are free to 
with draw consent until such a time that this is no longer practical. If you wish to withdraw please 
contact me on sm388@sussex.ac.uk 
If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me: sm388@sussex.ac.uk or PG 
Pigeon Holes, Friston Building, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9SP. 
Shadreck Mwale 
DPhil Candidate, Department of Sociology 
University of Sussex 
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Appendix Two: Survey questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
Title: Healthy volunteer views and Experiences in First time-in-human clinical trials 
Consent information 
Purpose of the Study: 
This questionnaire is part of a university of Sussex PhD research project on regulation and ethics in 
first-in-human clinical trials being conducted by Shadreck Mwale. One of the aims of this project is to 
document and collate views of healthy volunteers on their experiences with the hope of developing 
and understanding volunteer experience. To achieve this we would like to hear from healthy 
volunteers on their views on aspects of the clinical trial process.  
Confidentiality: 
Your responses will be kept completely confidential. Note that this research is for a PhD study at 
the University of Sussex and that your responses will NOT IN ANYWAY disqualify you, on the 
basis of your responses to this survey, from any future involvement in any clinical trial. However, it is 
being administrated by Richmond Pharmacology because they share an interest in improving relations 
with volunteers, with the intention of improving the volunteering experience.  
Decision to quit at any time: 
Your participation is voluntary; you are free to withdraw your participation from this study at any 
time. If you do not want to continue, you can simply leave this website. If you do not click on the 
"submit" button at the end of the survey, your answers and participation will not be recorded. You 
also may choose to skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. Should you wish to withdraw 
your responses after completing the survey from inclusion in the final report, you are free to do so 
until such a time that this is not practically possible. To withdraw from participation at any stage email 
s.mwale@sussex.ac.uk. 
How the findings will be used: 
The results of the study will be used for scholarly purposes only. The results from the study will be 
presented in educational settings and at professional conferences, and the results might be published 
in a professional journal in the field of Sociology and bioethics. Because we will ask you about a 
number of different aspects of volunteering in clinical trials, it is likely that we will use your data to 
address multiple questions regarding Healthy volunteer experiences. 
Contact information: 
If you have concerns or questions about this study, please contact Shadreck Mwale on 
s.mwale@sussex.ac.uk. By beginning the survey, you acknowledge that you have read this information 
and agree to participate in this research 
 Thanks in advance for your help and support. 
 
Part 1- How you get involved 
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1. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being not useful at all and 5 very useful) please rate how useful the 
following are as sources of information about up-coming clinical trials for you? (select one 
box per row) 
2. How many trials have you participated in since becoming a volunteer? 
(Please give a number)  
3. Do you only take part in clinical trials run by a specific clinical trials unit, or do you go wherever 
there are studies recruiting? (please select one) 
a. Yes                                  b.  No  (Go to Q5) 
4. If you only volunteer for a specific Unit, on a scale of 1-5 (1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly 
agree) please state how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements as reasons 
for doing so. (Please Select one per row) 
 Strongly 
disagree 
disagree Not sure agree Strongly 
Agree 
They pay good 
rates                      
1 2 3 4 5 
I am familiar with 
staff 
1 2 3 4 5 
The facilities are 
good 
1 2 3 4 5 
Other (please state) [Free Text] 
 
5. If you go to different units, on a scale of 1-5 (1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree) state 
how strongly you disagree or agree with the following statements as reasons why? (Please select 
one per row) 










a. Network of healthy 
volunteer friends 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Websites  1 2 3 4 5 
c. Print media (newspaper or 
magazine) 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Emails from Clinical 
Research Units 
1 2 3 4 5 













 1 2 3 4 5 
I am likely to take part in more trials 1 2 3 4 5 
The variation in rates paid means I choose where 
to get a good deal 
1 2 3 4 5 
Other reason please specify............................ [Free Text] 
 
Part 2 -Most recent involvement 
6. Thinking about the most recent trial you took part in, 
A. How long ago was it? (Please select one choice only) 
i) Less than a month 
ii) 1-3 months 
iii) 4-6 months 
iv) More than 6 months   
B. How did you hear about it (select one choice only) 
i) Through friends 
ii) Websites 
iii) Text from research company 
iv) Newspaper/magazine 
v) Other please state[Free Text Box]…………………………………………. 
C. How long did the trial last (including follow up days where appropriate? (select one 
choice) 
i) 1-7 days 
ii) 1-2 weeks 
iii) More than 2 weeks 































iv) More than £2000 
E. What was your employment status at the time? select any two that apply 
         
I.  Employed             
II. Employed Part-time 
III. Student Full-Time 
IV. Student Part-Time 
V. Not employed at all 
 Part 3- Deciding to take Part 
7. Thinking of the most recent trial you took part in, on a scale of 1-5 (1=strongly disagree and 5= 
strongly agree) state how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements stating at 
what stage you decide to take part in any clinical trial? (select one box per row) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
After considering information about the trial and reward on offer        1 2 3 4 5 
After consultations with family and friends    1 2 3 4 5 
After receiving further information about the trial during admission 1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. On a scale of 1-5 (1 being least important and 5 being very important) please rate how you 
consider the following to be important for you before deciding to take part in a clinical trial? 
(Please select one box per row) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
how the trial dates fit into my work schedule 1 2 3 4 5 
The monetary compensation on offer 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
How long you have to stay in the unit 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
How many follow up visits you have to make 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The potential risks involved in the trials 
 








Which unit is carrying out the study? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
The perceived level of discomfort you may have to endure  1 2 3 4 5 
 
9. Thinking about the most recent trial you volunteered in, on a scale of 1-5 (1 being very 
unsatisfied and 5 very satisfied) how do you rate your satisfaction with the information given to 





10. In generally on a scale of 1-5 (1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree) state how strongly 
you agree or disagree with the following statements as reasons for volunteering in clinical trials. 
(Please select one box per row) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
The monetary compensation on offer is important in my 
decision to take part               
1 2 3 4 5 
The purpose of the potential drug was important in my decision 
to take part 
1 2 3 4 5 
The desire to help in the advancement of science is important in 
my decision to take part 
1 2 3 4 5 
To help in the development of drugs that could potentially save 
lives 
1 2 3 4 5 




11. Imagine you were sent a text/sms about a trial that needed participants urgently. For each of 
the following statements please indicate your likelihood of taking part in a trial on a scale of 1-5. 
(1 being Extremely unlikely and 5 Extremely likely) (select one box per row) 
Very 
unsatisfied 




          1          2         3           4            5 
 1
  
2 3  4 5 











12. As part of the study I would like to talk in more detail with some healthy volunteers in a brief 
interview. Would you be willing at your convenience to take part in a confidential interview? In 
return you will be given a £20 Amazon voucher. 
a. Yes                             b. No 
13. If so, please provide your contact details ( email or Phone number) so this can be arranged 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
ABOUT YOURSELF 







a. Male  
b. Female 
16. What is your highest level education qualification (please select one) 
a. Degree or higher degree     
b.  Higher educational qualification below degree level 
c.  A levels or Higher 
d.  ONC/BTEC 
e. O level  
f. GCSE  
2. I would still take part if paid £200 for a 5 day, 5 night stay 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I would take part even if it has been less than 4 weeks since my 
last trial 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. If paid £1000 for a 5 day overnight stay I would take part despite 
the potential risks of the trial  
1 2 3 4 5 

















g.  Other qualifications (inc foreign qualifications below degree level) 
h.  No formal qualifications 
i. Don't know 
17.    Apart from volunteering in clinical trials are you (Please select one or fill in accordingly) 
a. Employed full time  
b. Employed Part-time  
c. unemployed 
d.  if you are employed please state your occupation (i.e. Teacher; 
plumber)………………………)[FREE TEXT BOX] 
e. if you are unemployed/employed are you  
1. Full-time Student  
2. Part-time student 
3. None of the above 
18. If you are employed, how much is your annual income (select one) 
 
a. Less than £10,000 
b. £10,000-£15,000 
c. £16,000-£20,000 
d. More than £21,000 
e. Prefer not to say 
19. How would you describe your marital status (Select one) 
a. Married 
b. In a relationship but not married 
c. Single  
d. Widowed 
e.  Divorced 
20. Do you have any dependants 
Yes                      No (Go to Q 22) 
21.  If yes how many dependents do you have? (State number) ............... 


























Asian Indian       
Other Asian please specify…[FREE TEXT BOX] 
Black African 
Black Caribbean  
Mixed 
White Caucasian  
              Other Ethnic group please specify...[FREE TEXT BOX] 
23. How would you describe your nationality (Please select one and/or write accordingly) 
a. British national  
b. British Resident but EU national (Please state country)  
c. EU national Resident in an EU Country (please state country) 
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